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1 
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION  
International climate technology transfer serves a broad set of different purposes covering 
global climate goals, national development aspirations, and companies’ profit motives. It is 
affected by socio-political and technical factors at different levels (global, national and local) 
where different entities intervene and influence the processes (Byrne et al. 2010). 
International climate technology transfer is shaped and reshaped by the decisions made at 
multi-level structures (international discourses, national policies, and firm practices). A 
change occurring at one level affects the technology transfer at other levels through either 
top-down or bottom-up processes. Research is needed to revisit and reinterpret existing 
theories and empirical evidence targeted directly at understanding the considerations which 
characterize climate technology transfer at the intersection of international climate policy, 
national development aspirations and firm level profit motives. A study into multi-level 
processes should provide information on the synergies of decision-making structures, and be 
based on analytical analysis of socio-political and technical factors.  
This doctoral thesis is a response to the need for an academic contribution to fill a 
knowledge gap in the understanding of international climate technology transfer by 
examining relationships between multi-leveled decision structures for climate technology 
transfer. The PhD study (a) considers new phenomenon in developing countries, (b) looks at 
the different actors and the specific modalities of transfer and, (c) locates climate technology 
transfer as a response to climate change at the interface between relationships of the multi-
leveled decision making structures: firm practices, national policies, and international 
discourses. 
 
The motivation for this doctoral thesis includes the following four components. 
 
Firstly, the thesis is responding to rapidly changing knowledge in the understanding of 
international technology transfer. The subject of technology transfer is not new to scientific 
researchers and practitioners; however, current global discussions, the national approaches 
and local practices of technology transfer need to respond to at least three key changes: 
(a) The effort of combating climate change has brought the international technology transfer 
discussion into the center of global debate and national development focus. Climate change 
requires a global response, encompassing the North and the South, local and global 
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communities, and public and private sectors. There is broad agreement among politicians, 
practitioners and researchers on the critical role of international technology transfer for 
effective global response to the climate change challenges, involving both mitigation 
measures and adaptation activities (Bell 2012; Forsyth 1998; Heaton et al. 2000; MacDonald 
1992). 
(b) A number of developing nations have become much more technologically sophisticated. 
While developed countries account for the bulk of innovation even in climate technologies, 
large emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil are already among the leaders in 
some areas of technology. There are major changes in the numbers of trained scientists and 
technologists, the level of science-based industry, and the magnitude of national scientific 
research and financing programs (Dechezleprêtre 2010; Baron 1993). This change is, of 
course, greater for the middle-income nations and much weaker for poor nations. There is, 
therefore, wide heterogeneity across developing countries themselves. The difference in 
economic advancement and technological sophistication among developing countries has 
enabled the flow of technology from one developing country to another through south–south 
cooperation. Today, the transfer of climate technologies between developing countries is not 
only an attractive suggestion for possible evolution of the current exchange of knowledge, 
but also represents an important reality in technological cooperation across countries. 
(c) The world is now globalized in the sense that free trade has spread and, in many 
industries, economies of scale now favor production facilities that serve more than one 
nation. In the era of globalization governance, issues have moved to a global level in 
response to a growing recognition of planetary interdependence. Globalization has improved 
access to technological latecomers to advanced technologies. It reduces the technology gap 
and has raised the level of productivity in developing countries (Archibugi and Lammarino 
1999; Helpman and Hoffmaister 1997). However, fulfilling the promise for fostering less 
crisis-prone, more climate resilient, and more sustainable globalization is still a concern for 
the promotion of appropriate technology transfer. 
 
Secondly, this doctoral thesis responds to the urgent need to act on climate change by 
providing empirical evidence on the relationships between the three levels of decision 
making structures: international climate policy debates, national development approaches, 
and local implementation. The interconnection between the three levels of decision-making 
structures for climate technology transfer is important to help avoid irreversible changes 
associated with dangerous levels of human-induced climate change. There is a need to 
systematically examine the multi-leveled decision processes for technology transfers that are 
important for meeting climate change mitigation and adaptation goals. However, the literature 
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specific to climate technology transfer is relatively recent, and does not focus on the interplay 
between multiple levels (Dechezlepretre et al. 2011; Doranova et al. 2010; Schneider et al. 
2010; Seres et al. 2009; Youngman et al. 2007). Studies on transfer of climate technologies 
are vital for informed global debates and evidence-based local decisions for more timely and 
direct responses to the specific challenges raised by climate change. Analysis on the extent 
to which local level climate technology transfer practices are reflected at the international 
climate policies, and the level of inclusion of international agreements in national policies and 
firm level practices, is vital for effective transfer of climate technologies to mitigate climate 
change. 
 
Thirdly, the research presented in this thesis attempts to contribute to the efforts for rapid 
transition of low carbon climate resilient development pathways in developing countries 
through the understanding of relationships between the three levels of decision-making 
structures for climate technology transfer. Achieving significant greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reductions requires new technologies everywhere, especially in developing nations, 
which need to both slow their GHG emission growth rate and to improve their economic 
futures (Ockwell et al. 2008; Ockwell and Mallett 2012). The latter is a priority that can be at 
the expense of increased GHG emissions without appropriate environmentally sound 
technologies. Technology transfer, therefore, needs to address concerns about development 
priorities in host countries. 
Analysis of development priorities and approaches of developing countries in the 
context of international climate technology transfer includes investigating the rapidly 
changing realities in developing countries. These changes encompass increasingly 
sophisticated technological advances, emergence of south-south technology transfer as a 
new paradigm for technology flow, and the rise of developmental state (or state capitalism) 
as a political philosophy. These new realities and phenomena in developing countries 
coupled with the drawn out global climate policy debates have made the process of climate 
technology transfer more complex. 
It is, therefore, important to conduct an analysis that will assist efforts for a rapid 
transition to climate-smart development. The analysis should consider recent changes in 
developing countries, and look at national climate-smart development aspirations in relation 
to coherency and comprehensiveness of global climate policy. 
This thesis emphasizes the role of developing countries, and in particular emerging 
economies, as sources as well as recipients of international technology innovations. Despite 
wide recognition of the economic advancement and technological sophistication of certain 
developing countries, these changes in relation to international technology flow, have 
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received relatively little attention in academic research and have no coherent international 
polices under the UNFCCC. 
 
Fourthly, existing empirical studies on international climate technology transfer provide mixed 
evidence on the role of international climate change discussions under the UNFCCC in 
presenting opportunities for local firms’ technological advancement and informing national 
climate-smart development pathways (Ott et al. 2008; Forsyth 2007; Branstetter et al. 2005; 
Ockwell et al. 2008). 
This research attempts to provide some evidence to help reconcile the difference in 
empirical evidence by exploring the link between the three levels of decision-making 
structures for climate technology transfer. The research elucidates the reasons for both good 
accords and disjunctions between international climate technology transfer debates under 
the UNFCCC, national policies and priorities for climate-smart development and firm level 
technological advancement and transfer. 
Technology transfer as an instrument to mitigate environmental problems and 
adaptation to climate change has featured prominently in many of the much-debated global 
climate change discussions. The Bali Action Plan1, agreed at the COP 13 of the UNFCCC in 
2007, reaffirmed the centrality of technology transfer to increase climate adaptation and 
mitigation capacities of developing countries. It has also made technology transfer one of 
four pillars (the other pillars are mitigation, adaptation, and financing) of a new climate 
agreement (Clémençon 2008). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports 
(IPCC 2007 and 2012) concluded that any stabilization of GHG concentrations is not 
possible without technological innovation and transferring new technologies and practices 
within countries and across national borders. The importance of technology transfer in 
solving climate change is also reflected in the integration of a number of articles stipulating 
technology transfer within the UNFCCC and has been underlined in various policies and 
academic texts. The UNFCCC requires parties to, “promote and cooperate in the 
development, application, diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices, and 
processes that control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
(UNFCCC 1992).” Moreover, economic and social benefits are associated with the transfer of 
technologies. In Agenda 21, a blueprint for sustainable development agreed upon by 178 
countries at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
technology transfer is seen as a significant potential instrument of sustainable development 
(UN 1993). 
                                                                
1 For more information on the Bali Action Plan, please refer Section 2.3.2. 
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1.2 PURPOSE, SIGNIFICANCE, AND SCOPE 
This thesis aims to examine the relationships between the multi-level decision structures for 
climate technology transfer through a combination of top-down macro policy analysis and 
bottom-up micro implementation analysis. 
 
In order to analyze these relationships, the thesis locates the issue of technology transfer as 
a response to climate change at the interface between three components: (1) technology 
transfer issues that have always been at the forefront of the global climate change debate, 
(2) the objective of technology transfer for achieving low-carbon climate resilient national 
socio-economic development aspirations and (3) the effectiveness of technology transfer at 
the firm level for deceasing GHG emissions and transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies to mitigate climate change. These three components are elaborated in the 
following section. 
 
(1) Climate technology transfer in the global climate change policy debates (Chapter 4 of the 
thesis). The need for enhanced capabilities for meeting the challenges of mitigating climate 
change has made technology transfer a high priority on the international development 
agenda as well as in climate change negotiations. The international community has 
recognized the vital importance of technology transfer in mitigating climate change. The 
international panel on climate change (IPCC) reported that without technology transfer it 
might be difficult to achieve emission reductions at a significant scale (IPCC 2007). 
Technology transfer has been used as a means of international cooperation and a concrete 
approach to GHG mitigation has been at the center of climate policy debates. In this regard, 
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol required Parties to promote and cooperate in the 
development and transfer of technologies that control, reduce, or prevent GHG emissions. 
The UNFCCC has been a major institutional setting for potential international cooperation on 
climate change. Climate change discussions and initiatives under the UNFCCC have 
stressed the need for cooperation between developed and developing countries for the 
promotion of technology transfer. 
 This thesis analyzes the substances and processes of the 2009 UN Climate Change 
Conference (COP 15) in Copenhagen and reviews policy positions of selected countries on 
international climate technology transfer. It examines what the outcome might mean for 
facilitating international transfer of climate technologies, and investigates causes for the lack 
of ambitious international climate technology transfer agreements. The Copenhagen summit 
brought together 115 Heads of State and Government, and was widely reported as the 
largest high-level gathering for climate change discussion. The Copenhagen Climate Change 
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Conference raised climate change policy to the highest political level. No other conference 
has featured an international agenda on climate change so prominently as COP 15 (Harvey 
2009). In the Conference, the negotiators were engaged with a fundamental political bargain 
directly involving technology transfer. However, deep divisions between developed and 
developing countries affected the bargaining processes and quality of its outcome. The 
Copenhagen conference set in motion particular negotiating positions, focuses and 
strategies. These are relevant to the other ongoing international climate policy debates under 
the UNFCCC. The thesis examines the origin and structure of different countries’ 
incompatible preferences and bargains under the UNFCCC, and explores the implications for 
transfer of climate technologies at national and local levels. 
 
(2) Climate technology transfer at the national level (Chapter 5 of the thesis). Technologies 
have been a driver of economic and social development worldwide, but not all countries have 
had the capacity to develop and maintain the technologies they require. In climate change 
negotiations one of the key issues has been enhancing developing country access to climate 
change technologies for environmentally sound economic development (Maskus and Okediji 
2010). Achieving low-carbon national socio-economic development is a primary objective of 
technology transfer for developing countries. There is widespread consensus that diffusion of 
knowledge and technologies is essential for economic growth and prosperity (Grossman and 
Helpman 1991; Romer 1990) and developing countries have the potential to industrialize on 
the basis of environmentally sound technologies as opposed to conventional ones (Ockwell 
and Mallett 2012). 
A developed-developing countries, north–south gap, historically characterizes 
technology ownership (Missbach 1999), with developed countries having a technological 
advantage. However, emergence of several developing countries as leading manufacturers 
and developers of low carbon technologies, and flow of technologies between developing 
countries, has challenged the traditional characterization of developed-developing, north–
south transfer as the only form of technology transfer (Brewer 2008). 
This thesis analyses the potential, characteristics, and relevance of south-south 
cooperation as the new technology transfer paradigm for international environmentally sound 
technology transfer, emphasizing the role of developing countries as both sources and 
recipients of technology innovations. The evidence for this part of the thesis on the South-
South climate technology transfer (SSCT) was provided through analysing the case of 
Ethiopia. 
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(3) Climate technology transfer at the local (firm) level (Chapter 6 of the thesis). Effective 
transfer of climate technologies at the local (firm) level to the Global South is one of the 
responses to the complex challenges of mitigating climate change (IPCC 2000 and 2007). As 
most technology is held in firms, firms are the most common technology suppliers, as well as 
the most common recipients (Patel and Pavitt 2000). Effective technology transfer at the firm 
level requires ‘dual embeddedness’ on the part of the affiliate, i.e. embeddedness in both 
local firms and international companies (multinational corporations), hence the combination 
of local and international knowledge transfers (Frost 2001). As a continuation of the national 
level analysis (Chapter 5), the firm level study also analyses the case of Ethiopia as a host 
for technology transfer, with other developing countries as well as developed countries, as 
sources. The thesis provides information on the effectiveness of the north-south climate 
technology transfer (NSCTT), south-south climate technology transfer (SSCTT) and north-
south-south climate technology transfer (NSSCTT). 
The thesis compares and contrasts SSCTT, NSCTT and NSSCTT by examining the 
characteristics of networks, quality relationship of actors, performance of actors’ network and 
the critical factors of firms’ ability to value new external knowledge. The thesis also explores 
internalization of new external information and the ability to utilize external knowledge. The 
thesis gauges effectiveness of the three modalities of cooperation for enhancing technology 
transfer at the firm level. It investigates the effectiveness of technology transfer at the firm 
level in terms of the distinct and combined effects of a firm’s network and absorptive capacity 
for technology transfer. 
SCOPE OF THE THESIS: 
The thesis focuses on analyzing the transfer of established technology from one operational 
environment to another (horizontal transfer). International technology transfer here denotes 
the geographical relocation of technology from one country to another. The thesis does not 
look at vertical technology transfer, which occurs when knowledge is transmitted from basic 
to applied research, and from there to development and production. The empirical analysis 
covers the horizontal technology transfer both from global north countries to global south 
countries and technology transfer within the global south countries. 
The thesis uses the term, “Climate Technology Transfer” to refer to technology transfer 
for minimizing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climatic variability as well as 
climate change. It characterizes international policy debates on the issue and national 
policies for promoting international technology transfer. In other studies, technologies for 
reducing GHG emissions have often been termed “Low carbon technology transfer”. This 
implies that the aim of the technologies is primarily for reduction or substitution of GHGs, but 
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not adapting to climatic variability (MacKerron et al. 2008). However, there is broad 
agreement among academicians, politicians, and practitioners on the importance of 
international technology transfer in combatting climate change, involving not only mitigation 
measures but also adaptation activities (Bell 2012; Forsyth 1998; Heaton et al. 2000; UNEP 
2001). Technology transfer is an encompassing notion in climate change policies because 
mitigation and adaptation both require technologies. Technology transfer as an 
encompassing theme in policy discussions of climate change related “transfer of 
technologies” is identified in the text of UNFCCC as the means for mitigating GHG emissions 
and adapting to the impacts of climate change (UNFCCC Articles 4, 9, and 11). 
Defining climate technology transfer is complex and there are many academic 
controversies surrounding it. However, it is not the intention of this doctoral thesis to engage 
in complex terminological discussions. Questions on the meaning of climate technologies do 
not only arise in the technology transfer context, but also with respect to the broader 
dilemmas of how to address the problem of climate change. This thesis adopts the more 
popular and balanced definition given by the IPCC as its working definition. This definition is 
also embodied in the UNFCCC technology transfer framework. Technology transfer is 
defined as: “… a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and 
equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different stakeholders such 
as governments, private sector entities, financial institutions, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and research/education institutions … the broad and inclusive term “transfer” 
encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology cooperation across and within 
countries. It covers technology transfer processes between developed countries, developing 
countries, and countries with economies in transition. It comprises the process of learning to 
understand, utilize and replicate the technology, including the capacity to choose and adapt 
to local conditions and integrate it with indigenous technologies” (IPCC 2000, p 3). 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The overarching research question investigated in this thesis is located in the context 
presented in the preceding sections. The historical controversies over climate technology 
transfer are perpetuated within global debates about combating impacts of climate change 
that challenge the optimistic vision of eradicating poverty, as embodied, for example, within 
the Millennium Development Goals. Hence, it becomes not only an interesting area for 
academic research, but also urgent to better understand how far the central tenets of 
international climate technology transfer debates are informed by, and reflected in, national 
policies and approaches as well as technology transfer practices at the firm level.  
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This doctoral thesis aims to analyze synergies of the multi-level structures of climate 
technology transfer to explore interconnections between decisions made at the three levels: 
international, national, and firm. In a sense, the thesis combines top-down macro-policy 
analysis with bottom-up micro-implementation analysis. For a more comprehensive 
understanding of the research framework of this study, refer to Figure 1.1. 
 
FIGURE 1.1  RESEARCH FRAMEWORK DIAGRAM  
 
 
The research framework diagram, Figure 1.1, examines the relationships between the multi-
leveled decision structures for climate technology transfer (area A in Figure 1.1), through a 
combination of top down macro policy analysis and bottom up micro implementation analysis 
(the Y-axis and X -axis respectively in Figure 1.1). 
 
In order to analyze these relationships, the thesis locates climate technology transfer as a 
response to climate change at the interface between the three relationships: the relationships 
between international and national level (area B in Figure 1.1), between international and 
firm level (area C in Figure 1.1) and national and firm level (area D in Figure 1.1). The area 
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indicated as A, B, C, and D describes the relationships that may exist between the three 
levels. In order to assess the quality of these relationships, the research employs a 
combination of both top-down and the bottom-up analyses2. 
 
The thesis seeks to answer the following twinned overarching questions: 
 
1. What is the relationship between firm practices, national policies, and international 
discourses for climate technology transfer? 
 
2. If there is a disjunction, then why? 
 
FIGURE 1.2  MAPPING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
 
Based on these overarching research questions, the following specific research questions 
were used to guide the empirical component of the thesis: 
                                                                
2 For more information, please see Section 3.1 and Figure 3.2 about the “iterative explanation 
building” technique, which reflects the combination of the top down macro policy analysis and bottom 
down micro implementation analysis. 
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i. What is the origin and structure of a country’s’ incompatible preferences and bargains at 
the international climate policy negotiations? Why did they fail to reach ambitious climate 
technology transfer agreements? 
ii. How relevant are country’s incompatible preferences and bargains in shaping national 
policies and firm level technology practices? 
iii. What is the nature of collaboration between developing countries for promoting climate 
technology transfer at the national level vis-à-vis the North-South technology transfer? 
iv. How far do national approaches for climate technology transfer match countries’ positions 
under the UNFCCC and actual local practices? 
v. How effective are the international cooperation modalities (SSCTT, NSCTT and NSSCTT) 
for enhancing the transfer of climate technologies at the firm level? 
 
These research questions are addressed in each of the three research chapters: Chapter 4, 
5 and 6 as presented in Figure 1.2. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This dissertation is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 begins with a section about the motivation behind the doctoral thesis. It also 
introduces and contextualizes the research and the research questions, and justifies the 
choice of topic and problem in terms of its theoretical, analytical, and methodological 
relevance.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the work that has already been done on the dissertation topic, both 
theoretical and practical. The literature reviewed includes concepts, literature on international 
climate technology transfer, national policies and approaches, and that assessing 
effectiveness of climate technology transfer at the firm level. It summarizes knowledge gaps 
in the existing literature and describes the value of the dissertation. The introductory section 
includes definitions, frameworks, and models as presented in the literature and presents 
trends in international climate technology transfer. The second section reviews literature on 
climate technology transfer in international climate policy, including that on multilateral 
environmental agreements, international technology transfer under the UNFCCC and 
technology transfer in international economic legal instruments, such as the WTO Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The third section covers 
literature on national economic policies and technology transfer. It presents the literature in 
five categories: (1) the role of international climate technology transfer for enhancing national 
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economic development; (2) the role of government and national policies in accelerating 
transfer of climate technologies; (3) south-south technology transfer; (4) Ethiopian climate 
change policies and strategies; (5) overarching theories to examine the relevance of south-
south technology transfer. The fourth section presents literature on firm level technology 
transfer. This section also includes literature on a firm’s motives for international technology 
transfer. The different approaches, methods, indicators and overarching theories in the 
literature regarding measuring technology transfer at the firm level, are also presented in this 
section. The final section in Chapter 2 describes the gaps in knowledge identified in the 
literature review that this doctoral research tackles. This section presents three major ways 
that this thesis differs from preceding studies. First and foremost, it emphasizes the 
interconnections of the multi-level structures of climate technology transfer. Second, it 
emphasizes the dynamic aspects of international technology transfer, rather than the static 
aspects. Third, the dissertation recognizes national realities and new paradigms and 
analyzes their implications for accelerating the transfer of climate technologies. Lastly, this 
doctoral thesis focuses on giving a broader picture of climate technology transfer through 
empirical evidence from a smaller-scale unit: firm level technology transfer. The study builds 
on the comprehensive notion of climate technology transfer by providing information on the 
synergies of decision-making structures. The results provide an analysis of socio-political 
and technical factors at different scales and how the different entities intervene and influence 
the decision-making processes. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the overall methodological approach and how the gaps in knowledge are 
converted into research questions and the type of method that is needed to tackle each of 
them. A qualitative explanatory research method, including a combination of case study, 
survey, and observation research methods, was employed to answer the research questions. 
The major data collection methods used in this thesis were: survey, observation, and case 
study. Three units of analysis of the research are identified: (1) preferences of developed and 
developing countries to international climate technology transfer under the UNFCCC; (2) 
national approaches to international climate technology transfer; (3) international technology 
transfer practices at the firm level. 
The data analysis follows a process of “iterative explanation building” and analysis in 
each unit took place concurrently with data collection. The thesis employs a mix of theories 
and schools of thought as a framework for examining the processes of multi-level 
international climate technology transfer. The last section of the chapter covers reliability and 
validity issues, emphasizing triangulation of data from multiple data sources. 
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Chapter 4, 5, and 6 address each unit of analysis and present the data collected and detailed 
results. In these chapters, salient findings are presented, interpreted and connected with 
supporting data provided as appropriate. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the causes for the lack of ambitious international climate technology 
transfer agreements and examines the origin and structure of the countries’ incompatible 
preferences and bargains under the UNFCCC. The analysis focuses on the 2009 
Copenhagen Climate Conference and reveals that the negotiators were engaged in a 
fundamental political bargain directly involving technology transfer, and shows how deep 
divisions between the developed and developing countries affected the bargaining 
processes. The chapter concludes that causes for the deep divisions between the global 
North and South countries, and the reasons incompatible preferences persist, rest not in the 
absence of shared norms (which is the importance of combating climate change), but rather 
in the historical contingency implicit in the principle of ‘differentiated responsibilities’. This is 
apparent in the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which effectively paralysed the Kyoto Protocol and led 
the climate bargaining process under the UNFCCC into apparently never ending circles. In 
terms of the negotiations in Copenhagen and subsequent meetings, the differentiated 
responsibilities principle has been a major sticking point. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates the potential and relevance of south-south cooperation for 
international climate technology transfer. The evidence indicates that technological 
cooperation of least developing countries (LDCs), such as Ethiopia, with developed countries 
is diminishing and is being overtaken by cooperation with the global south. However, the 
research concludes that growing South-South climate technology transfer (SSCT) is not an 
alternative to North-South climate technology transfer (NSCTT), rather it is an important 
adjunct to North-South cooperation in order to promote the flow of technology to developing 
countries. The research did not find indications from policies or practices that environmental 
wellbeing is a motivational factor for south-south climate technology transfer. Neither was 
political solidarity of the global south countries in international climate regimes a major 
motivating factor for south-south climate technology transfer. Key findings from the chapter 
are that south-south climate technology transfer is characterized by (1) lack of environmental 
objectives because of its “Business is Business” approach; (2) lack of support for 
improvement of the transferee institutional infrastructure; (3) limitations in private sector 
involvement as an engine of innovation because of the rise of state capitalism; (4) limited 
interaction of firms on the supply chain; and (5) limitations in reversing the unfair North-South 
trade relationship. These limitations highlight the need for adequate and effective policies for 
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maximizing the net benefits of transferees and ensure a “win-win” outcome of the 
technological cooperation. Also it found that South-South climate technology transfer has a 
development dimension, and has the potential to make a difference in critical development 
areas. 
 
Chapter 6 examines effectiveness of North-South (NSCTT), South-South (SSCTT) and 
North-South-South (NSSCTT) climate technology transfer through a firm’s ability to access 
information and ability to utilize knowledge obtained from external sources. The three modes 
of cooperation show distinct characteristics and result in dissimilar levels of effectiveness in 
technology transfer. Technological capacities occur in all three modes of cooperation, but at 
different levels. The results show the complementarity nature of NSCTT and SSCTT and 
ratified NSSCTT as an important way of strengthening effectiveness of this complementarity 
and fostering technology transfer by leveraging the best features of NSCTT and SSCTT. The 
research found that the NSSCTT was the more effective modality of cooperation for 
enhancing climate technology transfer, because it combined the comparative advantages of 
both SSCTT and NSCTT. However, some limitations in the NSSCTT were also revealed. 
Identifying the common interests of the three actors (The North, South and the host country) 
places additional demands on the management capacity of all the actors, in particular on the 
host country, to ensure each actor plays its designated role effectively. 
 
Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter. It reviews the preceding chapters, bringing the results 
together in order to answer the central research question and reflect on the findings of the 
analysis. Furthermore, it elaborates on the empirical and policy implications of the study, its 
limitations, and suggests areas for future research. The thesis concludes, in relation to the 
research question, that the three levels (international, national and local) are more loosely 
interconnected than is necessary for effective climate technology transfer. It reveals that 
there is a relatively good accord between the international climate technology transfer 
discourses under the UNFCCC and national technology transfer policy. There is also good 
concurrence between national policy and firm level climate technology transfer practices. 
However, there is a clear disjunction between the international and local level. The interplay 
between top-down and bottom-up processes has resulted in a mix of coherent and 
incoherent relationships between the three levels. 
 
Theoretical Framework: The thesis uses three different theoretical approaches to explain 
the dynamics of climate technology transfer at the interplay between international climate 
15 
politics, national climate smart development pathways and local contexts for climate 
technology transfer. 
International regime theories are the main theoretical lens used in Chapter 4 to capture 
the politics of international climate change and explain bargaining processes, international 
rule-based co-operation, and the basic problems in global climate negotiations. No single 
international regime approach is adequate to explain and effectively analyse the global 
climate negotiations and development of the climate change regime. The solution employed 
in Chapter 4 is to broaden the regime model by incorporating three core concepts of the 
approach (power, interest and knowledge) and to build on insights offered by historical 
institutionalism. Historical intuitionalism explains how international regimes established by 
countries with divergent, and often conflicting preferences, remain in place even when 
conditions have changed markedly. Central to this idea is that initial choices made at the 
foundation of a new institutional arrangement become ‘locked in’ and difficult to change. In 
contrast, development theories were used to examine climate technology transfer at the 
national level in Chapter 5 of the thesis to assess the potential and relevance of south-south 
cooperation for climate technology transfer (SSCTT). In this chapter, national development 
pathways were examined in relation to international regimes. 
 To analyze the climate technology transfer at the firm level in Chapter 6 of the thesis, a 
combination of actor-network theory (ANT) and the theory of absorptive capacity (TAC) was 
employed to examine the effectiveness of technology transfer. The use of ANT highlights the 
importance of access to information for technology transfer, whereas TAC centers on 
examining actors’ ability to integrate the information and knowledge into their processes and 
routines. 
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CHAPTER 2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The international transfer of technologies in the context of climate change is a topic that has 
been addressed in both academic studies and literature such as technical reports or working 
papers. Scholars and practitioners from a variety of academic backgrounds, such as 
economics, political science, international law, business and management, engineering, and 
industrial relations have all addressed the subject, marking it out as an interdisciplinary field 
of study (Martinot et al. 1997) 
Literature on climate technology transfer in this chapter is presented in four categories: 
literature that focuses on the concept of climate technology transfer, literature that deals with 
climate technology transfer in international climate policy, literature on technology transfer at 
the level of the firm, and literature related to the political economy of climate technology 
transfer and the role played by technology transfer in sustainable development. 
2.2 LITERATURE ON THE CONCEPT OF CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Literature reviewed in this section reveals the inherent complexity of defining climate 
technology transfer, difficulties in making conclusions, and contentions around the concept. It 
indicates that various levels of decision-making structures fragment what we know about 
international technology transfer. This fragmentation shows the limits of existing literature in 
presenting empirical evidences and analytical analysis on the multi-level decision making 
characteristics of climate technology transfer. 
There are numerous definitions of technology transfer frameworks, and models in the 
literature, but there is no general agreement on exactly what constitutes technology transfer 
or how technology transfer should be defined; and there are no coherent, overarching 
theories of technology transfer (Reddy and Zhao 1990). There has been a general 
consensus that any workable definition of technology transfer must be functional than formal. 
However, the specific definitions have varied. Different perspectives of technology transfer 
stem from different views of technology as a commodity, as knowledge, and as a 
socioeconomic process (Rosenberg 1982). In the field of climate technology transfer 
scholars or decision makers may convey varied connotations for technology transfer under 
different contexts. 
The concept of climate technology transfer started receiving global attention during the 
Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The concept was later defined in an IPCC 
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report (2000). As mentioned in Section 1.2 the IPCC (2000) definition is a popular and 
balanced view of climate technology transfer. The definition presupposes the dynamic 
processes that ensure applicability of technologies in local contexts, full disclosure of 
technical information by the technology providers, and built-in sustainability measures, 
including continued availability of the technology, etc. Clear methodologies and approaches 
for Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) and technology transfer have been set out to 
ensure that climate technologies address local needs of target users (UNDP 2009). 
Nevertheless, determining what technology should qualify poses important legal and ethical 
concerns. 
A core challenge for technology transfer is to navigate the complexities of technological 
development and scientific uncertainty, whether with respect to climate change or other 
environmental concerns, in evaluating what technologies are appropriate. This approach, 
which is central to a ‘needs assessment’, to some extent answers the question of which 
technologies are appropriate for particular countries; though ambiguities remain about the 
term more generally. Technologies may vary in appropriateness between different contexts, 
but the term, climate technology transfer may suggest all technologies have similar climate 
benefits or are equally attractive (Bell 1997; Forsyth 1999; Heaton et al. 1991; IPCC 2000; 
Martintot et al. 1997; UNFCCC 2003). Questions regarding the meaning of climate 
technologies do not just arise in the technology transfer context, but also with respect to the 
broader dilemmas of how to address the problem of climate change. The international 
climate change agreements continue to focus primarily on implementation issues rather than 
core definitional issues. 
Explaining the role technology transfer could play in reducing GHGs, and outlining 
specific mechanisms in an attempt to define appropriate technology more clearly, does not 
eliminate all ambiguities. For example, UNFCCC (2009) stated that climate technology 
transfer could provide developing countries with the capacity to install, operate, maintain and 
repair imported technologies, produce lower cost versions of imported technologies, adapt 
imported technologies to domestic markets and circumstances, and develop new 
technologies, whilst respecting relevant intellectual property rights. Developing countries 
could benefit from climate technology transfer if the technology transfer process is 
understood broadly to deal more fully with the demand-side aspects of innovation systems, 
including the political and institutional contexts of these systems, and the need to ensure that 
technology development proceeds on a self-determined, needs-led basis (Ockwell et al. 
2008; Ockwell and Mallett 2012; Wei 1995). 
 International technology transfer refers, in fact, to a comprehensive notion and a range 
of socio-political influences, including the tacit knowledge and a broad set of processes 
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covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment following different pathways, 
where different entities intervene and influence these processes. It is a complex process 
influenced by the goals and capabilities of both technology supplier and technology recipient, 
and involving several parties and stakeholders (Lall 1992). However, most definitions render 
international technology transfer as a relatively simple passing of knowledge from one 
institution to another (Davidson et al. 2008; Fransman 1985; Kathuria 2002; Kranzberg 1986; 
Ockwell et al. 2007). This knowledge is either embodied in machinery, codified in blueprints, 
licenses and manuals, or tacit within a person or a group (Andersen et al. 2007; Bell 1989; 
Bell 1997; Rosenberg et al. 1997). The knowledge is brought about through a learning 
process, and thus technology transfer is fundamentally a process of learning. In this view, 
transfer of inanimate objects, such as machines and blueprints, by itself does not constitute 
technology transfer, a view echoed by Rosenberg and Fritschak (1985). 
 Technology transfer includes transfer of patented, so-called ‘hard’ technology, such as 
equipment and products to control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of GHG in 
the energy, transportation, and industry sectors; and ‘soft’ technologies, such capacity 
building, information networks, training and research. It also includes transfer of unprotected 
or soft technology, such as know-how. 
 Evolutionary economists stress that in transferring knowledge some parts of the 
knowledge are not easily codifiable, but tacit. This makes the process of transferring 
knowledge between firms costly and require specific learning efforts, so the transfer of 
knowledge may not necessarily be successful (Attelwell 1992; Bodansky 1993). Tacit 
corporate technological capabilities is the antithesis of explicit knowledge, in that it is not 
easily codified and transferred by more conventional mechanisms such as documents, 
blueprints, and procedures, and must instead be internally learned, with or without external 
assistance (Bijker et al. 1987; Bell and Keith 1993; Chen 1996; Dahlmann et al.1981; Newell 
2008; Cantwell 2009). Tacit knowledge is derived from personal experience; it is subjective 
and difficult to formalize (Archibugi and Coco 2005; Cantwell 1989; Mytelka 2007; Dutrénit 
2004; Nonaka 1994; Nonaka et al. 2001). Therefore, tacit knowledge is often learned via 
shared and collaborative experiences (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka and Toyama 
2002); learning knowledge that is tacit in nature requires participation and ‘doing’ (Kuada 
2003). Because of the personal nature of tacit knowledge exchange, Roberts (2000) 
suggests that an important factor in this process is trust. She contends that the exchange of 
knowledge, and particularly tacit knowledge, is not amenable to enforcement by contract; 
hence, the importance of trust in the exchange of knowledge. 
 Roberts (2000) also argued that technological transfer could be more successful when 
it is between agents who share common social, cultural and linguistic characteristics. These 
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innovation system approaches are clearly important to facilitating transfer of technology at 
the firm level and focus on the production side; however, they have limitations in explaining a 
broader process of technological change such as international climate technology transfer for 
low-carbon climate-resilient development pathways. 
 Some literature has proposed a socio-technical transitions approach as being a 
broader and more ambitious way for better facilitating; promoting and enhancing the transfer 
of climate technology transfer (Byrne et al. 2010). A socio-technical approach combines the 
science and technology of devising a production, with application of the technology in 
fulfilling a societal function (Geels 2004). Literature on the socio-technical transitions 
approach has made a major contribution to understanding the complex and multi-
dimensional shifts considered necessary for adapting societies and economies to sustainable 
modes of production and consumption. However, literature regarding the contribution of 
socio-technical transitions approach to the study of low-carbon climate-resilient development 
pathways is limited. 
Technology transfer creates new technological capacity through technology transfers 
and active independent learning, creation and innovation of the recipient. Organisational 
learning is therefore an essential factor in the success of technology transfer. Learning 
processes are broader when foreign knowledge is linked to the wider structure of the host 
country economy through supply-side actors and demand side inter-firm linkages (Wei 1995); 
which in turn are strong when the host country has a network of local suppliers capable of 
supporting the operation and maintenance of this new foreign technology (Ivarsson and 
Alvstam 2005). Ockwell and Mallett (2012) argued that the innovation systems literature 
recognizes much of this, but tends to focus on supply-side actors and their interactions. 
Where the demand side is understood, it is strongest in regard to user-firms rather than final 
consumers. 
Climate technologies are important to the south in particular because they could 
accelerate development by skipping inferior, less efficient, more expensive or more polluting 
technologies and industries and move directly to more advanced ones. It is proposed that 
through leapfrogging, developing countries can avoid environmentally harmful stages of 
development and do not need to follow the polluting development trajectory of industrialized 
countries (Goldemberg 1998). The diffusion and application of climate technologies provide 
win-win solutions to the global south countries, allowing economic growth, climate change 
mitigation and resilience to climate change to proceed hand-in-hand. They potentially 
contribute to sustainable economic development by promoting greater access to resources 
and technologies to people who currently have no access. The concept of environmental 
technologies leapfrogging highlights the possibility that developing countries do not 
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necessary need to follow the paths of the industrialized world to fulfill their aspiration of 
development. 
International climate technology transfer is shaped and reshaped by the decisions 
made at multi-level structures (international discourses, national policies, and firm practices). 
The illustration on Figure 2.1 shows that decisions are made at each level (international, 
national and firm) and the decision made in one level has an effect on the other levels. The 
decisions made in each level play a part in making the transfer of technology successful. 
FIGURE 2.1 THE CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER MULTI-LEVEL SYSTEM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, literature on the multi-leveled characteristics of international climate technology 
transfer is fragmented along the different levels of decision-making structures (Reddy and 
Zhao 1990). Therefore, the next sections focus on literature on each of the multi-leveled 
decision making structures. 
2.3 LITERATURE ON CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 
Literature reviewed in this section shows that empirical evidence and analytical analysis on 
technology transfer in international climate policy focuses on analyzing the governing and 
regulating process. It demonstrates that the literature on climate technology transfer at the 
international level centers on searching for explanations to the reasons for ineffectiveness of 
international governances and failure to address the dynamic of technology transfer. The 
section indicates that the various studies conducted are solidly rooted in the early 
perspective of multi-lateral environmental governance. The review of literature in this section 
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reveals the knowledge gap in explaining the issue of technology transfers at the international 
level vis-à-vis other levels of decision-making structures for climate technology transfer. 
The section includes literature on multilateral environmental agreements, international 
technology transfer under the UNFCCC and literature on technology transfer in international 
economic law instruments, such as the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
2.3.1 LITERATURE ON MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
Questions about technology transfer in the climate change debate are not new. The literature 
shows variations, repeats, and retreats on this issue dating from the days of the New 
International Economic Order (Green and Singe 1975). The Declaration for the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), adopted by the United Nations 
in 1974 called for a restructuring of the international order toward greater equity for 
developing countries. The international legal aspects of technology transfer started to attract 
the interest of the international community when the new perceptions of development were 
examined as they related to basic needs and transfer of technology within the framework of 
the NIEO (Hope 1983). The NIEO acknowledges that the benefits of technological progress 
are not shared equitably by all members of the international community and specifically 
highlights that the need for and possibility of significant negotiation (Green and Singe 1975). 
The issue of technology transfer has been also raised in the negotiations related to the 
transfer of deep sea- bed mining technology in the context of the entry into force of the UN 
Convention of the Law of the Sea. In this regard, Li (1994) presented a comprehensive study 
of technology transfer for deep seabed mining under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
and the controversies that have arisen around it. 
Prominent among the multilateral environmental agreements literature is Agenda 21 
(UN 1993), which outlines several strategies for promoting technology transfer, that reflect 
not only the need for hardware but also for building associated local capacities. In Agenda 
21, technology transfer is seen as a significant potential instrument of sustainable 
development. Chapter 34 of Agenda 21, entitled “transfer of environmentally sound 
technology, cooperation and capacity-building,” calls for access to scientific and technical 
information; promotion of technology transfer projects; promotion of indigenous technologies; 
capacity building; and long-term technological partnerships between suppliers and recipients 
of technology. Agenda 21 defines ‘environmentally sound technologies’ as those that ‘protect 
the environment, are less polluting, use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle 
more of their wastes and products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable manner 
than the technologies for which they were substitutes’ (Agenda 21, Chapter 34). It further 
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explains the importance of technology transfer in this context and proposes “to promote, 
facilitate, and finance, as appropriate, the access to and the transfer of environmentally 
sound technologies and corresponding know-how, in particular to developing countries, on 
favorable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed, taking 
into account the need to protect intellectual property rights as well as the special needs of 
developing countries for the implementation of Agenda 21” (UN 1993:Section II 78). Some 
literature criticized this statement of Agenda 21 as simplistic because it overlooks the fact 
that most technologies are privately owned, and that offering preferential terms might 
undermine the commercial imperatives underlying its development. This literature 
emphasizes the importance of creating the proper macroeconomic and policy conditions for 
transfers, and then letting markets dictate technology choice and transfer modes (Guertin et 
al. 1993; Moltke 1992). 
In 1994, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Technology Transfer and Cooperation of 
Environmentally Sound Technologies, formed within the UN Commission for Sustainable 
Development, saw the technology transfer problem as one of inadequate financial resources 
and limited human and institutional capacities (UN 1994). The Working Group recommended 
that governments and international organizations provide more financing and “improve 
access” to environmentally sound technologies, including clearing-houses and information 
systems to disseminate information. Although the Working Group recommended facilitating 
access to technologies in the public domain, it recognized that private-sector activity was key 
to technology transfer and advocated linkages between research and industry. 
Positive measures to encourage the transfer of environment-friendly technology have 
been progressively included in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), like the 
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Montreal Protocol, that also establish a 
Multilateral Fund providing positive measures and a participatory approach between the 
different stakeholders in order to facilitate the transfer of technology (Kaniaru 2007). Similar 
policies and strategies were also prescribed in non-UN literature. Technology transfer under 
the MEAs was not successful and various studies have been conducted searching for an 
explanation to the failure of MEAs (Osofsky 2009; Osofsky 2010). There are at least two 
major factors suggested as primary reasons: ineffectiveness of the MEAs, and failure to 
address the dynamic of technology transfer (Pachauri 2000). In addressing the former, there 
have been several attempts of governing and regulating the process of international 
technology transfer (Ravindranath and Sathaye 2002). 
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2.3.2 LITERATURE ON CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER UNDER THE UNFCCC  
Literature on technology transfer in relation to the UNFCCC can be divided into five sets. The 
first provides overviews of climate technology transfer discussions, including objectives of 
international technology transfer under the UNFCCC, and the principles of transfer (Gupta 
1997; Grubb et al. 2001; Ravindranath and Sathaye 2002). The second focuses on analyzing 
specific measures and modes of technology transfer that could be used to transfer 
technology under the UNFCCC (Newell 2008; Ott et al. 2008). The third investigates 
whether, and how, a specific mechanism might contribute to the international transfer of 
climate technology (Forsyth 2005, 2007; Missbach 1999; Roberts and Parks 2007). The 
fourth includes a growing set of evaluation studies in relation to technology transfer and the 
clean development mechanism (CDM) (Cosbey et al. 2007; Michaelowa and Dutschke 2000; 
Wara 2008). The fifth includes literature that attempts to understand the difficulties in, and 
the requirements for, transferring climate technologies in general (Gupta 1997; Najam et al. 
2003; Martinot et al.1997; Missbach 1999). This particular set of literature comprises a large 
number of project evaluations, case studies, case study compilations, attempts to synthesize 
the case study literature and lessons for project design. 
Technology transfer has been a key objective of UNFCCC since its inception. Article 
4.5 of the Convention requires developed countries to “take all practicable steps to promote, 
facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country parties to enable 
them to implement the provisions of the Convention.” Furthermore, Article 4.7 establishes a 
clear link between the extent to which developing countries will implement their commitments 
under the UNFCCC, and the effective implementation by developed countries of their 
commitments relating to financial resources and the transfer of technology. 
The technology transfer discipline under the UNFCCC is, in general, inspired by the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ in the efforts to combat climate change 
(Bodansky 1993). Yet disagreements remain, particularly on obstacles to transfer of climate-
related technologies and the types of measures that should be taken to overcome them. 
Between the first conference of the parties to the UNFCCC in Berlin in 1995, and the 
third conference, in Kyoto in 1997, a pilot phase for climate-friendly investment took place 
under the name of Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ). Some literature has claimed AIJ 
focused too much on relatively low-cost projects in countries that already received high-
levels of foreign direct investment, leaving more costly projects to domestic governments or 
official development assistance (ODA) (Reid and Goldemberg 1997). Partly in response to 
these criticisms, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol created the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) as one of the three market-based mechanisms or flexible mechanisms (the other 
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mechanisms were Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation). But unlike the other 
mechanisms, the CDM was limited to investment in non-Annex I (usually developing) 
countries, and stated that investment should contribute to “sustainable development” in 
general, rather than greenhouse gas mitigation alone (Cosbey et al. 2007; Michaelowa and 
Dutschke 2000). 
Some literature has raised questions concerning effectiveness of the CDM’s 
contribution to technology transfer, suggesting that the CDM did not result in a real and 
verifiable reduction in emissions and technology transfer from developed to developing 
countries (De Sepibus 2009; Lutken 2008; Moon 2008). 
Debate on effectiveness of the CDM for technology transfer was partly triggered by 
controversy over market-based versus non-market based technology transfer (Ellis et al. 
2009). The developed world, championed by the USA, reiterated their view on market based 
technology transfer, noting that the Kyoto Protocol places technology transfer and the market 
at the core of the deliberations; where-as the G77+China view market based transfer as 
ineffective and requiring further measures. They want specific provisions for transfer of 
technology, financial resources and capacity building for developing countries ensured, 
before any market-based measures can be considered for climate policy, as a priority (De 
Coninck et al. 2008). 
The main method of technology transfer to developing countries is through market 
mechanisms, though in the context of climate technology transfer, market-based should be 
defined by international climate policies (IPCC 2000; Lovett et al. 2012; Morsink et al. 2011). 
The Bali Action Plan is a key agreement for climate technology transfer, and it specifically 
encourages the contracting Parties to take into consideration negotiation of proper measures 
for effective mechanisms and enhanced means for removal of obstacles to, and provision of 
financial and other incentives, for scaling up of the development and transfer of technology to 
developing countries (Clémençon 2008). The Bali Action Plan is part of the Bali Road Map, 
which was adopted at the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference, held in Bali, Indonesia. The 
Road Map is a set of forward-looking decisions representing work that needed to be finalized 
in 2009 at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen. The Action Plan 
defined the directions of the negotiations for a global and comprehensive post-2012 climate 
agreement and set out a framework for long-term cooperative action in order to reach an 
agreed outcome and adopt a decision at COP 15 in Copenhagen (Clémençon 2008). In 
order to achieve the objectives set out in the Plan, the Conference of the Parties created the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), 
tasked with conducting the negotiating process to create a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Discussions on technology transfer in the Bali Action Plan revolved around three main 
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issues: institutional arrangements, performance indicators, and financing (Clémençon 2008). 
To put this into perspective, the Action Plan called for “enhanced action on technology 
development and transfer to support action on mitigation and adaptation.” Such action would 
include: (1) Effective mechanisms and enhanced means for the removal of obstacles to, and 
provision of financial and other incentives for, scaling up of the development and transfer of 
technology to developing country Parties in order to promote access to affordable 
environmentally sound technologies; (2) Ways to accelerate deployment, diffusion and 
transfer of affordable environmentally sound technologies; (3) Cooperation on research and 
development of current, new and innovative technology, including win-win solutions; (4) The 
effectiveness of mechanisms and tools for technology cooperation in specific sectors. 
Mechanisms for technology transfer recommendations were made to address four areas: 
innovative options for financing the development and transfer of technology, enhancement of 
cooperation with relevant conventions and intergovernmental processes, promotion of 
indigenous technology development though provision of financial resources, and joint 
research and development and promotion of collaborative research. The Bali Conference 
was widely regarded as a key next step in continuing to chart an international course to 
mitigate global warming and deal with its impacts (Dalindyebo 2009; Taubman 2009). 
Debate over technology transfer continued at the 14th United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Poznan ́, Poland (“Poznan ́ Conference”), held in 2008. The conference was 
intended to be a significant milestone in global cooperation on climate change, marking the 
progress between the start of negotiations in Bali in 2007 and the conclusion of negotiations 
in Copenhagen in 2009. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), as an operational entity of 
the financial mechanism under the Convention, was requested by the COP at its thirteenth 
session tin Bali to elaborate a strategic programme to scale up the level of investment for 
technology transfer in order to help developing countries address their needs for 
environmentally sound technologies, specifically considering how such a strategic 
programme might be implemented, along with its relationship to existing and emerging 
activities and initiatives regarding technology transfer. The GEF presented the strategic 
program on technology transfer in Poznan and the report was welcomed by COP14 and 
renamed the ‘Poznan Strategic Program on Technology Transfer’. 
The Poznan Strategic Program established the following three funding windows within 
the GEF in support of technology transfer: (1) Conduct Technology Needs Assessments 
(TNAs) (2) Pilot priority technology projects linked to TNAs (3) Disseminate GEF experience 
and successfully demonstrated climate technology transfer. The Poznań Strategic Program 
on Technology Transfer was adopted as a step towards scaling up the level of investment in 
technology transfer in order to help developing countries address their needs for 
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environmentally sound technologies. As noted by Lovett et al. (2009) the 'Poznan Strategic 
Programme on Technology Transfer' was the major effective decision at the COP 14 on 
technology transfer. In addition, there was agreement on simplifying the CDM and increasing 
the geographical distribution of the funds, especially to Africa. However, the Parties couldn’t 
agree on inclusion of carbon capture and storage technology under CDM (Lovett et al. 2009). 
 
TABLE 2.1  KEY DECISIONS REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGIES 
Key decision Key outcomes related to transfer of technologies 
Berlin Conference 
(Decision 1/CP.1) 
Decided to review at each session of the Conference of the 
Parties the implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 1(c)1 and 52, 
of the Convention as a separate agenda item under “Matters 
relating to commitments” 
Buenos Aires Conference 
(Decision 4/CP.4) 
Established a consultative process to achieve agreement on a 
technology transfer framework 
Marrakech Conference 
(Decision 4/CP.7) 
Adopted the technology transfer framework 
Bali Conference 
 
(Decision 3/CP.13) 
 
 
(Decision 4/CP.13) 
Reconstituted the Expert Group on Technology Transfer and 
adopted the set of actions as set out in the recommendation for 
enhancing the implementation of the technology transfer 
framework 
Decision on the development and transfer of technologies under 
the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
Poznan Conference 
(Decision 2/CP.14) 
Adopted the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer 
 
                                                                
1  Article 4, paragraphs 1(c): All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances, shall: (c) Promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, 
including transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant 
sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and waste management sectors. 
2 Article 4, paragraphs 5: The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer 
of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly 
developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention. In this 
process, the developed country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of 
endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties and 
organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies. 
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2.3.3 LITERATURE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW INSTRUMENTS 
Climate Change and international trade, investment and technology transfer issues have 
intersected in diverse institutional contexts and at several levels of governmental activities. In 
this regard, the Stern Review (2006) describes the complex relationship between the WTO 
regimes and climate technology transfer in its recommendation to foster the transfer of 
climate technology transfer. 
International economic law instruments, such as the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) are also directly engaged in 
technology transfer issues. Article 66.2 of the Agreement specifically concerns itself with the 
obligations of industrialized countries to facilitate and promote technology transfer to least 
developed countries. Even if this article represents a positive obligation for the governments 
of developed countries, the nature of technology transfer covered by this provision is not 
specified or narrowed down and considerable discretion in designing the different measures 
is given to member states (Abbott 2003). Recent studies show that the mechanism instituted 
by Article 66.2 has so far not resulted in all the expected outcomes: many OECD countries 
have never submitted reports and the majority of the national policies examined do not 
specifically target least-developed countries or technology transfer issues (Moon 2008). 
A central aspect of the TRIPS Agreement is that it not only establishes minimum 
standards of IP protection, but also incorporates certain flexibility, allowing countries to 
position IP rights in the context of their public policy objectives and priorities. For example, 
the TRIPS Agreement allows for certain limitations and exceptions to the protection of IP 
rights and for national determination of the appropriate method of implementation. These 
provisions are known as “TRIPS flexibilities” and have been found to provide critical policy 
space in areas ranging from biodiversity and agriculture to public health and education 
(Correa 2007). In this regard, Article 7 requires that the international regime of IPR protection 
“should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare.” 
The issue of TRIPS flexibilities was considered during discussions at the UNFCCC, 
where some Parties expressed their concern that these flexibilities may be insufficient to 
ensure a rapid and widespread transfer of technology. Reviewing the possibilities for 
facilitating transfer of climate technology, Correa (2007) concluded that the room available 
within the TRIPS Agreement to foster technology transfer to developing nations is quite 
small. The World Bank (2007) also reported that only the elimination of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers could lead to an increase in the volume of clean technologies exchanged, from 7% if 
tariffs were removed to 14% following removal of both tariffs and non-tariff barriers, with 
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particular results in the fields of clean coal, wind power, solar energy, and energy-efficient 
lighting. 
The contribution of existing TRIPS flexibilities to climate-related technology transfer 
could be significant if access to, and diffusion of, technological innovations in the WTO 
should be seen from a more general perspective not limited to the field of trade (Cottier 
2008), and several provisions of the WTO TRIPS Agreement could be used to promote such 
transfer of technology. In this regard, scholars, UNFCCC Parties, and other stakeholders are 
of the view that additional measures should be taken to ensure that the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement supports the climate regime including the transfer of technology. However, the 
literature examines areas of conflict that the WTO might face – conflicts that might arise in 
the course of national legislation and international climate talks. For example, Rechsteiner et 
al. (2009) pointed out the existence of incongruence between the CDM and the TRIPs 
Agreement, mainly because some of the conditions required for participation in the CDM 
projects could be interpreted as discriminatory requirements. Some studies also discuss 
legality of various policy options debated in national legislation or the UNFCCC under the 
WTO (Barton 2007; Brack et al. 2000; Brewer and Young 2001; Brewer 2003). From a 
political economy perspective, they argue that the climate regimes including the transfer of 
climate technologies could provide opportunities for “free riding” on international agreements 
hence affecting free market competitiveness (Assuncao 2000). 
A growing literature on the interactions between WTO regimes and the emerging 
technology transfer in the context of climate change regime seeks to find potential win-win 
arrangements and suggest policy space for transfer of climate technologies and limit GHG 
emissions without sacrificing national competitive advantage of their own industries, and 
recommend a new code of good WTO practice on greenhouse gas emission controls 
(Hoerner and Müller 1996; Hufbauer et al. 2009; Kopp and Pizer 2007; Moon 2008; 
Morgenstern 2007; Morgenstern et al. 2007; Palmer and Tarasofsky 2007; Werksman 1999; 
Werksman and Santoro 1999; World Bank 2008). 
2.4 LITERATURE ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Literature reviewed in this section reveals that theoretical and practical works on climate 
technology transfer at the national level focuses on the role of technology for economic 
development and national policy options or strategies for enhancing the transfer of 
international technology transfer. The section focuses on literature under three categories: 
(1) Literature on the role of international transfer for boosting national economic 
development, (2) Literature on the role of government in formulating national policies to 
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accelerate the transfer of climate technologies, (3) Literature on south-south climate 
technology transfer. 
The review of literature in this section indicates that there is insufficient attention to 
explaining the implications of rapid technological advancement of developing countries for 
accelerating the transfer of climate technology transfer. It also indicates there are few 
empirical studies on the interconnection of decisions made on climate technology transfer at 
the national level (in particular in developing countries) and decisions made under the 
international climate policy regime. 
2.4.1 LITERATURE ON THE ROLE OF CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
There is broad agreement in the literature on international transfer of technology as an 
important link between the responses to climate change, involving both mitigation measures 
and adaptation activities; and achieving per-capita income growth and wider forms of socio-
economic development in developing countries (Baram 1994; Barnett 1995; Bell 2012; 
Forsyth 1998; Goldemberg and Monaco 1991; Heaton et al. 2000; MacDonald 1992; Rath 
and Herbert-Copley 1993; UNEP 2001). However, there are also a few studies that argue 
technology imports would ultimately have negative effects on employment and replace the 
development of technologies within domestic industries (Rawski 1975) and some 
researchers, for example Kooijman-van Dijk (2012), report the limitation of international 
technology transfer to benefit small-scale enterprises in developing countries. While, whether 
or not international technology transfer is beneficial to developing countries has been the 
subject of considerable debate, the general importance of technology and especially 
innovation as a contributing factor to economic development is undisputed. 
This debate has received little attention in recent literature, in particular in the field of 
climate technology transfer. The argument for this as stated by Bell (2012) is that greater 
transfer of climate technologies to developing countries would enable them to pursue growth 
in more environmentally sustainable directions. UNCTAD (2003, 2007) stressed that access 
to new technologies and the development of related capacities will play a key role in helping 
all developing countries to develop their productive capacities and sustain economic growth 
and poverty reduction. Most literature discusses the contribution of international climate 
technology transfer to development on a sector-by-sector base. For example, the World 
Bank (2005) details how renewable energy can help diversify a country’s energy portfolio and 
reduce the risk of over-dependence on fossil fuels, risks that fall disproportionately on the 
poor, and improve the balance of trade and create new economic opportunities. 
The domestic production of renewable energy helps create autonomy by reducing 
income dependence on agriculture and by fostering creation of a local web of economic 
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activities that are mutually reinforcing (Biswas et al. 2001). This diversification also 
contributes to the economic and energy security of a nation (Kapadia 2004). Mallett (2009) 
also reported that solar hot water systems have been shown to be an excellent way of 
providing hot water in urban and rural developing country contexts. In summary, the 
economic benefits associated with the international transfer of climate technologies from the 
perspective of developing countries as recipient countries could be seen from two 
perspectives. 
Firstly, international technology transfer could contribute to the avoidance of future 
costs through climate change effects. By providing access to technologies not readily 
available in developing countries, technology transfer can take advantage of unused, low-
cost emission reduction opportunities in developing countries. Taking advantage of these 
opportunities results in a lower total cost of emissions reductions, by allowing substitution 
from high marginal cost activities in developed countries to low marginal cost opportunities in 
developing countries. Transfers of climate technologies potentially lower the marginal 
abatement cost curve of the recipient country, making future emissions possible at lower 
costs (Keller 2004). There is broad agreement in the literature dealing with this subject that 
technology transfer make the costs of adaptation smaller than the benefits, and that climate 
change impacts and the associated need for adaptation will increase the cost of, and 
potential for, economic development in developing countries (Agrawala and Fankhauser 
2008; Biswas et al. 2001; and IPCC 2007). 
Secondly, international technology transfer could contribute to the economic 
development of a developing country by expanding the country’s industrial base. The 
generation of knowledge, its application in the form of technology, and technological change 
are key factors in achieving industrial development and economic growth (Cantwell 1994 and 
Mowery et al. 1991) and international technology transfer contributes to this industrial 
development in the recipient country (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 2002; Foley 1992; 
Maskus 2004; Stern 2007) though advancement of the competitiveness of an existing 
industry by increasing productivity and the qualitative development of new products, to the 
diversification of an existing product range, to the capturing of a larger share of the value 
chain of a certain product, and to the establishment of new industrial sectors (Barnett 1994; 
Gereffi et al. 2001; Lall 1998; Maskus 2004; UNCTAD 2007) emphasized that the key to 
sustained economic growth and poverty reduction in developing countries is increased 
productive capacities, a core part of which relies on technological progress. However, 
emissions are not reduced through the productive application of technologies but rather 
through the diffusion of an environmentally benign technology within a country. The overall 
amount of emissions reduced is a function of the level of the operating effectiveness of a 
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specific installation of technology and the number of applications relative to emissions from 
the alternative not-used technology (Kemp 1997). 
2.4.2 LITERATURE ON THE ROLE OF NATIONAL POLICIES  
The diffusion of climate technologies differs from conventional technology because their 
diffusion usually requires some policy intervention. There is a consensus in the literature that 
existing transfer of climate technologies has largely been the result of government efforts 
(Barnett 1990; Goldemberg 2006; Orshita and Ortolano 2002; Yanjia 2006). 
The UNFCCC Expert Group on Technology Transfer’s (EGTT’s) technology transfer 
framework includes an “enabling environment component” which focuses on “governmental 
actions, such as fair trade policies, removal of technical, legal and administrative barriers to 
technology transfer, sound economic policy, regulatory frameworks and transparency” 
(UNFCCC 2007). 
A number of studies have emphasised that transfer of climate technology transfer 
requires some sort of policy intervention in markets (Beise et al. 2003; Bergh et al. 2007; 
Jacob et al. 2005; Jacobsson and Johnson 2000; Kounetas and Tsekouras 2008; Mulder et 
al. 2003; Lovett et al. 2012). However, this doesn’t mean that markets for climate 
technologies don’t exist without government intervention in developing countries. They do 
exist, but are limited to small niches, as end-consumers lack the financial means to actually 
acquire renewable energy technologies themselves (Velayudhan 2003). Nevertheless, as the 
World Bank (2000) reported for the transfer of climate technologies, both the market and the 
government policy are important. 
A report from the World Bank has shed light on the role of communities; “the diffusion 
of green technology in developing countries depends equally on markets, governments, and 
communities.” (Hettige et al. 1996: 17). The Bank’s empirical studies have drawn attention to 
how communities can be involved in the transfer of climate technologies, and how policies 
should be designed in this respect. The World Bank report is based on three studies carried 
out by the Bank (Hartman et al. 1995; Huq and Wheeler 1993; Pargal and Wheeler 1993, 
1995) and a review paper summarizing the studies (Hettige et al. 1996). The concept and 
relevant empirical findings suggest that both leaving technology transfer to the market, and 
labeling it as a passive diffusion process are insufficient if the dedicated technology transfer 
of climate technology transfer is a policy goal (Hutchison 2005; Hurst 1990; Mulugetta et al. 
2000). 
If there are differences in technological capabilities between countries in climate 
technology, using the market is one way of arranging for transfer mechanisms. If they are to 
be transferred to places where insufficient absorptive capabilities exist, policy will either 
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complement market-based technology transfer or support the creation of technological 
capabilities (Archibugi and Coco 2004). 
The regulatory environment coupled with physical infrastructure and internal absorptive 
capacity in the form of human capital, together with internal research and development 
investments, is a key for effectiveness of international climate transfer. In stressing this, 
UNCTAD (2007) argued that, unless developing countries as recipients in the international 
technology transfer equation adopt policies to stimulate technological catch-up with the rest 
of the world, the international effort in promoting climate technology transfer would be 
unproductive and developing countries will continue to fall behind other countries 
technologically and face deepening marginalization in the global economy. 
A common theme in the literature concerns which policy options or strategies by 
governments and other agents can accelerate the transfer of climate technologies 
(Nakićenović and Victor 1993). Other researchers outline ways to harness private-sector 
activities for technology transfer in order to boost a national low carbon climate resilient 
economy (Baram 1994; Jaffe et al. 2002). 
Perspectives on policy actions that could be used to support technology transfer 
processes depend on the theoretical perspective chosen. Neo-classical theories recommend 
an increase of free trade and reduction of state intervention, reduction of distorting factor 
prices, and the support of functioning markets; whereas evolutionary approaches favor 
policies to support the learning process of firms (Lall 1992; Fu 2009). 
Much of the literature on national policies and approaches for international climate 
technology transfer investigates appropriateness of the technology that is being transferred. 
Externalities, for example through spillovers to the local industry to which the technology has 
been transferred, or other industries or even the economy as a whole, are very important in 
this respect. There are, for example, technical (referring to the technical risks, operational 
test data and risk aversion), regulatory (specific restrictions on technology, development and 
procurement lead times, intellectual property rights, lack of funding) and people barriers (lack 
of trust, lack of communication, experience with transfer, unawareness of new technologies, 
lack of information) (Greiner and Franza 2003). 
The Marrakech Accords therefore call for technology needs assessments (TNAs). The 
Accords, which were adopted at COP 7 in Marrakech, in December 2001, fully embrace the 
idea that the needs and strengths of each nation are different and thus the transfer of 
technologies requires an approach that recognizes these differences (Boyd and Schipper 
2002). Decision 4, among other things, calls for supporting technology needs assessments 
and enabling environments for technology transfer. The Marrakesh Accords also established 
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the Expert Group on Technology Transfer and charged it with monitoring the technology 
needs assessments (Decision 4/CP.7). 
Technology needs assessments (TNAs) are a set of country-driven activities that 
identify and determine the mitigation and adaptation technology priorities particularly of 
developing countries. Developing country parties have been conducting their TNAs with 
technical assistance of the UNEP, UNDP and GEF since the Marrakech Accords came into 
force. The purpose of a TNA is to identify, evaluate, and prioritize technological means for 
achieving sustainable development in developing countries, increasing resilience to climate 
change, and avoiding dangerous anthropogenic climate change. This is an attempt to 
address the concern that, without consideration of development priorities in host countries, 
there will not be sustainable transfer of technologies or proper use of limited resources. 
Technology Action Plans (TAPs) are developed out of the TNA process to establish an 
enabling framework for specific sectors and technologies; they define the realistic and 
appropriate set of actions and policies that can help overcome barriers to the deployment 
and diffusion of prioritized technologies. TNAs can also be seen as a starting point for 
countries to raise their emission-reduction ambitions, and think about longer-term strategies 
of adapting to climate change. This means a step change in increasing energy efficiency and 
the role of renewable technology, radically reducing deforestation, removing fossil fuel 
subsidies, among other measures. 
Article 4.9 of the Convention refers specifically to the specific needs and special 
situations of the least developed countries (LDCs) concerning funding and transfer of 
technology. The Marrakesh Accords (COP 7) also established a separate work programme 
for LDCs. This work programme included the preparation of national adaptation programmes 
of action (NAPAs) for LDCs to report their prioritized urgent and immediate adaptation needs. 
In this regard. The rationale for NAPAs rests on the low adaptive capacity of LDCs, which 
renders them in need of immediate and urgent support to start adapting to current and 
projected adverse effects of climate change. The Marrakesh Accords launched a Least 
Developed Country Expert Group (LEG) in order to support LDCs in their preparation and 
implementation of NAPAs. LEG was mandated to provide technical guidance and advice to 
LDCs and to facilitate information exchange and promote synergies with other multilateral 
environmental treaties as well as regional synergies. 
2.4.3 LITERATURE ON SOUTH-SOUTH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The evolution of south-south climate technology transfer (SSCTT) is a mostly unnoticed but 
interesting phenomenon. Emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, 
Malaysia, Turkey, the Republic of Korea, and some others are asserting themselves as 
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important sources of ‘catch up’ innovation with a strong position in specific environmental 
technological fields.3 China, India, Brazil, South Korea and Russia have become important 
inventor countries for most climate mitigation technologies, along with the three world 
leaders: Japan, the USA and Germany. China is a leading country for geothermal and solar 
sector and is responsible for 8% of the world's inventions and South Korea dominates the 
market in lighting technology and is the source of more than 6% of the world’s investment 
(Dechezleprêtre et al. 2008). Brazil is considered to have the world's first sustainable biofuels 
economy and is the world's second largest (just next to USA) producer of ethanol fuel and 
largest exporter. In 2010, Brazil produced 26.2 billion liters, representing 30.1% of the world's 
total ethanol used as fuel (Renewable Fuels Association 2011). Thailand exported 
approximately US$ 2.3 billion of water treatment, pollution control and renewable energy 
technologies in 2007, mainly to developing countries such as Ethiopia. The emerging 
economies have also extended their technical expertise in environmentally sound 
technologies to several developing countries through trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 
human movement and other forms of channels (Baron 1993). 
The south-south cooperation (SSC) concept has evolved over the years, gaining as 
well as losing momentum over time, depending largely on current conditions in the global 
economy. The embryonic mechanism for SSC received its conceptual and operational 
framework from the Buenos Aires Plan of Action of 1978, which aimed to further explore 
‘Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries’ (TCDC) activities in specific sectors 
(UNDP 1995). Today, after decades of consolidation, the discourse of SSC has achieved a 
certain level of maturity and the minimum financial and human resources required to promote 
meaningful change. With its growing popularity and the emergence of the BICS (Brazil, India, 
China and South Africa) economies, SSC has moved to the forefront of many bilateral 
agreements, UN agencies and international organizations’ mandates, and multilateral 
cooperative initiatives. Development practitioners are envisioning SSC as a policy tool to 
help in local, regional and national development processes. 
2.4.4 LITERATURE ON OVERARCHING THEORIES TO EXAMINE THE RELEVANCE OF SOUTH-SOUTH 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Dependency theorists view SSC as a possible source of self-reliance for the South, and an 
alternative to NSC (Smallman and Brown 2011). They argue that the economic surplus of 
developing countries (peripherals or satellites) was expropriated, while generating economic 
development in the developed countries (cores or hegemonic or centers), which appropriate 
the surplus (Frank 1971). The assumption is that at the core of the dependency relation 
                                                                
3 Based on the analysis of patent data. 
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between center and periphery lies an inability of the latter to develop an autonomous and 
dynamic process of technological innovation (Vernengo 2004). As a result, center countries 
control technology and the systems for generating it, putting technology at center stage. 
They argue that technology transfer from developed to developing countries is a 
mechanism through which the center consolidates its economic and cultural domination over 
the periphery (Darity and Davis 2005). The dependency school of thought believe that 
enhancing manufacturing capacity in developing countries is important for eliminating the 
structural divide between the center and the peripheries (Burbach and Robinson 1999). 
Through cooperation amongst themselves, developing countries could develop technological 
capacity and avoid the deteriorating disadvantageous terms of trade, and thereby circumvent 
the dependency ties that keep them underdeveloped and subordinate (Milios 2007; 
Smallman and Brown 2011). 
Based on these assumptions, the dependency school of thought has been advocating 
South-South Cooperation (SSC), that is, cooperation between the “peripherals”. The concept 
of SSC for dependency theorists such as Cardoso and Falleto (2004) and Senghaas (1979) 
is understood as a mechanism through which countries of the global South (the periphery) 
would be enabled to overcome dependence from the industrialized nations of the global 
North (the core). The dependency theory assumes that economic domination runs across 
north-south geo-economic patterns. 
Dependency theorists view North-South technology transfer at the core of the world 
economic system as harmful to long-term economic growth of developing countries, 
preventing them from emerging out of the periphery. They argue that technology transfer is 
just one more area through which the center (the North) consolidates its economic and 
cultural domination over the periphery (the South) (Darity and Davis 2005). They believe that 
at the core of the dependency relation between center and periphery lies an inability of the 
latter to develop an autonomous and dynamic process of technological innovation. As a 
result, center countries control technology and the systems for generating it (Vernengo 
2004). They argue that north-south cooperation, which is marked by significant technology 
gaps, can’t solve both environmental and developmental problems, since the north –south 
capital flow leads only to limited transmission of technology, not to the process of innovation 
itself. The solution, as they believe, is cooperation among the peripherals, which is horizontal 
and composed of equal interactions. 
However, some developing countries such as China, India, Russia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Turkey and Mexico, have emerged as global economic powers, and have come to 
represent an unusual position within the center-periphery framework. That is, these countries 
do not fit the theoretically constructed pattern of either a center or a periphery nation, 
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particularly in their relations with least developed countries, such as Ethiopia, which is the 
case study in this thesis. In this regard, Immanuel Wallerstein’s notion of the ‘semi -
periphery’ could be useful, particularly for analyzing the relationship between countries of the 
global South with different technological advancement. 
Technologically more advanced developing countries exhibit semi-peripheral 
characteristics. The idea of the semi-periphery is derived from the world system theory 
postulated by Wallerstein, which itself is a derivative of the dependency theory. The world 
system theory moves away from the stark bifurcation suggested in the dependency theory, 
which merely distinguishes between the core and the periphery. Middle-income countries 
perform a certain function in relation to the core and the periphery; they act as a buffer zone 
between these two extremes (Wallerstein 1979). 
Semi-peripheral theorists believe that economically, semi-peripheral countries are 
intermediate, because the more powerful countries exploit them; at the same time they 
exploit weaker peripheral countries (Graaff and Venter 2001). Indeed, it becomes more 
evident that the semi-periphery has a particularly complicated role within the world system. 
As an improvement from dependency theory, the semi-periphery allows world system 
theorists to escape stagnation (Graaff and Venter 2001), which confined the dependency 
school, but also to make sense of the dramatic economic development of middle-income 
developing countries. 
However, both world system and semi-peripheral theories, as part of dependency 
theory, have addressed SSC viewing it as a possible way out of the exploitative economic 
relations with the North and as a possible source of self-reliance for the South (Haq 1980). 
On the other hand, the realist school of thought views SSC as a political strategy employed 
by regional powers (i.e. BICS: Brazil, India, China, and South-Africa,) to have weaker states 
such as Ethiopia under their control, thereby elevating their influence in the international 
arena (Schweller 1997). Realist scholars have conceived states as homogenous actors in an 
endless process of power struggle for survival and domination. Consequently, from the 
realist perspective, real cooperation among states is unlikely and SSC is a strategy used by 
dominant emerging south states to secure power (Mundy 2007). The realist school of thought 
argues that SSC, is therefore promoted by regional hegemonic powers (BICS) to consolidate 
their dominance and influence, and it would be effective as long as it doesn’t diminish their 
power (Karns and Mingst 2004; Woods 2001). The Mercantilists share the realist 
presumptions in SSC and describe the world economy as an arena for inter-state competition 
for power, where states seek to maximize their wealth vis-à-vis other states (Woods 2001). 
They argue that the new powers from the South, in particular BICS, are engaged with LDCs 
in a SSC framework in order to meet their cheap production and natural resources demand, 
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and then use LDCs as a market for their manufactured goods (Kreitlow 2007). They view the 
stronger presence of emerging economies like China and India in less developed southern 
countries as a “monolithic dragon scrambling for natural resources to service their own 
growing capitalist economy” (Mohan and Power 2008 p. 25). They further state that the BICS 
export strategy is contributing to de-industrialization of LDCs (Mbeki 2006). 
2.4.5 LITERATURE ON ETHIOPIA CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 
Ethiopia conducted a Technological Needs Assessment (TNA) in 2008 and submitted its 
First National Communication in 2001 and a National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) 
to UNFCCC in 2007. The country has completed preparation of a new work program for 
action, the ‘Ethiopian Program of Adaptation to Climate Change’ (EPACC), that updated the 
2007 NAPA, and has also developed an overarching framework and national strategy, the 
“Climate Resilient Green Economy” (CRGE). 
According to the Initial National Communication of Ethiopia to the UNFCCC, GHG 
emissions in Ethiopia totaled 48,003 Gg CO2-equivalents in 1994, excluding CO2 
emissions/removals in the land use and forestry sector. Sector-wise, Ethiopia’s GHG 
emission profile is dominated by emissions from Agriculture contributing 80% of the total 
while gas-wise it is dominated by CH4 contributing 80% of the total CO2-equivalent 
emissions in 1994. 
The Technological Needs Assessment (TNA) of Ethiopia was based on the IPCC 
greenhouse gas emission categories/sectors namely; energy, agriculture, land use change, 
and forestry, industrial processes and waste. Sub-sectors were also selected under each 
sector based on the relative magnitude of GHG emission levels. 
The Ethiopia TNA identified and prioritized technologies for GHG reduction in the five 
sectors as follows: (1) Priority technologies for the energy sector include, micro-pico 
hydropower generation, photovoltaic, geothermal, wind turbine, alternative fuel, compact and 
efficient vehicles etc. (2) Priority technologies for the agriculture sector include technologies 
for reducing emission of methane from grazing livestock and technologies for reducing N2O 
(3) Priority technologies for land use change and the forestry sector include improved 
management of existing forests, expansion of forest cover and sustainable use of wood fuels 
as a substitute for fossil fuels (4) Priority technologies for the industrial process sector 
include raw material conservation, efficient use of end products, material recycling, and 
technology improvement (5) Priority technologies for the waste sector include composting, 
sanitary landfill and integrated solid waste management. 
A number of barriers for technology transfer were identified in each sector. The most 
common barriers cited in all sectors of the Ethiopia NPA were lack of: financial resources, 
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technical capacity, awareness, adequate coordination, institutional set up and clear 
policies/mandates. 
The quality of the Ethiopia TNA could be questioned simply by looking at the absence 
of quality review in the UNFCCC TNA process and lack of genuine and legitimate 
stakeholder consultations in the TNA preparation. The Ethiopia TNA also acknowledges that 
the report was not exhaustive, and suggested further studies and assessments to create a 
clear picture of the technological needs of the country. Critical assessment is not possible as 
there are no literature on the TNA, or comment of experts and scholars. 
The lack of academic literature is not only just on the Ethiopia TNA, but also in general 
there are no studies on the quality of Ethiopia climate change related policies, strategies, 
regulations and reports. There is some literature on technology transfer in the Ethiopian 
agriculture sector. Aberra and Beyene (1997) mention that the major technology transfer 
problem in the Ethiopian agriculture sector is lack of efficient dissemination pathways. 
Mulugeta (1998) found that annual productivity of crops in Northern Ethiopia was declining, 
partly owing to the lack of appropriate extension of available technologies. Technology 
transfer and adoption studies in eastern parts of Ethiopia have also identified that full 
participation of farmers was not considered as the basic strategy in technology dissemination 
(Wegayehu 1997; Gebre-Michael et al. 2009). 
The aim of technology assessment is to: inform decision makers, provide an early 
warning signal for unintended consequences, prepare stakeholders for possible 
technological changes, or facilitate the participation of stakeholders in decision-making 
(Smits and Leyten 1988). Therefore, stakeholder participation and feedback loops should be 
emphasized. The process of performing the TNA involves formation of a network of 
stakeholders who are involved in energy, climate change planning, and adaptation activities; 
as well as consulting technology owners and practitioners, entrepreneurs, communities, and 
sector representatives. Stakeholder perspectives can lead to development of a shared vision 
for moving forward. The key role of stakeholders for implementing change has been 
recognized in many studies (IPCC 2000; Morsink et al. 2011; Lovett et al. 2012; Lundvall et 
al. 2002), which indicate that new ways of operating can emerge from exploratory activities 
combined with deliberative processes. 
The Ethiopia National Adaptation Program (NAPA) presented international technology 
transfer as one of the major vehicles to implement effectively the projects identified in the 
report. The NAPA has identified twenty project ideas that address immediate climate change 
adaptation needs of the country. These projects broadly focus in the areas of human and 
institutional capacity building, improving natural resource management, enhancing irrigation 
40 
agriculture and water harvesting, strengthening early warning systems and awareness 
raising. 
Ethiopia’s Climate- Resilient Green Economy (CRGE, 2011), a relatively recent 
document, has three complementary objectives: fostering economic development and 
growth, ensuring mitigation of greenhouse gases (GHGs), and supporting adaptation to 
climate change. This vision asserts that building resilience to avoid damage to the economy 
depends on understanding the threats and priority areas for focusing adaptation efforts. The 
document sets out the challenges and opportunities which climate change brings for 
Ethiopia. It makes the case for why a carbon neutral and climate resilient development 
trajectory to a green economy is a priority for the country, and thus for the implementation of 
the country growth and transformation plan. 
The Green Economy Strategy identified seven sectors that offer the highest 
greenhouse gas abatement potential: power supply; buildings and green cities; forestry 
(REDD+); agricultural/soil-based emissions; livestock; transport; and Industry. In general four 
initiatives for fast-track implementation have been selected under the CRGE: (i) exploiting 
Ethiopia’s vast hydropower potential; (ii) large-scale promotion of advanced rural cooking 
technologies; (iii) efficiency improvements to the livestock value chain; and (iv) Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). The CRGE was made public 
in 2011 during the COP 17 Durban climate conference and investment of about $150 billion 
was estimated for its implementation up to 2030. 
2.5 LITERATURE ON FIRM LEVEL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The review of literature in this section is on climate technology transfer at the firm level and 
focuses on analyzing case studies specifically on mechanisms for technology transfer and 
investigating how specific mechanisms contribute to the technological learning of recipient 
firms in developing countries. There is, for example, extensive research on foreign direct 
investment, joint ventures, licensing and research and development (Hobday and Rush 
2007; Ivarson and Alvstam 2005; Kuemmerle 1999; Mowery and Oxely 1995; Pack and 
Saggi 2001). 
The section shows that literature on firm-level support for technology transfer is 
inadequate for understanding the big picture of climate technology transfer. This research 
emphasizes giving a broader picture of climate technology transfer through empirical 
evidence from a smaller-scale unit: firm level technology transfer. The section also describes 
the paucity of empirical studies that take into account the perspective of actors involved in 
actual climate technology transfer activities. It indicates that a limited amount of research has 
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been undertaken on the impact of political and institutional factors for effective firm level 
technology transfer. 
2.5.1 LITERATURE ON THE MOTIVATION OF FIRMS FOR INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Firms have a variety of motives for international technology transfer, although their main goal 
remains, in most cases, maximization of financial gains and building competitive advantages 
that enable them to make profit and to stay ahead of competitors (Narula and Dunning 2000). 
This generalized motive applies to both technology suppliers (in most cases multi-national 
companies) and recipient country firms. However, these two technology transfer actors could 
have some differences when it comes to details of their motives. A number of empirical 
studies support this assumption by revealing that different expectations exist between 
supplier and recipient regarding goals, as well as the content, of the international technology 
transfer processes (Bennett et al. 1997). 
For example, supplier firms participate in international technology transfer in order to 
increase market share, lower production cost, restructure existing production through 
rationalization, seek strategically related created assets, diversify product outreach, gain 
strategic advantages over competitors, and gain knowledge about local markets (Goulet 
1989; Narula and Dunning 2000); or according to Gilpin (1987), to enter into protected 
markets and for long term strategies (Kooijman-van Dijk 2012). Bruun and Bennett (2002) 
put it in more economic terms: firms transfer technology abroad in order to take advantage of 
cost and market factors, or as Gassmann (2003) argued, the purely monetary return of such 
transfers in the form of licensing fees. While technology supply firms have a number of 
incentives to transfer parts of their technology internationally, at the same time they also 
have an interest in controlling their technological assets. The interest in control over 
technology stems from the importance of technological advantage for the economic 
performance of the business firm (Gassmann 2003). 
Suppliers critically select recipients and countries, and engage in international 
technology transfer management to retain some parts of their specific knowledge, despite all 
inherent interest in the success of the transfer process (Cannice et al. 2003; Liebeskind 
1996). This transfer management includes transferring outdated technology, retaining core 
technology, increasing research and development efforts, changing ownership structures of 
subsidiary firms, accepting leakage and attempting to keep personnel (Bruun and Bennett 
2002; Cannice et al. 2003). 
As with technology recipients, cost minimization using foreign technologies is a strong 
motivation. But other motivations may be quite different from those of supplier firms, such as: 
(a) technical capabilities, quality, or cost reductions, that they cannot achieve on their own 
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(Archibugi and Coco 2004; Kogut and Zander 1993); (b) enhancing their reputation through 
the higher perceived status of “international level” technologies (Welsh et al. 2008); (c) 
access to managerial and marketing expertise, (d) access to export markets; and (e) access 
to distribution networks or other organizational assets (Samli 1985). Recipient-country firms 
may also seek energy-efficiency and renewable-energy technologies to comply with 
domestic environmental regulations. 
2.5.2 LITERATURE ON MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
There are different approaches, methods, and indicators in the literature regarding 
measuring technology transfer at the firm level, but there is agreement that measuring 
technology transfer is inherently difficult because technology has no measurable physical 
presence or a well-defined price (IPCC 2000; World Bank 2008). Patent counts are 
frequently used as a proxy for technology output (Archibugi and Pianta 1996; Branstetter 
2001; Eaton and Kortum 1996; Jaffe and Tratjenberg 1996). However, some researchers 
have serious concerns in using patent count as indicator for measuring technology transfer. 
Keller (2004) argued that patent statistics did not report transfers related to non-codified 
technology, and that patent count misses technologies that are not patented, particularly in 
developing countries where a large set of innovations are not patented. Also, if technology is 
in part non-codifiable, patent statistics miss that part (Keller 2004). Some researchers have 
pointed out that foreign R&D and exposure to trade could measure technology transfer 
through regression analysis where productivity is jointly explained (Bayoumi et al. 1999; 
Basant and Brian 1996; Hoekman and Javorcik 2006; and Xu and Wang 1999). 
Other studies, however, consider that import shares are not necessary for measuring 
the extent of technology transfer, as transfers do not necessarily occur through trade (Keller 
1999; Hutchison 2005). Bell (1989) developed a model to show the possible contribution of 
international technology transfer of industrial technology to the technological capabilities of 
the recipient. He distinguishes three different types of technology flow from technology 
supplier to technology recipient, each with different qualities: (1) Flow A comprises the capital 
goods and services needed to create the physical facilities of a new production system; (2) 
Flow B refers to the skills and know-how needed to operate and maintain the newly installed 
production facility; (3) Flow C refers to the skills and knowledge necessary to generate 
technical change. In practice, however, there are difficulties in precisely applying Bell’s model 
for measuring technology transfer. 
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2.5.3 LITERATURE ON OVERARCHING THEORIES TO EXAMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER  
The Actor Network Theory (ANT): When technologies are transferred within and among 
actor-networks, they make sense in different ways depending on the way they are translated 
by the actors, and the way they used to sustain or challenge the network. From an ANT point 
of view, successful technology transfer processes are a matter of creating, maintaining and 
strengthening heterogeneous networks so that they create durable connections. So in order 
to understand how a project progresses (or fails to progress) we need to “follow the actor” 
and observe how they extend (or fail to extend) the actor networks in which they are involved 
(Garrety et al. 2001). 
The basic elements of the theory are the existence of human and non-human actors 
and how they are tied together into networks, which are built and maintained to achieve a 
particular goal (alignment) (Bijker and Law 1992). Networks are constructed out of human 
actors (people, organizations, groups of scientists, engineers, companies, etc.) and non-
human actors (documents, competences, money, technological objects, machines, rules, 
software, etc.) (Akroyd 2001). ANT developed dynamic and flexible views as socio-
technological approach to technology transfer by mixing technological, economic and human 
factors to explain how technology is transferred. 
In ANT it is recognized that technologies do not evolve under the impetus of scientific 
logic and they are not possessed of an inherent momentum that allows passing through a 
neutral social medium (Latour 1999). In effect, “our technologies mirror our societies” (Bijker 
and Law 1992) as they are continuously shaped and reshaped by the interplay of a range of 
heterogeneous forces within the networks. 
What actor-network theorists seek to investigate are the means by which associations 
come into existence and how the roles and functions of subjects and objects, actors and 
intermediaries, humans and non-humans are attributed and stabilized (Murdoch 2001). 
Translation builds actor-networks from entities and it attaches characteristics to them and 
establishes more or less stable relationships between them (Murdoch 2001). 
 
The Theory of Absorptive Capacity (TAC): The role of absorptive capacity in receiving 
organizations has been identified to be one of the most important determinants in technology 
transfer (Yoeh 2009). Absorptive capacity addresses a highly relevant aspect of 
organizational activities by focusing upon a firms’ ability to sense their information 
environment, to recognize new technological opportunities and to capture and integrate new 
information and knowledge into the firms’ processes and routines with the subsequent aim 
and result of increased competitive advantage (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). The term 
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absorptive capacity was introduced by Cohen and Levinthal (1994) to describe the requisite 
capabilities of a firm to innovate. They define absorptive capacity as a firm’s ability to 
recognize the value of new, external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial 
ends. The premise of the notion of absorptive capacity is that the organization needs prior 
related knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge (Kim 1991). The potential to learn is 
greatest if the new knowledge that needs to be assimilated is closely related to the prior 
knowledge base (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). 
Zahra and George (2002) further explain it as a kind of accumulation and flow of 
organizational knowledge. They extended the theory by defining it as the process of 
knowledge acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation. Vincent Chauvet (2009) 
detailed the dimensions of absorptive capacity as: (a) recognizing and valuing new external 
knowledge (Acquisition), (b) a firm’s routines and processes that allow it to analyze, process, 
interpret and understand the knowledge obtained from external sources (Assimilation), (c) 
the internalization of new external information (Transformation), and (d) applying new 
learned external knowledge to commercial ends (Exploitation). 
In empirical work, absorptive capacity is usually analyzed in quantitative terms and is 
measured via critical factors of absorptive capacity such as: (1) technology diffusion 
channels and interaction mechanisms (Lin et al. 2002), (2) emphasizing employees’ ability 
and employees’ motivation (Minbaeva et al. 2003), (3) communication, and (4) diversity and 
strategic positioning (Nieto and Quevedo 2005). 
2.6 KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND VALUE OF THE STUDY 
This research differs in four major ways from preceding work. First and foremost, it 
emphasizes interconnections of the multi-level structures of climate technology transfer 
(decisions made at the three levels: international, national, and firm levels.). The literature 
review presented above on international climate technology transfer revealed that what we 
know about international technology transfer is fragmented between the three levels: 
research on firm level climate technology transfer, research on national technology transfer 
and research on international climate policy debates. Under the divided perceptions of 
between north and south, countries have been negotiating arrangements for technology 
transfer in international climate agreements, national governments have been preparing 
policy documents mainly as a response to international requirements and transfer of 
technology has been taking place at the firm level. All these have been happening without 
sufficient empirical evidence at the multi-level and multi-scale transfer of technology. Thus, 
filling the knowledge gap with actual cases may facilitate the difficult negotiations, improve 
the quality of climate policies, and accelerate the transfer of climate technologies. 
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Second, this research emphasizes the dynamic aspects of international technology 
transfer, rather than the static aspects such as measures and modes of transfer. The thesis 
investigates the reasons for the difficulties in developing a concrete international policy on 
climate technology transfer. It also examines the asymmetry in parties’ interests and 
demands on international climate technology transfer under the UNFCCC and its implications 
for international climate governance, national policies and technology transfer at the local 
level. Much prior work on international technology transfer concentrated on analyzing specific 
measures and modes of technology transfer, reviewing principles and objectives of 
international technology, suggesting policy space for transfer of climate technologies, 
compiling and synthesizing case studies and evaluating projects. There is no detailed 
analysis of country positions under the UNFCCC in the academic literature. 
Third, the level of innovation across countries has changed rapidly in recent years and 
the direction of international climate technologies has shown changes accordingly. Some 
developing countries are exporting climate technologies; and transfer of technologies from 
South to South and from South to North have been already observed. The role of 
government in enhancing technology transfer is becoming more heterogeneous across 
countries and is getting more complex. This research recognizes these realities and new 
paradigms, and analyzes their implications for accelerating the transfer of climate 
technologies. Despite the wide recognition of economic advancement and technological 
sophistication of developing countries, these changes in relation to international technology 
flow have not received sufficient attention in academic research, and no coherent 
international polices under the UNFCCC have yet been formulated. Much of the theoretical 
and practical work relating to the transfer of climate technology at the national level has 
emphasized international transfer of technology as an important link between the responses 
to climate change, and achieving national economic development including appropriateness 
of technologies and national policies for technology transfer. 
Fourth, this research emphasizes the broader picture of climate technology transfer 
through presenting empirical evidence from a smaller-scale unit: firm level technology 
transfer. The thesis takes into account the perspective of actors involved in actual climate 
technology transfer activities, reviews the characteristics of technology transfer networks and 
analyzes the quality of firms network relationships. It looks at how the political and 
institutional contexts influence firm level technology transfer. 
Prior work on climate technology transfer usually does not take into account the 
perspective of actors involved in actual climate technology transfer activities. The literature 
review in this chapter shows that studies on international technology transfer focus on 
specific mechanisms for technology transfer, and measures of transfer do not take into 
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account the diversity of channels through which these happen, and the outputs and effects 
that they convey. Choosing one specific mechanism, and related theories on how such a 
mechanism supports technology transfer, is inadequate for understanding the overall picture 
of climate technology transfer. In addition, although the technology transfer literature is 
extensive in terms of understanding institutional contexts, it is weak in terms of 
understanding political influences on transfer of technologies. 
This dissertation aims to fill gaps in knowledge associated with these four areas of 
climate technology transfer. The study also serves as a starting point for future research and 
contributes to the climate technology transfer debate by presenting empirical evidence and 
analytical analysis of international climate policy, national development approaches in the 
context of climate technology transfer, and local transfer practices. The strength of this study 
stems from its perspective and approach in examining the level of interconnections between 
the different scales of climate technology transfer. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of this 
study is its potential to build on the comprehensive and broader notion of climate technology 
transfer by providing information on the synergies of decision-making structures that result 
from analytical analysis of socio-political and technical factors at different scales, and how 
the different entities intervene and influence the decision making processes. 
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CHAPTER 3  METHODOLOGY 
 
The previous chapter reviewed the theoretical and empirical literature relevant to this 
doctoral research and the identified gaps in knowledge. This chapter presents the research 
design and methodology to answer the research questions. The chapter starts by describing 
the general research approaches and methods that were applied, as well as the rationale for 
the chosen research methods. This is followed by explanations of the instruments used and 
the processes followed for data collection and analysis. 
3.1 RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
This thesis examines the relationships between multi-leveled decision structures for climate 
technology transfer through an exploratory assessment of top down macro-policy analysis, 
and bottom up micro-implementation analysis. Specifically, the research addresses the 
research question: what is the relationship between firm practices, national policies, and 
international discourses for climate technology transfer and if there is a disjunction, then 
why? The overall focus of this thesis lies in better understanding the interconnections and 
synergies between the different scales to fill the knowledge gaps identified in Chapter 2 with 
empirical evidence. The thesis explains the value of international climate technology transfer 
by investigating micro-level processes in the form of national experiences and firm level 
transfer practices in the context of international climate policies to gain empirical data. At the 
same time, the thesis looks at the complexity and challenges of trying to achieve micro-level 
technological change for environmentally friendly development in developing countries 
through a decidedly macro-level policy process. The thesis combines top-down macro-policy 
analysis with bottom-up micro-implementation analysis and undertakes primary research on 
all three levels to obtain evidence on whether, and how, the three levels interact. It also 
seeks to gain detailed understanding of international technology transfer under the UNFCCC, 
an in depth understanding of national approach to international climate technology, and an 
analysis of its practical implementation at the local level. 
Firstly, technology transfer in the context of international climate change negotiations is 
examined to explain the causes for the lack of ambitious international climate technology 
transfer agreements. The major research question, therefore, to be answered by this 
component is “Why did countries fail to reach ambitious climate technology transfer 
agreements?” While addressing this question the section (Chapter 4) also looks at the 
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asymmetry in parties’ interests and demands on international climate technology transfer 
under the UNFCCC.  
Secondly, the realities in south-south climate technology transfer are investigated by 
answering the research question: What is the nature of collaboration between developing 
countries for promoting climate technology transfer at the national level vis-à-vis North-South 
technology transfer? This component specifically investigates the potential, motivational 
factors and the characteristics of South-South technology transfer compared to North-South 
technology transfer. 
Limitation in existing literature on providing details about the broader picture of climate 
technology transfer through empirical evidence from smaller-scale units, and the limitations 
of studies looking at the perspective of actors involved in actual climate technology transfer 
activities is addressed in the third component. This stage of the research studies 
implementation of national policies at the local level in the context of international 
negotiations. Here, effectiveness of international cooperation modalities (SSCTT, NSCTT 
and NSSCTT) for enhancing the transfer of climate technologies at the firm level is evaluated 
by taking into account the perspective of actors involved in actual climate technology transfer 
activities. This section reviews the characteristics of technology transfer networks and 
analyzes the quality of firms’ network relationships. The research question for this 
component is: “How effective are the international cooperation modalities (SSCTT, NSCTT 
and NSSCTT) for enhancing transfer of climate technologies at the firm level?” Table 3.1 
presents the operationalization of these research questions. 
 
Climate technology transfer is a highly complex process that evolves over time with no clear 
temporal boundaries. Qualitative research methodology helps in understanding how this 
complex, multi-leveled techno-social world is interpreted, investigated, and evaluated (Mason 
1996). Qualitative research methodology is more appropriate for this research project inquiry 
because it requires data collection and interpretation that is flexible and sensitive to the 
social and political context (Mason 1996). In addition, because of its complexity, 
understanding of climate technology transfer requires a holistic approach. Qualitative 
research methods can provide such a comprehensive view. However, as Patton (2002) 
points out, one of the problems associated with this methodology is the potential subjectivity 
and bias in data collection and analysis. In order to tackle this potential problem the 
perspectives of interviewees and survey respondents from a wide variety of backgrounds, 
and with diverse affiliations, was triangulated. 
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TABLE 3.1  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS FOR EACH STAGE OF THE RESEARCH 
Overarching research question: what is the relationship between firm practices, national 
policies, and international discourses for climate technology transfer and if there is a 
disjunction, then why? 
 
Research Stage Specific Research Questions Method 
1st Stage: 
International climate 
policy debates 
What were the preferences of 
developing and developed countries 
for promoting and implementing 
climate technology transfer? What 
was the origin and structure of 
countries’ incompatible preferences 
and bargains? How was the quality of 
the Copenhagen Conference 
outcome affected by the incompatible 
preferences and bargains of the 
parties? 
Observation of international climate change 
conferences, interviews of participants and 
delegates at a climate change conferences 
(mainly in Bonn), interpretation of treaties 
and historical secondary sources 
2nd Stage: National 
approaches for 
climate technology 
transfer 
What is the potential of South-South 
cooperation for climate technology 
transfer compared to North-South 
technology transfer? What are the 
motivational factors for the transfer of 
climate technology from one 
developing country to another? What 
are the characteristics of South-South 
technology transfer compared to 
North-South technology transfer? 
Survey to collect the perspectives of experts, 
researchers, policy makers, and practitioners 
on the government of Ethiopia low carbon 
climate resilient development approaches 
and international technology cooperation. 
The survey is administered through 
questionnaires backed by follow up 
interviews and focus groups discussions with 
professionals and policy makers in Addis 
Ababa. Content analysis of newspapers, 
news briefings, policy documents, archives.  
3rd Stage: Local 
relationships and firm 
level practices 
How are network relationships 
characterized, how are networks tied 
up and stabilized in SSCTT, NSCTT 
and NSSCTT?  How is absorptive 
capacity and technological learning 
characterized in SSCTT, NSCTT and 
NSSCTT? What are the challenges 
and benefits of the three modalities of 
cooperation for enhancing effective 
climate technology transfer, how 
could the challenges be overcome? 
A case study to gather and analyze relevant 
data. The empirical material includes direct 
observational evidence of actors, institutional 
context, and processes, interviews (formal 
and informal), reviewing relevant published 
material and the study of documentation 
available in the various international and 
local organizations involved.   
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Balnaves and Caputi (2001) and McCracken (1988) point out that quantitative methodology 
allows the researcher to gain a sharp focus on a limited set of predetermined research 
categories. However, climate technology transfer data for the purposes of this research do 
not exist as such, and only some imperfect proxies can be used to provide an idea of the 
extent of these transfers. Quantitative studies that define and measure technology transfer, 
and explain the factors that drive and enable them, are therefore limited by lack of data. 
Nevertheless, case studies, observation, and survey research methods complement the 
qualitative studies by generating in-depth and broader descriptions of climate technology 
transfer, whilst at the same time showing the actual technology transfer process in its context 
and by providing a focused, localized, empirical, and qualitative approach to understand the 
variables that govern successful technology transfer. 
This research, as shown in Table 3.1, employs a combination of case study, survey, 
and observation research methods. The combination of these methods enables the 
explanatory qualitative research to use first-hand experience and quotations of actual 
conversations to reach an understanding of climate technology transfer and provide an 
explicit rendering of the structure, order, and broad patterns found at each of the three levels 
investigated. 
Qualitative researchers have frequently suggested that research design, data collection 
and analysis are simultaneous and continuous processes (Burgess 1984; Goetz and 
LeCompte 1984). This is the guiding principle of the research methodology of this thesis as 
demonstrated in the methodological framework diagram (Figure 3.1). In the framework of this 
guiding principle, this research follows the constant comparison method as an overall 
analytic strategy to interpret and analyze data. According to Goetz and LeCompte (1984), 
this method includes a simultaneous comparison of all social incidents observed. As social 
phenomena are recorded and classified, they are also compared across categories. Thus, 
relationship discovery begins with the analysis of initial observations. This process 
undergoes continuous refinement throughout the data collection and analysis process. As 
events are constantly compared with previous events, new topological dimensions, as well 
as new relationships, may be discovered (Geels 2007, 2009; and Goetz and LeCompte 
1984). 
To trace the relationships between the international  (Chapter 4), national (Chapter 5) 
and the firm level (Chapter 6) climate technology discussion structures and ensure the 
continuous refinement of the data collection and analysis process, this research employs an 
“iterative explanation building” and “concurrent analysis technique”. “Iterative explanation 
building” is a technique, which aims at iterative explanations of the object of study to trace 
causal links (Yin 2003). 
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In order to trace relations between the three levels of analysis (international, national, 
and firm levels), each research chapter (Chapter 4, 5 and 6) relates findings to the other 
levels of analysis. Linking of the three levels of analysis was done to trace possible causal 
links and to support the holistic picture of climate technology transfer. Application of the 
iterative explanation building analysis technique enables the research to combine the top 
down macro-policy analysis and bottom up micro-implementation analysis (Geels 2002 and 
2006). The analysis in each level takes place concurrently with data collection. This early and 
continual analysis approach enables the collection of better data by cycling through old and 
new data, and adjusting tactics and even strategies based on what Bogdan and Biklen 
(1982) distinguished as preliminary findings. 
 
FIGURE 3.1  THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH OF THE THESIS 
 
As indicated in Figure 3.1, data analysis is an ongoing iterative process where data was 
continuously collected and analyzed almost simultaneously. This causes the researcher to 
move backwards and forwards between different sequences in the research process. This 
echoes the view of Wiseman (1974) when she writes that the “constant interplay of data 
gathering and analysis is at the heart of qualitative research”. 
In each level, data collection and analysis happened concurrently: new analytic steps 
informing the process of additional data collection and new data informing the analytic 
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processes. Because of this social science researchers such as Shamoo and Resnik (2003), 
and Green et al. (2007) underscore the fact that qualitative data analysis process is not 
entirely distinguishable from the actual data collection. 
The methodological diagram (Figure 3.1) demonstrates this, and to put this in context, 
in this research, data collection methods were redesigned and future interview questions 
were modified, based on analysis results of completed surveys and interviews. This kind of 
approach is important to social research as qualitative research seldom involves the use of a 
straightforward set of procedures (Miles and Huberman 1984), but instead research design, 
data collection and analysis is interwoven (De Vaus 1991). It is also well summarized by 
Bechhofer (1974) when he stated: “The research process, then, is not a clear cut sequence 
of procedures following a neat pattern, but a messy interaction between the conceptual and 
empirical world, deduction and induction occurring at the same time”. 
When the concurrency approach was impractical due to the busy schedules during the 
interview process and participant availability was limited, survey results and prior interview 
transcripts were read, and notes were made, to enable the conduct of the next interview to 
be better focused. Probes were fashioned and tactics refined and the interview process 
evolved as it progressed through the research participants. The aim was to constantly 
engage in preliminary analytic strategies during data collection (Bogdan and Biklen 1982). 
As indicated in Figure 3.1, this thesis uses different theoretical lenses to analyze the 
relationships of the three decision-making levels of international climate technology transfer. 
For further information on use of theories in this research as a conceptual and 
methodological tool please see Section 3.2.4. 
3.2 DATA ACQUISITION AND INTERPRETATION  
The major data collection methods used in this thesis are interview, questionnaire, 
observation, and case study, as the research problem requires multiple methods (Brewer 
and Hunter 1989). A conventional multi-method approach generates multiple data sets from 
analysis of the same problem, which can then be cross-validated (Baker 1994), enabling a 
more valid and reliable construction of realities. Details of the practical data gathering are 
explained in each of the research chapters (Chapter 4, 5, and 6). In this section the three 
major data collection methods, (survey, observation, and case study) of the research are 
presented in a generic sense. However, a relatively more in depth discussion is given to 
qualitative semi-structured and unstructured interviewing since it was identified as the most 
suitable method for collecting data and is the most frequently used technique in all the three 
research chapters. 
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The qualitative survey data collection methods used in this research comprises both 
open and closed ended questions intended to measure participants’ general perceptions and 
attitudes about countries’ positions on international technology transfer discussions under the 
UNFCCC, national technology cooperation approaches and firm’s technology partnership 
modalities. The survey enables data capture from a wide participant pool, while obtaining the 
broader view of climate technology transfer. McIntyre (1999) observed that surveys elicit 
information about attitudes that are otherwise difficult to measure using observational 
techniques. 
However, the survey instrument was generally unsuitable for gathering information 
relating to the historical context of climate technology transfer such as previous international 
agreements, national technology transfer policies, regulations, and firm contractual 
agreements etc. Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993) noted that surveys are generally 
unsuitable when an understanding of the historical context of phenomena under investigation 
is required. This limitation of the survey method was tackled by gathering historical data 
through a review of secondary literature about the history of treaties, policies, regulations, 
and contractual agreements. Interviews were also conducted to secure more personal 
narratives and a deeper insight into issues associated with collaborative relationships and 
technology transfer. 
To be able to gain a profound insight, interviews were used in this research both as a 
source of primary data and as a complement to other sources. In this regard McNamara 
(1999) pointed out that interviews are useful to follow-up responses to questionnaires. 
Qualitative interviewing is one of the most common ways in which the ‘hows’ and ‘whats’ of 
people and their lives can be studied (Fontana and Frey 2005). It also manifests specific 
characteristics that make it an extremely versatile approach to doing research (Berg 1998). 
In conducting the interviews a general frame was used to as a guide, usually a semi-
structured approach. However, the study did not follow a strict frame as the interviewees 
often expanded on interesting issues that were not included in the initial framework. 
As the research proceeded, modifications of the questions, based on experience in the 
field and results of primary analysis, were made in order to make them more suitable for the 
study. In the semi-structured interviews the protocol was developed using open-ended 
questions based on the central focus of each research chapter before data collection in order 
to obtain specific information and enable comparison across cases. The interviews 
nevertheless remained open and flexible so that individual participants’ stories could be 
probed in more detail. As some social researchers have argued, this technique (semi-
structured interviews) allows the interviewees to freely express their viewpoints while also 
allowing the researcher to guide the interview (Kvale 1996; Flick 2009). 
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A copy of the interview protocol was sent to those participants (especially to the higher 
officials) who asked for it before the interview took place, though these were relatively few. 
Pre-testing of the interview protocol was also conducted to get feedback on individual 
questionnaire items, to intercept possible problems with terminology, and to get an indication 
of how respondents may answer some of the questions. 
Each topic area was introduced by the researcher with an open-ended question that 
allowed spontaneous expression by the respondents in answering the questions, as well as 
further in-depth probing by the interviewer where necessary. The research also employed an 
almost totally unstructured interviewing technique. In this technique the researcher usually 
asked a single question and the participants were then allowed to respond freely, with the 
researcher simply responding to points that seem worthy of being followed up. Burgess 
(1984) argues that unstructured interviewing tends to be very similar in character to a 
conversation. 
This type of interview was used mainly when the researcher met participants in 
conferences and other events and the interview was very much ‘conversational’ in style. The 
first focus of this interview was putting the participants at ease while also explaining fully and 
clearly in what ways the researcher was hoping for help and then a more detailed interview 
was conducted in a form of relaxed conversations. The conversations were took place in 
conference rooms, offices and sometimes even during a car journey and over meals. The 
respondents aware that they were being interviewed for research purposes. The main 
content of the conversations consisted of comments, discussion and questions about the 
climate policy conferences, Ethiopia government technology transfer approaches and views 
about different actors of technology transfer. 
Participants in the unstructured interviews were chosen based on their knowledge and 
expertise to provide the information needed. They were recommended by several sources 
and acted as key informants, also referred as key consultants (Werner and Schoepfle 1987), 
and provided in-depth, expert information on elements of international climate technology 
transfer. Though these unstructured interviews (key informant interviews) were like a 
conversation among acquaintances and allowed a free flow of ideas and information, notes 
were taken and developed in detail immediately after each interview to ensure accuracy. A 
set of common subheadings was also used to ease the data analysis that was occurred 
concurrently with the data collection. 
When collecting non-sensitive information, focus group discussions were used to 
understand differences in perspectives `and explore the depth and nuances of opinions 
regarding international climate technology transfer and technological cooperation 
approaches of the Ethiopian government. 
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In order to generate in-depth descriptions of climate technology transfer, an 
observational data collection method was used in all three levels of climate technology 
transfer. Observation was conducted during climate change conferences, UNFCCC 
Convention subsidiary bodies meetings, and national workshops on the Ethiopian Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTP) and manufacturing and production operation of selected 
companies in Ethiopia. The observation method was used for obtaining information on 
actors’ actions, roles, behavior and interactions that were otherwise inaccessible. 
A case study method following the approach of Yin (1984, 1992, 1994 and 2003) was 
also employed. Multiple case studies that observe a number of cases and their context were 
chosen for the purpose of analyzing local level climate technology transfer. The chosen case 
studies provided qualitative information about what constitutes successful technology 
transfer and what are the key enabling factors. They highlight the particularities of climate 
technology transfer in the context of a least developed country.  Yin (1984 and 1992) pointed 
out that in a case study approach data collection should include multiple sources. Data 
sources for the selected case studies of local level transfer of technology analysis included 
review of public and non-public documents, interviews, survey, and observations. 
3.2.1 RESEARCH ACCESS AND ETHICAL CONCERNS 
Entry into the research domain of international climate technology transfer was challenging 
and quite difficult. A large number of communications (emails and voice mails) made to 
initiate contact with various delegates of countries at the climate conferences under the 
UNFCCC were left unanswered, despite repeated attempts; others were politely declined. 
Denial of access to the researcher and data acquisition limitations were not restricted 
to delegates of countries at the UNFCCC climate policies, but also with the Ethiopian 
authorities, and to some extent to industrial communities. This access denial issue, while 
frustrating and a limiting factor to this inquiry, was not entirely surprising. The researcher has 
been working for international organizations and that background has provided concomitant 
knowledge of the concern of government representatives for revealing their positions outside 
the negotiation rooms. That knowledge, coupled with an understanding of climate change 
policy debates as major process in world politics, made denial of access not entirely 
unexpected even before this inquiry commenced. In addition, data collection for the 
international level study was made in 2009 at the Copenhagen Climate Conference, which 
attracted a great deal of attention. The researcher of this doctoral thesis, with a full 
understanding of all these circumstances, carefully considered access when designing the 
research. 
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To counter the problem of research access, Johnson (1997) proposes incremental 
access strategies that rest on the principle of building positive relationships and establishing 
credibility. Social science researchers argue that the strength of the interviewer-participant 
relationship is perhaps the single most important aspect of a qualitative research project. It is 
through this relationship that all data are collected and data validity strengthened (Adler and 
Adler 2002; Kvale 1996). It was the quality of this relationship that likely affected some 
participants’ self-disclosure, including the depth of information they shared about their 
experience of the international climate policy negotiations, Ethiopia climate policies and the 
effectiveness of technology transfer. At first contact during the interviews, participants 
expressed feeling guarded while discussing their experiences. Had they not felt at least 
some sense of safety with the interviewer, they likely would not have been forthcoming in 
discussing these difficult events at all. 
To access data and recruit interviewees, the researcher made use of two central 
techniques; namely, gatekeepers and snowballing. Firstly, gatekeepers “are those individuals 
in an organization that have the power to grant or withhold access to people or situations for 
the purposes of research” (Seidman 1998). Snowballing, on the other hand, is the use of 
“one contact to help you recruit another contact, which in turn can put you in touch with 
someone else” (Seidman 1998). These methods are useful as they can overcome the 
problems that arise when the researcher tries to find relevant informants (Bryman 2001). 
Moreover, gatekeepers are imperative for any study as they are often the first “load of snow” 
necessary for expanding the snowball (Bryman 2001). 
The main gatekeepers in this research were higher government and political party 
officials, company senior management members and officials at the UNFCCC, government 
agencies and private companies in various capacities. Gatekeepers were useful in this 
research not only because of their local influence but they had power to add credibility and 
validity to the research by their acceptance of it. 
The researcher used his personal contacts with gatekeepers at the secretariat 
(UNFCCC) in Bonn, various ministerial offices in Addis Ababa, and other countries to gain 
access to organizations and increase participation in the research project. Once gatekeepers 
had identified initial participants, a snowballing technique was used to enhance the variety of 
participants. As Seidman (1998) has commented, introductions from gatekeepers helped to 
even out inherent power relations as a known person introduced the researcher to the 
participant. The researcher was perceived as “friend of a friend,” whereas the participant was 
viewed as an expert on his or her own experiences. 
The researcher was fortunate to have privileged access to higher government officials 
in climate conferences and other high profile related international conferences, for example, 
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he had the chance to meet and organize interviews (especially unstructured interviews) with 
higher government officials in Bonn, Addis Ababa, Brussels, Washington, Cape Town, 
Brasilia, Beijing, Istanbul, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, Mauritius and Oslo. These higher government 
officials served as key informants and also as gatekeepers. They introduced the researcher 
to other potential participants (a snowballing technique). There are also, as argued by 
Seidman (1998), drawbacks to the use of snowballing: it can result in a restricted sample of 
participants drawn from similar backgrounds1. 
The value of the study was explained to each and every participant in different 
instances and in fact, most participant organizations found the research valuable as they 
faced their own questions about the interconnections of the three decision-making structures 
for international climate technology transfer. 
During the data collection stage, the researcher strived not only for accuracy but also 
preserved the right of each participant to withdraw or decline to take part in the research. The 
researcher informed the participant interviewees about the objective of the inquiry and that 
they are free to cancel their participation whenever they want. The names of the interviewees 
have been published with their consent and all were offered anonymity and informed about 
confidentiality. 
3.2.2 LEVELS AND UNITS OF ANALYSIS  
This multi-leveled analysis of international climate technology transfer adopted three levels of 
analysis as an analytical concept. In social science study “levels of analysis” refer to sets of 
causal processes (each representing different degrees of organizational complexity), or 
pointers to the location, size, or scale of a research target; and refers to a more or less 
integrated set of relationships (Sawyer 2002; Simon 1962; and Kontopoulos 1993). There are 
three general structural levels into which social research may fall: macro, meso and micro 
(Gell-Mann 1994; Yurdusev 1993). On the other hand, the units of analysis are the primary 
components being analyzed in the study (Trochim 2006) and it could be individuals, team, 
formal organization, or a state (De Vaus 2006). Yurdusev (1993) has argued, there can be 
no separation between “level of analyses” as an issue of how to methodologically study the 
object, and “unit of analyses” as an issue of what to study, because they link to each other 
through the idea of the ‘whole’. 
In social science, micro-level is referred to as the local level and examples of micro-
level units of analysis include persons, families, or neighborhoods. Meso-level refers to 
analyses that are specifically designed to reveal connections between micro- and macro-
                                                                
1 Gatekeepers and snowballing approach could introduce considerable bias in participant selection. 
Please see Section 3.3 for the steps the researcher took to avoid bias. 
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levels. Meso-level units of analysis include community, clan, or state. Macro-level is referred 
to such as the global level and examples of macro-level units of analysis include 
international, society, or civilization. In the literature of international studies, levels are 
comprised of three layers for analysis: – individual (sub-national), state, and international 
system (Rourke 2005; Singer 1961). 
This thesis focus on levels of causal processes as differentiated both in social and 
international political research to study and identified three levels: (1) the preferences of 
developed and developing countries to international climate technology transfer under the 
UNFCCC (International-level analysis) (2) the national approaches to international climate 
technology transfer (State/National-level analysis) (3) the international technology transfer 
practices at the firm level (Local/Firm-level analysis). 
Choice of the levels of analysis was rooted in the objectives of the thesis and research 
questions. The research question asks about the nature of the relationship between firm 
practices, national policies, and international discourses for climate technology transfer. 
Choosing the three layers to the international climate technology transfer as a research level 
of analysis was therefore inevitable. Analyzing and understanding of the international climate 
technology transfer requires addressing the complex questions of scale and definition 
through innovative interactions of the three layers. 
The firm-level analysis (Micro-level analysis) broadened the company study in order to 
understand what the importance of technology transfer is to firms, how new capabilities were 
acquired, and what kind of technology transfer modalities the firms are adopting. This level of 
analysis helped to analyze a broader picture of international technology transfer dynamics 
within the firms and level of influence of national policies and technology transfer 
approaches. Three firms that involved a large set of actors from both the global south and 
industrialized world were selected as case studies. These selected firms shed light on the 
various channels of technology transfer and could feature the complex political economy of 
climate technology transfer. These three firms are the unit of analysis for this level of study 
(Unit of analysis 3). 
The national-level analysis (Meso-level analysis) was carried out by investigating the 
Ethiopian government technology transfer approaches in the context of the international 
technology transfer discussions under the UNFCCC. The Government of Ethiopia serves as 
the unit of analysis for the state-level analysis of the thesis (Unit of analysis 2). The views 
and opinions of those firms selected as case studies for the third unit of analysis were also 
included in the second unit of analysis. 
The analysis for international level technology transfer (Macro-level analysis) was done 
in the context of its value for the micro-level (firm practices) and meso-level (national 
59 
experiences) technology transfer. The international-level analyzed incompatible preferences 
between the developed and developing countries on what institutions under the UNFCCC 
are doing for moving up the international negotiations on Technology Transfer. The unit of 
analysis for this level, therefore, is the UNFCCC (Unit of analysis 1). However, as argued by 
Yurdusev (1993) and others in the study of international relations, this thesis doesn’t make a 
clear distinction between the three levels of analysis and the respective units of analysis. 
3.2.3 ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE AND TECHNIQUES 
The qualitative data analysis processes in this research run concurrently with the actual data 
collection, because analytical steps inform the process of additional data collection, and new 
data informs the analytical processes (see Section 3.2). The theoretical lens from which the 
researcher approaches the phenomenon (see Section 3.2.4), the strategies that the 
researcher uses to collect or construct data (see Section 3.2), and the understandings that 
the researcher has about what might count as relevant or important data in answering the 
research question (see Section 3.1) are all analytic processes that influence the data (Patton 
2002; Rubin and Rubin 1995). The main purpose of data analysis in qualitative research is to 
organize the information so as to present a narrative that explains the meanings, feelings 
and opinions that underlie the behavior of the participants in the study (Rubin and Rubin 
1995). 
This section presents analysis as an explicit step in conceptually interpreting the data 
set as a whole, using the constant comparing method. Three major stages characterize the 
constant comparison analysis (Strauss and Corbin 1998). During the first stage (open 
coding) the data are divided into small units then, during the second stage (axial coding) 
these codes are grouped into categories. Finally, in the third and final stage (selective 
coding) the researcher develops one or more themes that express the content of each of the 
groups (Strauss and Corbin 1998). These three stages explain how in this research data 
were sorted, organized, conceptualized, refined, and interpreted. It should be noted that 
these stages are simply the overarching approaches of the research. The stages were not 
strictly followed each of the research chapters of this thesis, as each chapter employed a 
slightly different analysis technique. Despite the slight differences in the analysis techniques, 
the three research chapters followed the following analytical procedures. 
(1) Emerging patterns or trends, strongly held opinions and frequently held opinions were 
noted. At the end of each interview and observation an ‘interview summary’ sheet was 
prepared, reducing information into manageable themes, issues, and recommendations. 
Each summary provided information about the key informant’s position, reason for inclusion 
in the list of participants, main points made, implications of these observations, and any 
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insights or ideas the researcher had during the observation and interview. Sections of the 
notes that relate to each question/issue were highlighted and participant comments that may 
be worthy of future quotation were marked. 
(2) Descriptive codes were used to organize responses; however, numeric codes were not 
appropriate for this research. In the multiple data collection method, and where open-ended 
questions are the primary techniques, coding principles were used to organize the responses 
into categories that identified and brought together corresponding themes (Rubin and Rubin 
1995). The codes covered key themes, concepts, questions, or ideas, such as country 
position on the bargaining points of the international policy debates under the UNFCCC; and 
policies, approaches, motivations, characteristics, and experiences of climate technology 
transfer in Ethiopia. Categories and subcategories for coding based on key study questions 
were developed. For the initial set of questions and observations, formal coding approaches 
for analyzing the data were not planned, as the interview schedule provided for questions 
covering predetermined themes and issues. 
The overall flexibility of the interview schedule, however, resulted in participants’ 
answers sometimes deviating from the planned order of the questions and also additional 
issues being discussed. This meant that, where necessary, responses had to be grouped 
together so that coincidental concepts and themes that emerged from the conversations 
could be examined. Notes, memos, transcribed interviews were read paragraph by 
paragraph and word by word, the themes and categories were marked as they appeared, 
and after a code for each paragraph had been provided, the themes were grouped together. 
This grouping of like with like, data bits with data bits, created the categories of the 
data, which became the basis for the organization and conceptualization of the research 
data, "categorizing, therefore, is a crucial element in the process of analysis" (Dey 1993). 
Content analysis, or analyzing the content of interviews and observations, is the process of 
identifying, coding, and categorizing the primary patterns in the data (Patton 2002). Dey 
(1993) argued when a particular category is adopted, a comparison is already implied and he 
further asserted that the process of developing categories is one of continuous refinement; 
therefore, flexibility is required to accommodate fresh observations and new directions in the 
analysis. 
(3) This assertion of Dey’s leads to the final stage of the analysis where more and more 
decisions were made about which bits of data can or cannot be assigned to the category and 
in the process themes that expressed the content of each category were developed. Survey 
and interview questions were examined continuously and the coding categories were revised 
though out the data collection and early analysis process. During the course of the analysis, 
the criteria for including and excluding data, rather vague in the beginning, became more 
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precise. Categories were defined and redefined by specifying and changing the criteria used 
for assigning them to the data. In so doing, it was recognized that the definitions developed 
in the beginning were quite general and contingent in character. "In defining categories, 
therefore, we have to be both attentive and tentative - attentive to the data, and tentative in 
our conceptualizations of them" (Dey 1993). 
To visualize findings more clearly, quickly, and easily the research data were presented 
mainly in a table format. Reliability of data was examined including assessing participants’ 
knowledgeability, credibility, impartiality, willingness to respond, and presence of outsiders 
who may have inhibited their responses. Greater weight was given to information provided by 
more reliable respondents. The results of early major findings of the research chapters were 
sent to key informants for feedback. Their feedback along with the early analysis approach 
enabled the researcher to take another look at the research method and collect further data, 
which is why an early and continual analysis approach was an appropriate strategy for this 
research. Finally, a report that reflects back to the objectives of the study, and the 
information needed by the research, was prepared. The descriptive report summarized 
comments, observation of participants, and analytical reports that highlight key findings. 
3.2.4 THE ROLE OF THEORY 
This research employed multiple theories in the research framework in order to examine the 
multi-leveled nature of international climate technology transfer. Theories as a conceptual 
and methodological tool are necessary since facts alone cannot be employed to answer 
questions posed in the study of reality (Marsh and Stoker 1995). Thus, theories as 
methodological instruments explain ‘the real world’ and bring concepts together in a 
perspective of shaping potential maps that interpret the international climate technology 
transfer system. 
This research first drew on historical institutionalism to investigate the causes for the 
lack of ambitious international climate technology transfer agreements. It also employed 
international regime theory, most notably drawing on its three core concepts namely power, 
interest and knowledge to explain the basic problems in global climate negotiations and to 
examine the asymmetry in parties’ interests and demands for climate technology transfer 
under the UNFCCC. The international environmental regime as an analytical approach is the 
dominant theoretical lens for the study of bargaining processes and international rule-based 
co-operation (Hasenclever et al. 1997; Keohane 1989; Young 1989), and much of the effort 
to interpret international climate co-operation has proceeded from the basis of the regime 
approach (Keohane 1989). 
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The research also took advantage of pertinent insights from development theorists to 
investigate whether and how the Ethiopian government development approaches and its 
engagement in south-south cooperation accelerate the transfer of climate technologies. 
Dependency theorists view SSC as a possible source of self-reliance for the South, and SSC 
as an alternative to NSC, which they consider an almost subversive strategy to strengthening 
developing countries both politically and economically (Smallman and Brown 2011). They 
argue that technology transfer is just one more area through which the center (the North) 
consolidates its economic and cultural domination over the periphery (the South) (Darity and 
Davis 2005). On the other hand, the realist school of thought views SSC as a political 
strategy employed by regional powers (i.e. BICS: Brazil, India, China, and South-Africa,) to 
have weaker states like Ethiopia under their control, thereby elevating their influence in the 
international arena (Schweller 1997). Consequently, from the realist perspective, real 
cooperation among states is unlikely and SSC is a strategy used by the dominant emerging 
southern states to secure power (Mundy 2007). SSC, as a realist school of thought would 
argue, is promoted by regional hegemonic powers (BICS) to consolidate their dominance 
and influence and it would be effective as long as it doesn’t diminish their power (Karns and 
Mingst 2004; Woods 2001). 
This research also employed a combination of actor-network theory (ANT) and the 
theory of absorptive capacity (TAC) as theories to examine the effectiveness of technology 
transfer at the firm level. ANT is used as a conceptual framework for analysis to investigate 
the degree and form of continual mobilization of global and the local networks; and the way 
in which they are connected to determine the success of the set goals of international 
technology transfer. It helped to understand how associations in climate technology transfer 
come into existence; and how the roles and functions of subjects and objects, actors and 
intermediaries, humans and non-humans are attributed and stabilized (Murdoch 2001). More 
specifically, ANT’s treatment of technology transfer as a complex socio-technical and 
heterogeneous network comprising actors, institutional arrangements, textual descriptions, 
work practices and technical artifacts (Garrety et al. 2001) has a particular appeal for this 
study. Although the use of ANT to understand the effectiveness of technology transfer at the 
micro level offers a natural starting point for addressing the research questions, the study 
also employed TAC as a possible addition to help with further understanding. One of the 
main motivations for including TAC in the analysis was that it offered additional insights with 
regard to the absorptive capacity of receiving organizations. The absorptive capacity of host 
countries, as argued by Lovett et al. (2012), is a key element for effective technology 
transfer. TAC as a conceptual and methodological tool for the development of research 
practice examined firms’ ability to sense their information environment, to recognize new 
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technological opportunities and to capture and integrate new information and knowledge into 
the firms’ processes and routines with the subsequent aim and result of increased 
competitive advantage (Lane and Lubatkin 1998). The objective of using a combination of 
these two perspectives was to accentuate issues of technological information access and 
assimilation of climate technology transfer. 
3.3 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
The nature of this specific study, which interviewed policy makers, negotiators at the 
international climate policy discussions, industrial experts, and scientists, was aimed to 
obtain as wide a scope as possible on the interpretations, experiences and actions of the 
participants regarding the topic under investigation. This dictated that different criteria be 
taken into account to ensure reliability and validity. Reliability has to do with the quality of 
measurement, with how consistent the measurements are, or how reproducible the set of 
results are (Trochim 2006). Validity concerns methodological soundness or appropriateness, 
and refers to whether the concepts being investigated are actually the ones being measured 
or tested; it thus serves as a framework for assessing the quality of research conclusions 
(Patton 2002; Trochim 2006). 
To ensure the quality of this research several approaches were employed: 
(1) Triangulation of data from the multiple data sources. This triangulation served as the 
primary strategy to check and validate the accuracy of the thesis findings. Triangulation 
involves the use of two or more independent sources of data and tests their consistency 
(Mathison 1988; Patton 2002). The strength of triangulation in qualitative research lies mainly 
in the area of data analysis as it adds credibility to and confidence in any conclusions has 
drawn (Patton 2002). Various kinds of triangulation can be used, the central idea of them all 
being the combining of different methods, theories and so forth to study the same 
phenomenon, with the aim of testing for consistency of results (Patton 2002). This thesis 
used multiple research methods, which as Johnson (1997) argued, could facilitate a more 
valid and reliable construction of realities through data triangulations to accurately record a 
particular construction of reality. The process of triangulation in this thesis was conducted by 
correlating the different data sources. Responses to the survey questions were compared to 
interview data and focus group discussions and review of documents. 
(2) Credibility and conformability refers to the degree to which the researcher demonstrates 
that the results and conclusions are believable from the perspective of the research 
participants, and the degree to which the results can be confirmed or corroborated by others 
(Patton 2002). The results of early major findings of the research chapters were sent to key 
informants for feedback. As additional means of assuring the credibility and conformability of 
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methods and results, the terms/principles according to which the results were interpreted 
were checked with knowledgeable persons, such as experts of some research techniques 
like ANT, and others experts in the field under study, such as colleagues at the secretariat 
(UNFCCC), Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia) and the World Bank. In addition, the 
appropriateness of the terms of reference used for interpretation was fairly obvious as they 
were taken from the subject literature. 
(3) Consistency is another criterion to ensure the quality of the research. The concepts and 
themes that emerged from the data collection techniques and settings were carefully 
organized according to themes and documented; and as Patton (2002) pointed out this 
measure arguably attests to consistency across the cases in the research. The concurrency 
analysis approach along with the iterative explanation building was also helpful to ensure the 
consistency and dependability of data. 
(4) Researcher bias was also checked to confirm the quality of this research study and the 
conclusions drawn from the results. Flick (1998) and Patton (2002) argue that a researcher 
can potentially bring bias into a study, for example by influencing participants in some way or 
another, selecting data that best supports the theory, or bringing personal perspectives into 
the analysis and interpretation of data. As the researcher of this doctoral thesis has been 
working in the climate change issues for years, his own biases as an investigator was 
examined, including tendencies to concentrate on information that confirms preconceived 
notions, seek consistency too early and overlooking evidence inconsistent with earlier 
findings, and being partial to the opinions of elite key informants. 
(5) In addition to a scrupulous application of the criteria discussed above to ensure the 
quality of the methods applied in conducting a research project and analyzing its results, 
which would inevitably contribute to solving or minimizing the potential problem of bias, the 
openness and honesty of the researcher with the participants, and his clarification of all 
aspects of the research topic with them before the interview commences, help to minimize 
bias (Flick 1998). In this study, the underlying goals of the study were explained when the 
meetings were set up and also discussed at the start of and during the data collection (see 
Section 3.2). In the matter of bias, impartiality is critical if a researcher is serious about 
proving that the findings of the research reflect the ideas of the participants and their 
situation, and not the motivations and perspectives of the researcher (Patton 2002). 
The impartiality of the researcher was attested to by the fact that there was no specific 
reason for consciously or unconsciously constructing a biased version of his experiences. 
Nothing had to be “proven”, as the researcher entered into the study without any hypotheses 
to test, or any preconceived ideas regarding the issues at hand or the outcomes of the study. 
No expectations or guidelines were specified for the research which was purely to explore 
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and thus gain understanding of the phenomena surrounding the relationships between the 
three levels of decision making structures in international climate technology transfer as 
experienced by its central role players. In addition, the academic character of the research 
was highlighted when contacting the research subjects in particular those whom the 
researcher contacted them through friends and colleagues (snowballing). 
After the introduction was made the researchers’ friends and colleagues were not 
involved. In research of this kind, where having a range of participants is key to achieving the 
study objective, the snowballing technique can be somewhat tautological and, indeed, could 
jeopardize the data and impartiality of the researcher. Because of such drawbacks, the 
researcher used survey questionnaires in addition to interview and observation research 
methods. 
In order to avoid any attempt from gatekeepers to influence the research process with 
their own version of “reality” by only indicating participants “approved of” by themselves, all 
gatekeepers and their recommendations, although respected, were treated with some 
degree of caution. The guiding principle of the research was one of inclusiveness to include 
as many views and narratives as possible. To enhance reliability of the research, the 
academic character of the research was highlighted when contacting research subjects, in 
particular those whom the researcher contacted through friends and colleagues. The 
concurrency analysis approach, together with iterative explanation building, was important for 
ensuring reliability of data. The demonstration of accuracy of the results through all these 
methods served to enhance the overall data analysis and to consequently enrich the findings 
and conclusions of this doctoral research. 
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CHAPTER 4  HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNFCCC: INCOMPATIBLE 
PREFERENCES AND BARGAINS AT THE COPENHAGEN CLIMATE CONFERENCE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1 BACKGROUND 
The objective of this chapter of the thesis is to investigate causes for the lack of ambitious 
international climate technology transfer agreements. It will draw on the concept of historical 
institutionalism and demonstrate that institutional structures put in place in the 1992 climate 
change agreements have been difficult to change. 
 
The chapter will examine the origin and structure of countries’ incompatible preferences and 
bargains under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Historical institutionalism explains the case of international regimes established by countries 
with divergent, often conflicting preferences, remaining in place even when conditions have 
changed markedly. This results in a gap between the founders’ goals and the design features 
they select to achieve them (Pierson 1996). Central to this idea is that initial choices made at 
institutional foundation become ‘locked in’ and difficult to change, especially if they exhibit 
‘positive feedback’, i.e. each action confirms the validity of the previous choice (Katznelson 
and Weingast 2005). The institution then becomes ‘path dependent’ and difficult to change 
from a course plotted in the past, even when there is a demonstrably more effective and 
efficient course available. Under conditions of historical intuitionalism, incremental changes 
could result in substantial future changes, but these changes are constrained by being path 
dependent. The proposition that there are divergent, often conflicting, preferences in the 
establishment of institutions, and the exploration of international negotiations as path 
dependent, and characterization of some agreements and institutions as entrenched and 
resistant to reform, is central to this chapter of the thesis. 
 
This chapter specifically examines the substance and processes of the 2009 Copenhagen 
Climate Conference negotiations and reviews policy positions of countries on international 
environmentally sound technology transfer as a climate change mitigation mechanism. 
During the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference the negotiations engaged in a 
fundamental political bargain directly involving technology transfer, but the deep divisions 
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between the developed and developing countries affected the bargaining processes and the 
quality of its outcome. 
 
The first Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting under the UNFCCC, held in Berlin in 1995 
interpreted the principle “common but differentiated responsibilities”, which was introduced in 
1992. That interpretation formalized the divide between the global North and South countries 
in order to recognize the role of historical polluters in contributing to greenhouse gas 
concentrations. The aim was to allow developing countries to develop without a cap on 
emissions and encourage them to adopt environmentally sound technologies. The US senate 
reacted to inclusion of the principle of differentiated responsibilities in the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol by passing the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in 1997, stating that the USA would not ratify 
a treaty without the full participation of developing nations in agreeing to binding emissions 
targets. The Byrd-Hagel Resolution, with its complete rejection of the UNFCCC principle of 
differentiated responsibilities, together with a lack of binding commitments for developing 
countries, prevented the USA from signing the Kyoto Protocol, effectively delaying its entry 
into force to the point where it was no longer particularly relevant. 
 
This research demonstrates that once an agreement has been negotiated between a large 
numbers of countries, then it is hard to change to another path due to inbuilt inflexibility in the 
establishment of the international institution. The Copenhagen 2009 international climate 
negotiations demonstrated only incremental changes in the historical stance of countries on 
climate technology transfer. 
 
The principle of differentiated responsibilities, dating from the birth of the UNFCCC, was a 
major sticking point in Copenhagen and subsequent meetings preventing concrete forward 
movement in the international climate policy negotiations. Incompatible preferences and 
deep divisions between the developed and developing countries characterized the 2009 
Copenhagen Climate Conference. This asymmetry in parties’ interests and demands are 
rooted in the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", which is seen as one of 
the key principles of the UNFCCC. 
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This chapter of the thesis explains the reasons for the difficulties in developing a concrete 
international policy on climate technology transfer. The chapter specifically analyses the 
asymmetry in parties’ interests and demands on international climate technology transfer 
under the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen both in terms of substance and process. 
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 The contribution of this chapter of the thesis is two-fold: 1) the chapter provides insights 
on the origin and structure of countries’ incompatible preferences and bargains on climate 
technology transfer in international climate policy; 2) based on the results of the analysis, the 
chapter provides insights for exploring the reasons for accords and disjunctions that could 
exist between international climate technology transfer debates under the UNFCCC, national 
policies and priorities for climate smart institutions (to be discussed in Chapter 5) and 
effectiveness of technology transfer at the firm level (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 6). 
 
Against this background, this part of the PHD study is guided by the following research 
question: 
 
Why did countries fail to reach ambitious climate technology transfer agreements? 
 
Based on this overarching question the specific research sub-questions are: 
i. What were the preferences of developing and developed countries for promoting and 
implementing climate technology transfer? 
ii. What was the origin and structure of countries’ incompatible preferences and 
bargains? 
iii. How was the quality of the Copenhagen Conference outcome affected by the 
incompatible preferences and bargains of the parties? 
4.1.2 METHODOLOGY 
The data collection methods used in this part of the thesis were interviews, focus group 
discussions and direct observations of the negotiations. Collection of primary data on 
international climate technology transfer negotiations was not easy. 40 of the 51 emails sent 
out to country delegates to the UNFCCC and Ad hoc Working Groups (AWGs) to initiate 
acquisition of data were unanswered. In addition, most delegates were not comfortable about 
revealing their positions and discussing their preferences outside of the negotiation rooms. 
 To counter the problem related to access and recruiting of interviewees, the researcher 
used his contacts at the secretariat (UNFCCC) in Bonn and various countries such as in 
German, Ethiopia, China, Belgium, Ghana, Mexico, Norway, Mauritius, etc. Use of direct 
personal researcher contacts in those countries and agencies helped to enhance credibility, 
establish positive relations, and gain access to delegates of other countries and recruit 
interviewees. The development of positive relationships and the affirmation of researcher 
credibility helped to obtain the depth of information and persuade delegates to share their 
experience of the international climate policy negotiations. 
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 This research employed both structured and unstructured interviews. In both cases 
open-ended questions were used. The unstructured interview (key informant interview), was 
very much ‘conversational’ in style and was used to secure more personal narratives and a 
deeper insight into issues associated with countries’ positions on climate technology transfer. 
 These interviews were conducted when the researcher met participants in climate 
change events such as in the 32nd sessions of the UNFCCC Convention subsidiary bodies, 
which took place from 31 May to 9 June 2010 in Bonn, and the thirteenth session of the 
AWG-KP1 and the eleventh session of the AWG-LCA2, which took place from 2 August to 6 
August 2010 in Bonn. During these events, information on delegates’ and non-state actors’ 
actions, roles, behaviour and interactions was obtained by direct observation. Phone 
interviews were used to follow up the results of the unstructured interviews and observations 
made during the climate change events. The interview questions were communicated to 
participants by email before the interviews. In order to get as much information from the 
delegates as possible, the phone interviews were conducted when it was convenient for 
them. A total of 35 participants from 22 countries were interviewed by phone. Most of the 
participants were not happy with tape recording of the conversation; therefore, written notes 
were taken when participants spoke. 
 Focus group discussions were also conducted on August 4, 2010 with non-government 
actors including the World Resource Institute, Wuppertal Institute, Pakistan Climate and 
Development Knowledge Network (Pakistian-CDKN), World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD), and University of Cape Town. The objective of the 
focus group discussion was to understand differences in perspectives and explore the depth 
and nuances of opinions regarding international climate technology transfer. As it was done 
for each interview and conference, detailed notes were taken and developed after the focus 
group discussion to ensure accuracy. As the method of data collection proceeded from 
observation to unstructured interview to focus group discussion and then to phone interview, 
modifications of interview questions based on the experience in the field and results of 
primary analysis were made in order to tailor them for the study. Historical secondary data 
were used to back up the primary data collected through interviews, observation and focus 
group discussion. The historical data included reviewing the processes and documents of 
previous climate change conferences and results of preceding negotiations and agreements. 
 Data evaluation was conducted in an on-going iterative basis in which data was 
continuously collected and analyzed almost simultaneously. Interviewee responses, 
                                                                
1 Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-
KP). 
2 Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). 
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observation reports and discussion notes were constantly compared with each other and 
recurring themes, new topological dimensions, as well as new relationships, were 
discovered. 
 This chapter employed theories as methodological instruments to bring concepts 
together with the perspective of shaping potential maps that interpret the international climate 
regimes in relation to the debates on climate technology transfer. Historical intuitionalism 
along with the international regime school of thought was employed as a conceptual 
framework for analysis to examine the countries’ incompatible preferences and bargains for 
climate technology transfer under the UNFCCC and to explain the origin and structure of the 
asymmetry in parties’ interests and demands in global climate negotiations. Historical 
institutionalism proceeds through a constant movement back and forth among cases, 
questions, and hypotheses. Historical institutionalisms analyze macro contexts and 
hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining 
just one institution or process at a time. This helped focus the research, by examining the 
climate institution both in terms of process and substance to effectively employ an iterative 
process of data analysis. Historical institutionalisms analyses organizational configurations 
over time, whereas others look at particular settings in isolation; and pays attention to critical 
junctures and long-term processes where as others look only at slices of time or short-term 
manoeuvres. 
 It should be noted that no single international regime approach is adequate to explain 
and effectively analyze the global climate negotiations and development of the climate 
change regime during the Copenhagen Climate Conference. The solution employed in this 
chapter is to broaden the regime model slightly by incorporating three core concepts of the 
approach namely power, interest and knowledge and to build into this framework some of the 
key insights offered by historical institutionalism. 
 The international environmental regime as an analytical approach is the dominant 
theoretical lens for the study of bargaining processes and international rule-based co-
operation (Hasenclever et al. 1997; Keohane 1989; Young 1989), and much of the effort to 
interpret international climate co-operation has proceeded from the basis of the regime 
approach (Keohane 1989). In the regime school of thought there are important differences in 
emphasis and understandings of the negotiation process through which regimes are created, 
the factors that are important and the extent to which regimes matter. For instance, in power-
based theories (theory of Hegemonic Stability) the dominant power sets up a hegemonic 
system of itself or international management and determines the basic principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures of the system (Grieco 1988; 1993). Utility-based 
approaches, on the other hand, emphasize that states are self-interested, regimes are 
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developed in part because actors in world politics believe that with such arrangements they 
will be able make mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be difficult or 
impossible to attain (Keohane 1989). A third strand is the constructivist approach where 
emphasis is placed on consensual knowledge and a regime will be formed mainly when 
there is common knowledge or understanding on the nature of the issue and what needs to 
be done to achieve solution (Litfin 1994; Haas 2004). 
 Historical institutionalism on the other hand considers the particular historical contexts 
in which international regimes are born and in which they must survive (Katznelson and 
Weingast 2005). It recognizes that the extent of countries’ divergent preferences is highly 
contingent on past decisions and no decisions that characterize international negotiations. 
Tensions within founding coalitions mean that no one group of actors predominates in 
specifying an institution’s structures and functions (Pierson 2004). Historical institutionalism 
also tends to be more focused on how the behaviour of political actors shapes the nature of 
diverse forms of incremental change than on the type of large structural transformations 
(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). 
 This chapter of the thesis is organized in eight sections. This section is devoted to 
presenting a brief background of the chapter, research questions and methods of the 
research including the overarching approaches and theories for examining the incompatible 
preferences and bargains at the international climate policy negotiations. The second section 
assesses the UNFCCC historical pathways mainly from the perspective of technology 
transfer negotiations. The third section examines the debates that were carried out in the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). Section 
4, 5 and 6 examine the most common issues of contention in the climate technology-transfer 
negotiations in the 2009 Copenhagen Conference. Section four explains the type of 
organizational structure and power that the technology transfer organizations should wield. 
Section 5 details the discussions around whether additional instruments are necessary for 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) or not. Section 6 assesses the asymmetry in parties’ 
interests on how much money should be contributed, from what sources, and with what 
governance arrangements. Section 7 presents the consequences of the incompatible 
preferences of developing and developed countries. The last section (Section 8) provides a 
concluding discussion. 
4.2 FOUNDING MOMENTS: THE FORMALISATION OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE 
The events in Copenhagen had their basis in what happened during the period leading up to 
COP 15: “the seeds of the diverse problems that beset the Copenhagen Conference were 
sown long before it opened” (Müller 2010). In an historical intuitionalism perspective, policy 
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choices made when an institution is being formed, when a policy is initiated, or during first 
generation decisions, have a continuing influence over the negotiations far into the future 
(Pierson 2000). The initial institutional formations will persist and become ‘path dependent’ 
and the forces of inertia take over (Hall and Taylor 1996). Therefore, it is worthwhile taking 
note of the discussions on technology transfer in the time leading up to COP 15 before 
turning to the 2009 Copenhagen bargains on technology transfer. The following section 
examines the UNFCCC historical pathways mainly from the perspective of technology 
transfer negotiations. 
 The role of technology cooperation and transfer in achieving the stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough level to prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system has been recognized in the 
UNFCCC’s goals since the convention came into force in 1994 (UNFCCC 1994). The 
UNFCCC, adopted at the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (the first “Earth 
Summit”) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, contains what has become a crucial passage. 
The first “principle” in Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows: “The Parties should 
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on 
the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead 
in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” The phrase – common but 
differentiated responsibilities – has been repeated countless numbers of times in policy 
documents since the UNFCCC was adopted in 1992 in the first “Earth Summit” in Rio de 
Janeiro. 
 The principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities” was interpreted in the 
Berlin Mandate, which was agreed three years after the Earth Summit in the very first 
Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC (COPs) in 1995. The Berlin Mandate interpreted 
the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” as: (1) launching a process to 
commit (by 1997) the Annex I countries (developed countries) to quantified greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions within specified time periods (targets and timetables); and (2) stating 
that the process should “not introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in 
Annex I (developing countries). 
 Thus, the Berlin Mandate effectively established the dichotomous distinction between 
the global South and North countries. The Berlin Mandate codified with numerical national 
targets and timetables for Annex I countries (developed countries) in the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol. It was in direct response to this Mandate that the US Senate subsequently passed 
unanimously (95-0) the Byrd-Hagel Resolution on 25 July 1997 (Senate Resolution 98, 105th 
Congress, 1st Session) stating that: “It is the sense of the Senate that the United States 
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should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in Kyoto in 
December 1997, or thereafter, which would mandate new commitments to limit or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other agreement 
also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period.” The resolution 
represented a powerful signal that a Kyoto-type agreement, which arguably violated both 
conditions specified in the resolution (developing country participation and serious harm to 
the economy), would not receive the support of the required two-thirds majority of the 
Senate. The first periods of the UNFCCC negotiations were dominated by the gulf between 
European Union and the USA though their policy differences were less significant. The EU-
USA negotiation was in a holding pattern for a number of years since the USA rejected the 
Kyoto Protocol and expressed its unwillingness to discuss any alternative architecture. To 
overcome the political bargain, the EU-USA negotiations had been continued in particular 
outside the UNFCCC framework. As noted by Bodansky (2010), when the USA re-engaged 
in the negotiation process the split between the US and EU paled and the shift in the 
negotiating dynamic became apparent, and the developed-developing country divide moved 
to centre stage. 
 
Though it was shadowed by the EU-USA negotiation and was not that noticeable, the 
difference between developing and developed countries on technology transfer was 
significant in every COP in particular in COP12 in Nairobi. The gulf between the two parties 
continued into COP13, which took place in December 2007, in Bali, Indonesia. Negotiations 
on technology transfer were one of the major stumbling blocks and were among the last 
issues to be resolved (CIEL, 2008). However, the conference managed to adopt the Bali 
Action Plan (BAP), which identified technology development and transfer as one of the four 
“building blocks” of a future climate change agreement. COP13 also commissioned the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) to develop “Strategic Programme”. Parties in COP14 in 
Poznan, Poland endorsed the GEF´s program and became the “Poznan Strategic Program 
on Technology Transfer” (Lovett et al. 2009). The main focus of the program was to scale up 
the level of investment in technology transfer through existing GEF processes. As noted by 
Lovett et al. (2009) the Poznan Strategic Program was weak for refashioning or 
strengthening existing institutions. As the halfway point between Bali and Copenhagen, 
COP14 made commitments for the next 12 months to continue the negotiating processes to 
enhance international climate change cooperation under the Bali Roadmap. 
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In Copenhagen and the period leading up to COP15, the focus of contention around 
technology transfer was largely on the governance and funding of technology transfer 
including: (i) Institutional arrangement: the type of organizational structure and power the 
technology transfer organizations should wield, (ii) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR): whether 
additional instruments are necessary for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) or not, (iii) 
Finance: how much money should be contributed, from what sources, and with what 
governance arrangements. These are the most common contentious issues in climate 
technology-transfer agreements (De Coninck et al. 2008). 
 
The 2009 Copenhagen Conference was the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to 
UNFCCC and the fifth Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (COP/CMP 5). The Conference took place from December 7-19, 2009. About 
115 world leaders attended the conference, and more than 40,000 people, representing 
governments, non-governmental organizations, and intergovernmental organizations were 
gathered. The role of technology transfer in achieving the stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a low enough level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system has been recognized in the UNFCCC’s goals since the 
convention came into force in 1994 (UNFCCC 1992). In this regard, the UNFCCC requires 
Parties to promote and cooperate in the development and diffusion, including transfer of 
technologies that control, reduce, or prevent GHG emissions. The ratification of the UNFCCC 
has been the grand institutional setting for potential international cooperation on climate 
change. Technology transfer discussions under the UNFCCC include commitments for 
technology and financing, particularly flowing from developed to developing countries, as well 
as potentially facilitating international licensing and patent protection (Coninck et al. 2007). 
 In Copenhagen the discussions were carried out in two working groups, on the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-
KP) and Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
(AWG-LCA). Technology transfer was debated and negotiated in the long-term action group 
(LCA) along with mitigation, adaptation, and shared vision. In the LCA group the negotiators 
were attempting to come up with as much consensus as possible on texts on technology 
issues. The centre of contentions on technology transfer in Copenhagen focused on the 
governance of international technology transfer and institutional arrangements for financial 
resources, and intellectual property rights (IPR). 
 
Despite those efforts, in the 2009 climate conference technology transfer remained as one of 
the most controversial and unresolved issues. The debates on technology transfer were 
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affected by incompatible preferences between the developing and developed countries. This 
chapter of the thesis reviews these preferences and bargains between the two parties on 
Long-term Cooperative Action and its implications for climate technology transfer to 
developing countries. Before turning to the analysis of the negotiations carried out in the LCA 
group the next section provides an overview of the debates in the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). 
4.3 IMPASSES OVER POST-KYOTO AGREEMENT 
A major criticism of the Copenhagen Conference was the failure to attain reduction 
commitments and the lack of assurance that the Kyoto Protocol would continue in a second 
period starting 2013. The Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 5) in the 2009 
Copenhagen Conference began with the issue of further commitments by developed 
countries to reduce their GHG emission under the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The first commitment 
period, with a target of 5.2% reduction based on 1990 levels, was to end in 2012. The Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol 
(AWG-KP) has worked since 2006 with a mandate to conclude negotiations on the second 
and subsequent commitment periods of Annex I Parties so as to ensure there would not be a 
gap between the first and the second commitment periods. Further emission cuts were one 
of the most important items stalling the talks at the Copenhagen Climate Conference. 
 
Further emission cuts with new obligations on the developing countries has been most 
contentious in the negotiations, as it relates to the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”. The G77/China insisted that based on this agreed principle developing 
countries should not participate in the Protocol’s call for emissions reductions including the 
second commitment period under the Protocol. Whereas the developed countries argued 
that the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” needs, at the least, a new 
approach. They, in particular Japan and Europe, insisted that the present Kyoto Protocol3 
should be replaced by a new single agreement that includes the US but that also places new 
obligations on the developing countries to act on their emissions. This was unacceptable to 
the developing countries because, in their turn, they insisted that the Berlin Mandate doesn’t 
require them to participate in any emission cut commitments and obligations. In addition, 
they had doubts on the effectiveness of the new treaty to place strict and legally binding 
commitments on the developed countries to cut their emissions, unlike the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
                                                                
3 Almost all members of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change are members of this 
protocol, with the United States as a notable exception. 
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TABLE 4.1  THE INCOMPATIBLE PREFERENCES OF DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ON EMISSION 
REDUCTION AND POST-KYOTO AGREEMENTS  
Bargaining points Developed countries (Annex I + USA) Developing countries (G77+China) 
 
Kyoto Protocol (KP) 
 
The second and subsequent 
commitment periods for 
greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reduction targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol 
A new agreement should be established 
that replaces the present Kyoto Protocol. 
KP should be superseded or made 
redundant because a comprehensive 
and ambitious agreement is needed, 
which is more inclusive than the KP 
(Developed countries except USA). 
The Kyoto Protocol should be maintained, as it 
was the only reliable basis for emission 
reductions. 
The Group reiterated that it rejected attempts by 
developed countries for another legally binding 
instrument that would put together the 
obligations of developed country Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol and actions of developing 
countries. 
Conditions for emission 
reduction commitments 
 
Governments announced emission cut 
figures before and during COP15 are 
made in the context of a new, universal, 
comprehensive and effective 
international agreement on climate 
change that is provided that USA and 
major developing economies also do 
their part. 
The legal commitment of Annex I Parties is 
under the KP, not dependent on any other 
Parties. Under the KP, they are to lead in 
emission reduction, and also in providing 
financial and technological support. These 
commitments should be done under no 
conditions.  
Figures on the emission 
reduction targets 
Most Annex I Parties have tabled a 2020 
emission reduction target and the range 
of emission cut pledged is between 16 
and 23% of the 1990 levels by 2020. 
USA 17% of the 2005 levels. The EU 
has already endorsed a 30% reduction 
provided other developed countries 
contribute in comparability and major 
developing economies also do their part. 
The targets for Annex I countries for the second 
commitment period have to be an aggregate 
target and should be over 40% reduction by 
2020 compared to 1990 levels. Anything less 
than this will not be true to science and the 
current pledges by Annex I Parties are 
inadequate, and if accepted, will put the world 
on a track for a 3.5- degree temperature 
increase. 
Market-based approaches 
The use of market-based 
flexible mechanisms 
(Emissions Trading, Joint 
Implementation, Clean 
Development Mechanism) to 
meet the reduction targets 
Market mechanisms were important to 
ensure the cost-effectiveness of 
mitigation, the group said (in particular 
the EU). It asked for this issue to be 
included in the agreement.  
Addressing climate change through Market-
based approaches is purely an economic affair 
distorting the principle of polluter pays to the 
one who pays has the right to pollute. The need 
to provide adequate funding sources to face the 
challenges of climate change is not a market. 
Measuring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) 
The developing countries actions on 
mitigation should be subjected to the 
measuring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) internationally.  
The issue of measuring, reporting and 
verification internationally could affect, national 
sovereignty and national competence. 
Therefore, to have one’s own oversight was 
important. 
Form of the final agreement Proposes the adoption of a political 
agreement. 
Rejected attempts to have a political agreement 
rather wanted to see a legally binding 
document. 
Source: Country submissions and interviews conducted face to face with country delegates on 31 May - 11 June 
and 2 Aug - 6 Aug 2010 in Bonn, Germany as well as by emails and telephone calls. 
 
The United States for its part had strongly reiterated its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol 
because of the conditions set in the Byrd-Hagel Resolution. As a result, the talks were 
deadlocked on whether the Kyoto Protocol would survive and whether there would be a new 
single agreement. Along with the fate of the Kyoto Protocol, there were many issues 
surrounding the bottleneck in the negotiations of the emission reduction of developed 
countries. Table 4.1 reports the major impasses over Post-Kyoto and emission reduction 
agreements. 
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As summarized in Table 4.1, the two parties disagreed on almost every major issue of the 
Kyoto Protocol. Each nation committed and agreed to abide by its domestic climate 
commitments, whether those are in the form of laws and regulations or multi-year 
development plans. But domestic political circumstances were not always conducive to 
action, especially for the USA it was an inappropriate time as the domestic climate 
legislation, formally called the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES) was 
in the hands of the senate. This legislation, which aimed to reduce greenhouse gas and 
facilitate the transition to a clean energy economy, was approved by the House of 
Representatives on June 26, 2009 by a vote of 219-212, but was still under consideration in 
the Senate. Bang et al. (2007) noted that agreement on this legislation would seem to be a 
prerequisite for extension to an international agreement. As a result, President Obama was 
not able to offer anything to the conference and other countries responded in kind. 
 
However, during the closing of the COP plenary, twenty-five heads of government and state, 
‘Friends of the Chair’, did manage to agree on the text of what became known as the 
‘Copenhagen Accord’. The way the “Friends of the Chair” was organized, and the process 
that led to the creation of the Accord, subsequently created concerns that an “un-transparent 
and undemocratic” negotiating process characterized it. As a result, some countries namely 
Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Sudan opposed the Accord and the COP decided 
to do no more than “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord. 
 Even among most of the negotiating groups that agreed on the Accord, there was a 
common understanding about the imperfection of the Accord, but they supported its adoption 
in order to turn it into an operational step towards a better future agreement. In reference to 
this, Papua New Guinea said, “the Accord is not perfect but it is a quick start and begins to 
build architecture” (Naughton and Hines 2009). The Accord does not mention any figures of 
the emission reduction that the developed countries were to undertake after 2012 when the 
first commitment period for emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol expired, either as 
an aggregate target or as individual country targets. 
4.4 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENHANCING CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
This section outlines the institutional implications for technology transfer of the Copenhagen 
Agreement and analyses the discussions and eventual agreements on the necessary 
institutional arrangements. The developing country position on institutional realignments was 
that existing institutions, in particular those outside the UNFCCC, are not functioning well and 
market mechanisms are insufficient. Developed countries argued that the G77/China need to 
ensure proper regulatory environments to create demand for technologies and that they need 
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to ensure intellectual property protection and enforcement to ensure that companies feel 
comfortable licensing technology. These are part of attempts for a broader re-framing of 
climate technology transfer that focuses on market mechanisms, mitigation technologies, and 
on the flexibility of mechanisms such as the CDM. 
 
Before examining the institutional implications of the Copenhagen conference, it is first worth 
looking at the nature of existing institutions under the UNFCCC that deal with technology 
transfer. 
- The Conference of the Parties (COP) is highest decision-making authority of the 
Convention. All countries that are Parties to the Convention are members of the COP, and 
each has equal status. There are two permanent subsidiary bodies, which support the work 
of the COP. These are the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
responsible of providing advice to the COP on scientific, technological and methodological 
issues. The other is the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) that oversees the 
assessment and review of the Convention’s implementation. In addition to the two standing 
subsidiary bodies, the COP can form ad hoc subsidiary bodies to carry our specific tasks. All 
Parties to the UNFCCC are also members of these ad hoc groups. 
- IPCC and GEF, which external to the UNFCCC provide information via scientific reports 
and operates the Convention’s general financing mechanism respectively. 
- The Convention also established a Secretariat to provide support to all the institutions of the 
climate change convention processes. 
- The key UNFCCC body for technology transfer is the Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
(EGTT), which was established with the objective of enhancing implementation of 
Convention goals on technology transfer (specifically Article 4, paragraph 5 of the 
convention), including inter alia, by analyzing and identifying ways to facilitate and advance 
technology transfer activities. 
 
In the run up to Copenhagen and COP 15, most of the debates on technology transfer 
focused on establishment of new institutions, and/or strengthening and redefining existing 
institutions as a prerequisite for enhanced action on technology transfer under and outside 
the UNFCCC. 
 The positions shown in Table 4.2 are on the basis of broad categorizations: developing 
and developed nations, otherwise there have been some very minor differences within each 
group. For instance, major developing countries (the so called BASIC countries: Brazil, South 
Africa, India and China) are interested more in mitigation technologies, whereas LDC interest 
lies in adaptation. 
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TABLE 4.2  THE INCOMPATIBLE PREFERENCES OF DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ON 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 G77 + China Annex I Countries + USA 
1 Establishing a new body under the UNFCCC: 
Establishing an Executive Body (EB) that would function 
as the main institution under the UNFCCC. One of the 
EB’s tasks would be to develop a global Technology 
Action Plan to accelerate research and invention.  
Maintaining the existing bodies and strengthening the 
involvement of the World Bank: Technology 
development and transfer through different channels, 
including the World Bank and regional development 
banks. 
Expressed preference for a sectorial approach to 
technology. Japan proposed the establishment of 
sectorial expert committees with participants from the 
public and private sectors to identify and analyze relevant 
technologies.  
 
2 Creating a favourable environment for climate 
technology transfer at the international level but still 
under the UNFCCC: Establishing supporting Technical 
Panels that would compile information on policies and 
measures, intellectual property rights and cooperation 
and assessment, monitoring and compliance.  
 
Creating favourable environment for climate 
technology transfer at the national level in developing 
countries: The UNFCCC should facilitate the creation of 
an effective domestic environment for innovation and 
dissemination of environmentally sound technologies in a 
broader context of mitigation and adaptation strategies.  
3 Refashioning the existing governance of finance 
under the UNFCCC: Establishing a Multilateral Clean 
Technology Fund (MCTF) under the UNFCCC that would 
provide technology-related financial support as 
determined by the Executive Body. The fund would partly 
act like a venture capital fund, where public investment 
leveraged private capital for emerging technologies. 
 
Maintaining the existing governance of finance and 
strengthening involvement of the World Bank: 
Expressed preference for strengthening existing 
institutions, including those outside the UNFCCC like the 
World Bank. 
4 Attempted to modify the Expert Group on Technology 
Transfer (EGTT) 
 
Proposed maintaining the EGTT and continuing its work 
 
Source: Country submissions and interviews conducted face to face with negotiators on 31 May - 11 June and 2 
Aug - 6 Aug 2010 in Bonn, Germany as well as by emails and telephone calls 
 
The most noticeable differences between developed countries were on emission targets. For 
instance, small islands led by Tuvalu proposed a new protocol which would have the 
advantage of potentially forcing deeper global emission cuts that also required other 
developing countries to participate in the emission cut commitments and obligations. Tuvalu 
was immediately supported by other small island states, including Grenada, Trinidad and 
Tobago and several African states; but 15 countries, including the powerful nations of China, 
Saudi Arabia and India, opposed it. However, when it comes to technology transfer the split 
between the countries in each group pales in comparison to the gulf between countries on 
emission targets and other issues. The issue of technology transfers mostly is a shift of 
primary axis in the negotiations from EU-US and BASIC-Small Islands to developed-
developing countries. 
 The proposals indicated in Table 4.2 are founded on the major arguments of the two 
groups. In spite of the strong divisions between the two groups, there were some areas of 
agreement. 
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(i) Establishment of Technology Mechanisms to accelerate technology development and 
transfer in support of adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven 
approach and based on national circumstances and priorities. As shown in Table 4.2, 
creation of such mechanisms is the result of compromises to developing countries demand 
for international mechanisms and the developed countries stance on the importance of 
national actions. 
(ii) Creation of a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund as an operating entity of the financial 
mechanism. However, there were no concrete agreements on the functions of these entities 
on issues such as the exact structure and mandate of the entities, as well their funding. 
(iii) Enhancing environments and capacity building for technology development and diffusion. 
(iv) The two groups also reached agreements on one of the major stumbling blocks in the 
negotiations leading to Copenhagen: establishment of international measurement, reporting 
and verification (MRV) mechanisms. True to the Accord those actions supported by 
international finance and technology transfer and capacity building will be subject to 
international MRV. MRV is one of the issues that placed China and the US in very odd 
positions. It was when the Chinese premier announced the flexibility of his country for the 
international MRV that the negotiations returned to life. The final consensus seems to 
consider demands of both parties despite the lack of clarity regarding the actual 
implementation mechanisms for MRV. 
(v) There was also an understanding, broadly shared among negotiators, that the CDM 
should continue to exist under a future agreement, even though there was controversy on 
how precisely it should be reformed and what activities it should cover. There is a general 
understanding that the CDM does not deliver the necessary climate technology transfer for 
all developing countries including: imbalanced regional distribution, high transaction costs, 
slow registration processes, etc. (Schneider et al. 2008; Rong 2010). 
(vi) The two parties also had similar proposals on establishing and strengthening national 
and regional centres of technological innovation and networks. They agreed to develop a 
technology action plan that would include establishment of national and regional technology 
excellence centres. The plan would reinforce north-south, south-south and triangular 
cooperation, including joint research and development. The USA proposed a new structure 
referred to as ‘Hub and Spokes’ that would compile information on technologies and develop 
tools and models to assist technology needs assessments, technology road mapping and 
policy design relating to all stages of the innovation cycle. 
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4.5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPR) 
In the Copenhagen Conference, developed countries emphasized the role current IPR 
frameworks have for encouraging and rewarding innovation and creating a predictable 
investment environment whereas developing countries pushed for the improvement of the 
current IPR framework. The argument is based on the fact that IPR in the area of climate 
technologies need attention, though they do not deny its contribution for innovation. This 
position was also substantiated by one of the Brazilian delegates who said “IPR encourages 
innovation in particular in the private sector and no one can deny that” he added “however, 
the current IPR regimes seriously affect the diffusion of climate scientific knowledge and 
technology” (personal communication, June 07, 2010 in Bonn). In the complex process of 
climate technology transfer negotiations, the issue of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) has 
proven to be one of the most contentious debates (De Coninck 2008). 
 Country submissions of developing countries have considered IPR as a potential 
barrier to technology transfer. By contrast, in developed countries submissions, IPR is 
considered as an incentive for further technology development. NGO’s and business 
proposals on IPR for the Copenhagen Conference mirror the debate between developing 
and developed countries. Most NGO’s have stated as their position that IPR is one of the 
obstacles that must be addressed in a systemic and crosscutting manner to promote the 
transfer of technology (Meyer et al. 2009). 
 Business representatives, in turn, advocate establishment of appropriate institutional 
frameworks and strong protection of IPR. In particular, the United States Chamber of 
Commerce pushed for strong protection of intellectual property rights throughout the 
negotiations (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 2009). 
 
To address the crucially important issue of IPR, the LCA non-paper considered five distinct 
options: 
(i) Technology development, diffusion and transfer [shall] be promoted by operating the 
intellectual property regime in a balanced manner. 
(ii) Countries could take a range of measures to ‘address adaptation or mitigation of climate 
change’ – including the use of compulsory licensing, the creation of a patent pool, and the 
sharing of publicly developed technology. 
(iii) Least developed countries vulnerable to climate change could exclude environmentally 
sound technologies to adapt to and mitigate climate change. 
(iv) The Executive Body on Technology should establish a committee or an advisory panel or 
designate some other body to proactively address patents and related intellectual property 
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issues to ensure both increased innovation and access for both mitigation technologies and 
adaptation technologies. 
(v) Parties may compulsorily license specific technologies for the purpose of mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change. 
 
TABLE 4.3  THE INCOMPATIBLE PREFERENCES OF DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ON 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPR) 
 G77 + China Annex I Countries + USA 
1 IPR is a potential obstacle to climate technology 
transfer and hence some form of action needs to be 
taken. 
 
IPR is an incentive for further technology 
development, rather than a potential barrier to 
Technology Transfer 
2 Proposed the use of compulsory licensing and 
exemption where IPR is a barrier to the diffusion of 
technologies in developing countries. 
 
IPR is developed and held privately in most 
countries. Parties should consider ways of 
improving the environment for technology diffusion. 
3 Identification and removal of all barriers to access 
technologies at the most affordable cost and 
appropriate treatment of intellectual property rights 
including exclusion of patents on climate related 
technologies to developing countries Parties. 
 
The protection by countries of intellectual property 
right is an essential component of an overall 
strategy to promote technology innovation, diffusion 
and transfer  
4 The existing IPR system does not match the 
increasing needs of accelerating development, 
transfer, and deployment (D&T&D) of 
environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) to meet 
challenges of climate change. An innovative IPR 
sharing arrangement shall be developed for joint 
development of ESTs. 
 
Protection of IPRs is crucial as they and their 
associated profits contribute to recoup research and 
development investments, provide strong incentives 
for further technology development and transfer, 
and also create sources of business 
competitiveness. 
5 Specific regulatory arrangement to curb negative 
effects of monopoly powers of environmentally 
sound technologies shall be put in place. 
 
The group recognizes the benefit of IP protection, 
which supports country ownership and encourages 
the implementation of locally defined development 
strategies. 
 
Source: Country submissions and interviews conducted face to face with country delegates on 31 May - 11 Jun 
and 2 Aug - 6 Aug 2010 in Bonn, Germany as well as by emails and telephone calls 
 
The G77 plus China group supported such options vigorously, whereas developed countries 
led by the United States and Australia, resisted inclusion of such options in any agreement. 
As a result, no agreement was reached and surprisingly the Copenhagen Accord did not 
contain any text on IPR. 
4.6 FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
The COP15 negotiations on finance were relatively successful and the issue of finance was 
treated in a number of places in the Accord. The key messages, however, were in three 
consecutive paragraphs, (i) creating a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, (ii) establishing a 
High-level Panel on potential sources of revenue, and (iii) create a “collective commitment” 
for developed countries to provide “new and additional” resources. 
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 The finance discussion was centred on issues such as how much money, from what 
sources, and with what governance arrangements? The main tension behind these core 
issues was examining Regulatory Approaches versus Market Based Methods for climate 
technology transfer. Developed countries emphasized the role of the market and the need for 
states to create enabling regulatory environments. Their argument was based on the 
success story of market instruments for technology transfer in other conventions, for example 
technology transfer for the Ozone Layer in the Montreal Protocol. However, some academics 
argue that there are fundamental differences between climate friendly technologies and other 
technologies, and the general trend from regulatory approaches to market based methods or 
from public sector to private sector finance for channeling technology is a concern for the 
transfer of climate friendly technologies (Andresen et al. 2007). Therefore, the success story 
of market-based approaches for the transfer of some technologies cannot be easily 
translated to climate friendly technologies. 
 In agreement with the Accord’s paragraph 10, US$30 billion in “fast start” money for the 
period 2010-2012 would be provided, balanced between adaptation and mitigation and long-
term finance of a further US$100 billion a year and by 2020; and it would be mobilized from 
all sources (public and private, bilateral and multilateral). 
 
On the collective commitment paragraph, and the amount of the fund pledged, there were at 
least four major concerns: 
(i) Since the Copenhagen Accord does not bind Contracting Parties for the work to be 
continued, the basis for making operational the financing provisions in the text is 
uncertain. In addition, it was not backed up by an acceptable, concrete scheme of how 
these funds are to be raised. 
(ii) The two groups – developing and developed countries - conceptualized the agreed 
funding differently. Developed countries saw financial assistance, in essence, as part of 
an implicit quick-fix linked to developing country mitigation commitments whereas 
developing countries, in contrast, saw it as payment of the “carbon debt” that they 
believe that developed countries owe for their historical emissions (Bodansky 2010). 
(iii) Another ambiguity would be whether this pledged money is new and additional or if it is 
just part of existing funding, such as financing from Official Development Assistance 
(ODA). This might end up with a different interpretation and eventual setbacks from 
promises; and the enthusiasm to contribute to such a new and additional fund could fade 
through time. 
(iv) The pledged amount may fall short of estimated needs. From what has been estimated 
by different groups the pledged amount is relatively small. In this regard, the UNFCCC 
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estimated yearly technology transfer financing to be an estimate of additional investment 
flows to developing countries, ranging from $95-150 billion (UNFCCC 2009). In that 
sense, the pledged US$100 billion falls short of the UNFCCC estimation too. 
 
Despite disparities in the positions of the two parties as shown on Table 4.4, the stand of the 
G77 plus China on financing received moderate support from developed countries. There 
was a general consensus by both sides that climate technology transfer at scale requires 
public funds in order to leverage private financing, and states agreed on the need for 
substantial new funding to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change. 
However, what this leveraging of private finance through public finance precisely entails is a 
controversial issue. 
 The finance issue was informally discussed among the main players shortly before the 
Copenhagen Conference, meaning outside the UNFCCC framework. The discussion was 
mainly between Nicolas Sarkozy, Meles Zienawi, and Barrack Obama. The Africa Union 
chief negotiator, the late Ethiopia’s Prime Minster, Meles Zienawi, acknowledged these 
discussions without giving any detail about the deal made (acknowledgement of these 
meetings by the Prime Minster was disclosed in Copenhagen to a group of Ethiopians on 
December 20, 2009 in the Amharic language). 
 Though moderate agreement was reached on the pledges of money, developed 
countries put some conditions for developing countries to be eligible for the financial 
assistance. The Group said that developing countries have been promised assistance if they 
undertake mitigation actions, provided they subject themselves to measurement, reporting 
and verification. The group also associated the financial assistance with acceptance of the 
Copenhagen Accord. In this regard, Ed Milliband, the former UK Energy and Climate Change 
Minister, was straight forward about linking funding of developing countries with accepting 
the Accord. The US also wanted an arrangement through which Parties can associate with 
the Accord. It said there are funds in the Accord, and it is open to any Party that is interested 
(Eilperin 2010, April 09). This implies that Parties that do not register their endorsement of 
the Accord would not be eligible for funding. The G77 plus China challenged these conditions 
by asking (Naughton and Hines 2009, Dec.08; Watts 2009, Dec.19): What if these actions 
are found by some undefined, inadequate standards? What about the promised financing 
then? The Group also asked when all of these are going to be implemented, even if it is 
assumed that all the Parties would also sign and ratify whatever new treaty is projected to be 
negotiated post-Copenhagen. 
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TABLE 4.4  THE INCOMPATIBLE PREFERENCES OF DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ON 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
 G77 + China Annex I Countries + USA 
1 Developed country Parties shall take substantive action to 
provide financial resources mainly from their public finance 
on grant and concessional basis for developing country 
Parties. A supplementary role can be played by other 
sources of finance like the private sector and global carbon 
markets. Nonetheless, the major source of funding will be 
the public sector. 
The international financial architecture has to catalyse 
various sources (private/public) and mechanisms (e.g. 
carbon market, innovative instruments) both at national 
and international level. Private finance will be the bulk of 
the scaled-up finance, particularly for mitigation, and will 
play a major role in driving economic and technological 
changes. Nevertheless, public funding will remain 
subsidiary for technology innovation, diffusion and transfer. 
 
2 Developed countries’ parties and other developed parties 
shall provide substantial, predictable and public funding. 
The funding scale shall be USD 400 billion per year but 
some counties like Bolivia and China called for 0.5-1% of 
the annual GNP of Annex I Parties. 
Given that the private sector is responsible for 86% of 
global investment and financial flows it is clear that it will 
be the principal mechanism for technology diffusion. 
Improving an enabling environment for the private sector is 
the key for encouraging the involvement of more business, 
which will lead to further promotion of Technology 
Transfer. Commercialization in various forms such as 
product exports, joint ventures, and licensing constitute 
also valuable means. 
 
3 Developed countries’ Parties shall provide substantial, 
predictable and public funding additional and different from 
ODA to meet the agreed full costs and/or incremental 
costs incurred by developing countries’ Parties. 
 
Domestic and international private investment, public 
sector financing, multilateral mechanisms such as the new 
Climate Investment Funds at the World Bank, and carbon 
markets. 
4 The money needed by developing countries is to address 
the climate impacts that have been caused by the 
historical emission of developed countries. The financial 
pledges are based on historical responsibility and polluters 
pay principle. 
 
Developing countries were promised assistance if they 
undertake mitigation actions, provided they subject 
themselves to measurement, reporting and verification. 
5 Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an operating 
entity of the UNFCCC's financial mechanism should be 
established.  
 
The existed institutions for channeling funds for climate 
technology transfer should be maintained. 
Source: Country submissions and interviews conducted face to face with country delegates on 31 May - 11 June 
and 2 Aug - 6 Aug 2010 in Bonn, Germany as well as by emails and telephone calls. 
 
 Developing country negotiators reiterated the fact that financial assistance was not a 
priority in the Copenhagen bargaining. In this regard president Lula of Brazil said (Susan 
Watts 2009, Dec. 19), “Some leaders think that money will solve the problem. Money is 
important to address the climate challenge, but developed countries should not see this as 
doing developing countries a favour. Developing countries are not begging for money and 
this was not a bargain between those who have money and those who do not. The money 
needed by developing countries is to address the climate impacts that have been caused by 
the historical emission of developed countries”. Mr Lula added, “Brazil did not come here to 
beg any one. We don't need foreign money for our targets - we can meet them with our own 
resources.” He even surprised the parties by announcing the possibility that Brazil will 
contribute economically toward climate change measures in needy countries. 
 The arrangement for the UNFCCC financial mechanism got moderate support from 
both sides. The Copenhagen Accord called for the establishment of a Copenhagen Green 
Climate Fund (GCF) as an operating entity of the UNFCCC's financial mechanism, as well as 
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a High Level Panel to consider potential sources of revenue to meet the $100 billion per year 
goal. Meanwhile the Accord did not exclude the idea of the developed countries either; it 
included the proposal in Accord paragraph eight (8) stating that a "Significant portion of 
international funding should flow through the GEF”. In COP14 in 2008, the Poznań Strategic 
Programme reported the major gaps in GEF support for technology transfer; it described the 
entities’ engagement with the private sector as 'haphazard' and highlighted the entities weak 
national communications and lack of knowledge management on technology transfer 
activities (Lovett et. al. 2009). It is not clear whether these gaps were taken into 
consideration when it was decided that the GEF would continue as a major operating entity 
to manage the “significant portion” of international funding. 
4.7 THE CLIMATE LOSERS CLUB: WHO LOST IN COPENHAGEN? 
The 2009 Copenhagen Conference put the whole world in the climate losers club, because 
the costs of doing little or nothing in climate change would be even bigger in the long run. 
Stern (2006 and 2007) estimated that the price of failing to act will be equivalent to losing at 
least 5% of global GDP each year. Inaction will make the marginal abatement cost curve of a 
country higher and the associated need for adaptation will increase the cost of, and potential 
for, economic development (Keller 2004; Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008; Biswas et al. 
2001; IPCC 2007). 
The "winners” indicated on Table 4.5 will eventually be swamped by these costs and 
resulting destabilization. Therefore, from one perspective, the Copenhagen Conference did 
not produce any winners, as there was no any change from the old path. 
The international climate negotiations under the UNFCCC represent the type of 
institutions that historical institutionalism characterizes as entrenched and resistant to reform 
(Katznelson and Weingast 2005). Table 4.5 reports winners and losers as if the bargaining in 
Copenhagen was a zero game – as if one party loses but the other party wins. However, in 
Copenhagen there was no bold expression of political will that would have radically change 
the political landscape and trajectory of the international climate regime. In this respect the 
Keohane (1984) regime formation theory can be applied here, because states have assumed 
the opportunity costs of belonging to the concrete agreement outweigh an alternative course 
of behaviour, and as a result they were not interested in establishing a regime. There was a 
last minute compromise but that did not include any binding verifiable, and internationally 
enforceable agreement. It helped only to avoid total disarray. Equally there was no concrete 
agreement for technology transfer. 
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TABLE 4.5  THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE FINAL AGREEMENTS ON THE INCOMPATIBLE PREFERENCES OF 
DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 G77-China China Annex I - USA USA 
On Measuring, 
reporting and 
verification 
(MRV) 
The developed 
countries demanded 
MRV mainly from the 
BRICS countries. 
However,   
Brazil, India and South 
Africa were flexible to 
the demand.  
Loser: It had to make a 
concession on the 
verification of its 
actions. 
Winner: obtains the 
verification of 
developing countries 
actions, esp. those of 
China, through 
international 
consultations and 
analysis. 
Winner: obtains the 
verification of 
developing countries 
actions, esp. those of 
China, through 
international 
consultations and 
analysis. 
On the future 
of KP  
Loser: Their fight for 
ambitious climate-
agreement goals was 
unsuccessful. The 
Accord makes no 
reference to a future 
legally binding 
instrument at any point 
in time. 
Winner: The accord 
sets no additional 
obligations compared to 
what it plans to do 
domestically. 
Loser: The Accord does 
not take a decision on 
the future of the Kyoto 
Protocol. So 
hypothetically KP 
Parties find themselves 
stuck in the KP. 
Winner: The accord 
sets no additional 
obligations compared to 
what it plans to do 
domestically. 
Financial 
assistance  
Winners:  Agreements 
were reached to provide 
new and additional 
quick -start resources. 
It is not clear if China 
wants the financial 
assistance of the 
developed countries. 
Loser:  Could not 
position the private 
sector as a principal 
mechanism for financial 
flows. Their contribution 
is much more than the 
USA’s to fast start 
finance. 
Its contribution is much 
less (1/3) than the 
Japanese and the EU to 
fast start finance. 
Financial 
4assistance for 
climate 
technology 
transfer 
Loser: the agreement 
does not show a clear 
linkage between the 
technology mechanism 
and financial 
arrangements.  
 Winner:  no agreement 
for additional fund for 
the activities undertaken 
within the technology 
mechanism.  
 
Winner: no agreement 
for additional fund for 
the activities undertaken 
within the technology 
mechanism. 
Institutional 
arrangements 
for climate 
technology 
transfer  
Winners: agreements 
have been reached to 
rekindle institutions 
under the UNFCCC. 
Winners: agreements 
have been reached to 
rekindle institutions 
under the UNFCCC.  
Losers: maintaining 
existing institutional 
systems was not 
accepted. 
Losers: maintaining 
existing institutional 
systems was not 
accepted. 
 
Performance 
Assessment 
and Monitoring 
for technology 
transfer 
Losers: there was no 
concession on the 
monitoring and 
assessment 
mechanisms for climate 
technology transfer 
including range, scale 
and effectiveness. 
Loser: there was no 
concession on the 
monitoring and 
assessment 
mechanisms for climate 
technology transfer 
including range, scale 
and effectiveness. 
Winners: They will not 
make a concession on 
the verification of their 
actions on climate 
technology transfer. 
Winners: It will not 
make a concession on 
the verification of its 
actions on technology 
transfer. 
IPR Loser: the agreement 
does not contain any 
text on IPR as there 
was no agreement to 
change the current IPR 
framework. 
Winner: happy with the 
current IPR framework. 
Winner: the agreement 
sets no additional 
obligations on IPR. 
Winner: the agreement 
sets no additional 
obligations on IPR.  
Technology in 
general 
Loser: the Accord was 
very thin on technology 
and the agreement was 
not concrete enough for 
technology transfer. 
Loser: the Accord was 
very thin on technology 
and the agreement was 
not concrete enough for 
technology transfer. 
Winner: technology 
transfer was very thin in 
their submissions and 
the agreement didn’t set 
major additional 
obligations . 
Winner: technology 
transfer was very thin in 
its submissions and the 
agreement didn’t set 
major additional 
obligations. 
 
Lack of information about the other Parties’ objections and commitments were revealed 
during the conference; and fear of cheating, and questions concerning domestic interest 
were played out. In this regard, the AU chief negotiator, Meles Zienawi, when explaining one 
                                                                
4  In Copenhagen, developing countries wanted to see a clear linkage between the technology 
mechanism and financial arrangements under the COP technology transfer agreements to ensure that 
proposals on technology transfer would receive financing. 
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of the reasons for his success in the finance negotiation said “we were successful in finance 
negotiation partly because we did not reveal to anyone our bargaining figures until we 
discussed them with the relevant parties” (Ethiopia Television Broadcasting Service Dec. 20, 
2010). That could be a reason why President Barack Obama and other developed county 
presidents and premiers were curious to know what financial bargains Zienawi had for 
Copenhagen; and which they discussed with him shortly before the conference. 
 This research revealed that most of the delegates interviewed to solicit further 
information on the Copenhagen negotiations were politically endowed with extremely 
suspicious approaches. Such a response was not surprising because the climate change 
negotiations under the UNFCCC were already confined within a politically charged 
atmosphere, which was intensified at the Copenhagen Conference. When explaining his 
suspicion about this research, an Indonesian delegate said “we have lost because of 
asymmetrical information flow, therefore, we have to be careful with our words, in particular 
outside the UNFCCC negotiation halls” (personal communication, Aug. 07, 2010 in Bonn). A 
Belgian delegate said: “it is not easy to say something on technology transfer as we do not 
have a clear picture of the kind of technological mechanisms that can satisfy the demand of 
the other party” (personal communication, July 13, 2010). 
 In Copenhagen, domestic interests dominated the negotiations, all parties wanted to be 
a winner, nobody wanted to lose and compromise their position. Every one focused on the 
benefits and costs at stake in the negotiation. To an extent these potential benefits and costs 
caused the Copenhagen Conference and its aftermath to be a politically charged 
atmosphere. In an environment where it was not possible to create a “win-win” situation, 
some countries would seem to be losers, and other winners, of the bargains. Therefore, it is 
pertinent to ask, who won and who lost in Copenhagen? Table 4.5 reports the winners and 
losers of the bargaining. 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
The Copenhagen Conference outcome confirmed the validity of the very first decision of the 
first Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC, the Berlin Mandate, which led to a dichotomy 
between developed and developing countries. These deep divisions characterized the 
Conference, a lack of information about the other Parties’ objections and commitments was 
revealed and domestic interests dominated. The results of the conference were more limited 
than many people had hoped for, and are less than some people may have expected. The 
discussions on technology transfer have been marked by the incompatible preferences 
between developed and developing countries. 
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 Causes for the deep divisions between the global North and South countries, and the 
reasons incompatible preferences persist, rest not in the absence of shared norms, the 
importance of combating climate change, but in the historical contingency implicit in the 
principle of ‘differentiated responsibilities’ that led to the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which in turn 
effectively paralyzed the Kyoto Protocol and took the climate bargaining process under the 
UNFCCC into apparently never ending circles. In terms of what transpired at Copenhagen 
and subsequent meetings, the differentiated responsibilities principle has been the major 
sticking point. The Berlin Mandate acted as an anchor, preventing real progress in the 
Copenhagen international climate negotiations. The developed countries insisted that the 
post-2012 regime should address the emissions of major developing countries, whereas the 
developing countries were negotiating on the basis of historical responsibility, capacity to 
respond, development needs and the polluters pay principle. These divergent foci and 
approaches of the parties led the conference bargaining process in circles and ended up in a 
political declaration, the Copenhagen Accord, rather than a legally binding agreement. 
 Asymmetry in parties’ interests and demands did not leave room for an ambitious and a 
legally binding agreement. As a result, climate technology transfer remained as one of the 
most conflicted areas and an unresolved issue. It was noted that the issue of climate 
technology transfer was pushed mainly by the G77 plus China group, whereas developed 
countries remained reactive and defensive. The issue of IPR appears to be a deadlocked 
negotiation agenda, and it was not possible to find common ground; as a result, the 
Copenhagen Accord does not contain any text on IPR. Analytical studies on the relationship 
between IPR and the transfer of climate-related technologies would be useful to bring the 
negotiating process on IPR from its deep freeze and overcome the apparent differences. 
 In Copenhagen there were incremental adjustments on climate technology transfer 
institutions, but still, divergent and often conflicting preferences persisted in the 
establishment of these institutions because changes of direction were constrained by the 
increasing returns and positive feedback that resulted from the first-generation decision i.e. 
the principle of ‘differentiated responsibilities’. In the words of historical institutionalists, the 
change is path dependent, and its end result is unpredictable. The incremental changes 
achieved were mainly on institutional arrangements for climate technology that include 
establishment of a Technology Mechanism, a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, and a High 
Level Panel. The effectiveness of these institutions depends on their structure and mandate, 
openness to non-state actors, and the energy, funds and skills available to exercise 
leadership; however, wording of the Accord is ambiguous on these issues and on the 
structure of the envisaged institutions in general. 
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 As a result, the challenges of having an independent institute versus the focus on 
existing institutions may continue. The negotiators have also reached some kind of 
agreements (though it may be the lowest common denominator) on collective financing. 
Collective commitments by developed countries to provide new and additional quick-start 
financial resources have been agreed. However, here, a serious concern is that there is no 
guarantee that these are new and additional resources and there is lack of clarity on what 
happens next, i.e. to make it a legally binding treaty. One of the Philippines’ delegates, 
Andreev Sano, in Bonn on June 10, 2010, assessed this concern and said, “The promises 
made in Copenhagen regarding funding have not been translated into legal binding 
agreements yet.” The agreements are, therefore, more valuable if they can bind the parties 
more effectively. 
 
In summary, the debates in Copenhagen were neither about the significance of moving 
beyond language to concrete consideration of the problems and their potential solutions, nor 
on the importance of new technology in solving the climate problem per se; but rather about 
what institutions are for moving up the international negotiations on climate technology 
transfer. Moreover, the Accord doesn’t bind Contracting Parties for the work to be continued 
under the UNFCCC. 
 However, the ad hoc adjustments, as well as the split observed among the G77/China 
group, and in particular the divide between BASIC and Small Islands, could herald the 
beginning of a process of blurring the developed/developing countries distinction. Perhaps 
the time has come for innovative proposals for future international climate-policy architecture, 
not for incremental adjustments to the old pathway. The incremental changes on climate 
technology transfer institutions might serve as incentives to mobilize coalitions behind the 
need for changes on the major sticking point of the international climate bargaining: the 
principle of ‘differentiated responsibilities’. 
 A change on the first generation decision could usher in profound institutional 
transformation in the realms of international climate technology transfer. 
 
What are the implications of these kinds of incremental changes to national level climate 
technology transfer policies and strategies; and to effectiveness of climate technology 
transfer at the firm level in particular, in those countries that need those climate technologies 
to both avoid locking in high carbon infrastructure and to achieve low carbon development? 
How are the alliances and groups of parties in the Copenhagen conference translated into 
practice at the national and local level climate technology cooperation? The next two 
chapters attempt to answer these questions. Chapter 5 investigates the potential and 
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relevance of international cooperation for climate technology transfer for informing national 
climate smart development pathways, whereas Chapter 6 examines the effectiveness of 
international climate technology transfer at the firm level by making a comparison of different 
modes of technological cooperation. 
 
93 
CHAPTER 5  RATIONALIZATION OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR CLIMATE 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
5.1.1 BACKGROUND 
Chapter 5 investigates the potential, characteristics, and relevance of the new technology 
transfer paradigm, South-South cooperation, for international climate technology transfer. 
The evidence for this part of the thesis on the South-South climate technology transfer 
(SSCT) was provided using the case of Ethiopia. 
The evidence clearly indicates that the technological cooperation of least developing 
countries (LDCs), such as Ethiopia, with developed countries is diminishing and is being 
overtaken by cooperation among the global south. However, the research concluded that 
growing South-South climate technology transfer (SSCT) is not an alternative to North-South 
climate technology transfer (NSCTT), rather it is important to complement North-South 
cooperation in order to promote the flow of technology to developing countries. 
The North-South divide has been present since the UNFCCC came into force in 1994, 
but Chapter 4 concluded that the divide showed signs of blurring in the Copenhagen 
Conference due to a dynamic of Southern fragmentation in which major developing and least 
developed countries assumed markedly different positions. More specifically, the recognition 
and increasing self-organization of major developing economies in the BASIC group (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China) as a separate body of negotiation, has brought a new 
fragmentation process to the South. Rapid economic productivity and energy use of the 
major developing countries, which is coupled with increased greenhouse gas emissions over 
the last two decades, is the cause for emergence of asymmetric interest and fragmentation 
among developing countries. 
On the other side of the equation, differences in economic advancement and 
technological sophistication among developing countries, has enabled the flow of technology 
from one developing country to another through south–south cooperation emphasizing the 
role of developing countries as sources of technology, and not only as recipients of 
international technological innovations. 
The emerging of several developing countries as leading manufacturers and 
developers of low carbon technologies, and flow of technologies between developing 
countries, has challenged the traditional characterization of developed-developing, North–
South transfer as the only form of climate technology transfer (Brewer 2008). The North–
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South technological gap historically characterizes technology ownership (Missbach 1999) 
with developed countries having a technological advantage. 
In least developing countries, such as Ethiopia, technological cooperation with other 
developing countries has been increasing. However, whether South-South climate 
technology transfer (SSCTT) is an alternative to North-South climate technology transfer 
(NSCTT) or not, has been a point of discussion among academicians and practitioners. 
South-South cooperation (SSC) has experienced successes and failures, challenges and 
opportunities, which are linked to both the international climate regime and national policies. 
The growth of Ethiopian climate technologies imports is one of the fastest in the world. 
Ethiopia is one of the few developing countries1, which responding to a voluntary provision of 
the not-legally binding Copenhagen Accord, planned to carry out mitigation actions to 
become a carbon neutral country by 2020. This self-commitment signals that changes have 
occurred to the point where the previous and most fiercely defended Southern consensus 
has been given up by some developing countries. Since the first negotiations for a climate 
change framework convention in the early 1990s, the South has united under two unalterable 
key bargaining positions: developing countries will not accept responsibility for climate 
mitigation, and thus will not formally commit to Greenhouse gas emissions reductions; and 
developed countries are responsible for financing the adaptation of the most vulnerable 
countries. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHAPTER AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The central objective of this chapter of the thesis is to investigate whether and how SSCTT, 
as opposed to NSCTT, can improve transfer of climate technologies. It attempts to advance 
the understanding and rationalization of SSCTT at the national level taking Ethiopia as a 
case study. It emphasizes the role of developing countries, in particular emerging 
economies, as sources and not only as recipients, of international technology innovations. 
Despite wide recognition of the economic advancement and technological sophistication of 
developing countries, these changes in relation to international technology flow have not 
received sufficient attention in academic research and no coherent international policies 
under the UNFCCC have yet been formulated. The chapter uses climate technology transfer 
in its broader conceptualization: the international transfer of environmentally friendly 
technology as embodied in green consumption goods. 
The contribution of this chapter to the thesis is twofold: 1) the chapter provides insights 
into the capacity and potential of SSCTT versus NSCTT, and on involving dominant national 
policies in developing countries for promoting climate technology transfer through the 
                                                                
1 By end of 2010 the other developing countries who made similar announcements were the Maldives 
and Costa Rica. 
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analysis of Ethiopian government preferences and a search for a model for achieving low-
carbon climate resilient national socio-economic development aspirations, 2) based on the 
results of the analysis of the nature of collaboration between developing countries for 
promoting climate technology transfer at the national level, the chapter provides the 
opportunity to reach a better understanding the interconnections and synergies between the 
local and international levels of technology transfer to fill the knowledge gap in climate 
technology transfer with empirical evidence. 
 
This part of the PHD study is guided by the following research question: 
 
What is the nature of collaboration between developing countries for promoting climate 
technology transfer at the national level vis-à-vis the North-South technology transfer? 
 
Based on this main question the specific research sub-questions are: 
i) What is the potential of South-South cooperation for the transfer of climate technology 
transfer compared to North-South technology transfer? 
ii) What are the motivational factors for the transfer of climate technology from one 
developing country to another? 
iii) What are the characteristics of South-South technology transfer compared to North-
South technology transfer? 
5.1.2 METHODOLOGY 
The data collection methods used in this part of the thesis were questionnaires, interviews, 
and focus group discussions. Initial assessment was conducted between October 8 to 
December 10, 2010 on the status of climate technology transfer in Ethiopia by telephone and 
email with relevant public agencies and non-state actors. This was followed by three months 
(from February 07, 2011 to April 27, 2011) fieldwork in Ethiopia to distribute questionnaires 
and conduct interviews. 
 Questionnaires were developed in Amharic, the Ethiopian official language, but were 
also translated and administered into English in order to adapt to the language needs of 
expatriates. The questionnaires were pilot-tested with six selected respondents and revised 
to eliminate ambiguity in some of the terminology, adjust the political sensitivity of some 
questions, and ensure confidentiality of information. After the pilot-testing phase, the 
questionnaires were distributed in person to eighty-six participants. Most of the respondents 
required an in-person follow-up meeting to further explain the research study, or to provide 
assistance with the survey; and some of them were unwilling to comment on public policies. 
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Private companies, in particular, showed less interest in responding to questions that 
pertained to their internal financial, logistical, and human capital performances. Sixty-six of 
the participants returned a completed or semi completed questionnaire, and follow up 
interviews were conducted with twenty-five of them. The participants include higher political 
figures (both from the governing and opposition parties), researchers, business people, 
investors and expatriates. 
 Focus group discussions were held on April 10, 15 and 22 with a group size of 9, 8, 
and 10 respectively to explore the meanings of some of the survey findings. The participants 
for the focus group discussion were selected on the basis of their opinions in the 
questionnaire. Those who had a range of views came together and discussed on pre-
identified topics. 
 Secondary data, mainly from the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia, National Bank 
of Ethiopia, Ethiopia Investment Authority, Ethiopia Ministry of Capacity Building, 
Environmental Protection Authority of Ethiopia and Ministry of Commerce and Industry were 
collected to analyze trends in investments, exports and imports, and to study technological 
cooperation over a long period of time. 
 The data collected and analyzed before the field trip (October 8 to December 10) 
enabled design of the primary data collection to be very specific and targeted. The data 
analysis was conducted in an on-going iterative process, in which data was continuously 
collected and analyzed almost simultaneously in order to inform the next stage of the data-
gathering process. 
 
The theoretical underpinning for this chapter assesses the potential and relevance of south-
south cooperation for climate technology transfer (SSCTT) from two main perspectives. 
Firstly, the dependency school of thought theorizes national development pathways in 
relation to international regimes and views south-south technology transfer (SSTT) as 
technology transfer between peripherals in an horizontal and equal interaction. Secondly, 
and in contrast, the realist school of thought argues that SSTT is essentially subject to the 
same dynamics and analytical tools as north-south technology transfer (NSTT). Another 
theoretical approach that can be used to explain the nature of cooperation modalities for 
transfer of technology, is the intermediate technology school of thought (IT) promoted by 
Schumacher and his associates. IT views the SSC as an approach to technology transfer 
between countries, which share similar histories, culture, and social structure, and thus have 
a better mutual understanding of their absorption capacity, markets, financial and social 
situations (Kaplinsky 2009). Unlike the two major schools of thought, IT promotes both north-
south and south-south cooperation for technology transfer. This chapter, however, employs 
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the two major theories (the dependency and the realist school of thought) as methodological 
instruments to investigate whether and how SSTT, as opposed to NSTT, can improve 
transfer of climate technologies. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the next section evaluates the 
paradigms of south-south climate technology transfer using the overarching theories, and 
assesses the prominent feature of recent trends of climate technology transfer though the 
south-south cooperation. This is followed by a section focused on assessing the potential of 
south-south cooperation for effective climate technology transfer. Sections 4 and 5 analyze 
the motivations and characteristics of south-south climate technology transfer. The last 
section (Section 6) concludes with a discussion on the rationalization of south-south 
cooperation for climate technology transfer. 
5.2 LOOKING AT THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTH-SOUTH CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
THROUGH THE LENS OF DEVELOPMENT THEORIES 
This chapter of the thesis draws on development theories to examine the nature of 
collaboration between developing countries for promoting climate technology transfer at the 
national level vis-à-vis North-South technology transfer. South-south cooperation (SSC) is a 
source of self-reliance for dependency theorists, but it is a political strategy for exploitation 
for the realist school of thought. 
The surge in academic work on climate technology transfer associated with 
developments in international climate politics has made the dependency school of thought 
relevant once again. Therefore, a reconsideration of dependency theory here also seems to 
be appropriate. The origins of the dependency theory central principle - center-periphery 
relations- are technological and determined by the international division of labor2. They have 
been promoting SSTT with the aim of enhancing self-reliance and international solidarity but 
at the same time, technical processes and objects guide it. 
The growing innovation capability of climate technologies in emerging economies, and 
the increasing technological gap among the global south, challenges the potential for 
dependency theory to understand the SSTT as an alternative to the NSTT. The intermediate 
technology school of thought (IT) considered these challenges and promoted SSC not as 
alternative to NSC, but as complementary to NSC and a framework under which technology 
is transferred among the developing countries. Schumacher and his associates, who believe 
that technology is ideologically neutral, argues that so long as technology is small-scale, 
                                                                
2 In other words, the center produces manufactured goods for itself and the periphery; and the 
periphery produces commodities mainly for the center, while maintaining a relatively big subsistence 
system. 
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decentralized, labor-intensive, energy-efficient, environmentally sound, and locally controlled, 
it doesn’t matter whether the transferor is the global North or the South (Todaro 2003). Many 
of the ideas integral to intermediate technology, which were described in Schumacher’s 
influential work, “Small is Beautiful”, can now be found in the characteristics of climate 
technologies3. 
Advocators of the south-south collaboration (SSC) mode of climate technology transfer, 
such as the dependency theorists, put the following reasons for promoting SSC for climate 
technology transfer at the core of their arguments: 
i). The understanding of common developmental and climate challenges among the global 
South made SSC the appropriate mechanism for a better climate technology transfers. 
ii). Environmental technologies such as cooking stoves could be better advanced in southern 
countries, since northern countries no longer face issues such as indoor pollution – and if 
they once had the technology, it has now become obsolete, or the institutional memory has 
been lost. 
iii). SSC could also create a wide range of trade partners for climate technology and that in 
turn might reduce market uncertainties. 
iv). The increment in the share of world trade could provide more collective bargaining 
capacities for the south. 
v) Technologies available in developing countries are perceived by many to be more suitable 
to the needs and requirements of the South (Mahmoud 2007). They also believe that the 
manpower required for these technologies is available in the south and more cost-effective 
than alternatives from the North (Mahmoud 2007). 
 
On the other hand, the realist school of thought views SSC as a political strategy employed 
by regional powers (i.e. BICS: Brazil, India, China, and South-Africa,) to have weaker states 
like Ethiopia under their control, thereby elevating their influence in the international arena 
(Schweller 1997). Realist scholars have conceived states as homogenous actors in an 
endless process of power struggle for survival and domination. Consequently, from the 
realist perspective, real cooperation among states is unlikely and SSC is a strategy used by 
the dominant emerging south states to secure power (Mundy 2007). SSC, as the realist 
school of thought argued, is promoted by regional hegemonic powers (BICS) to consolidate 
their dominance and influence and it would be effectives as long as it doesn’t diminish their 
power (Karns & Mingst 2004; Woods 2001). 
Though the evolution of south-south climate technology transfer is not well recognized 
in the international climate discussion, it is an interesting phenomenon. Growth of the 
                                                                
3 Characteristics of climate technologies are described in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
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emerging economies in climate technologies and other areas creates leader nations within 
the global south countries and creates a technology gap between them. The technology gap 
between the global south and specialization in different climate technologies could prompt 
technology transfer and utilization of complementarities between developing countries and 
direct cooperation between larger developing countries and other countries in the South (Yu 
2009). 
The growing innovation capability of climate technologies in emerging economies and 
the increasing technological gap among the global south challenges the dependency theory 
thinkers understanding of SSTT as an alternative to NSTT. 
The following sections assess the potential and relevance of south-south cooperation for 
climate technology transfer (SSCTT) from the perspectives of dependency theorists and the 
realist school of thought. 
5.3 GAUGING THE POTENTIAL OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE CLIMATE 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The ever-strengthening presence of emerging economics such as China, India and Turkey in 
Ethiopia has considerably changed the industrial landscape of the country. In 2010, more 
than 60% of approved FDI flows to Ethiopia originated from developing economies, mainly 
from Saudi Arabia, India, China, and Turkey (Ethiopia Investment Authority). In 2010, there 
were about 316 Chinese investment projects in Ethiopia and over 900 projects were in pre-
implementation phase (Ethiopia Investment Authority). Indian investments in Ethiopia totalled 
about 400 million USD in 2005, but in 2010 the investment volume increased nine-fold and 
reached over five billion USD with investment from 500 Indian companies (Embassy of India 
in Ethiopia). The Indian investment volume is expected to double to $10 billion by 2015 
(Ethiopia Investment Authority). 
 
Climate technology transfer to Ethiopia from other developing countries focuses mainly in the 
area of sustainable construction materials and smart building systems, hydropower turbines, 
wind turbines, electric trains, energy-efficient electric lights, and large-scale industrial 
process equipment for metals, and other less energy-intensive industries. Table 5.1 presents 
the potential of developing countries to manufacture and export climate technologies, and the 
Ethiopia experience in acquiring these technologies from its southern partners. The table 
indicates that climate technologies that are suitable for use in developing countries such as 
Ethiopia could be available from other more industrially-orientated developing countries. It 
confirms the fact that developing countries can offer recipient nations appropriate climate 
technological solutions. 
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TABLE 5.1  GAUGING THE POTENTIAL OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE CLIMATE 
TECHNOLOGY: POTENTIAL AND THE ETHIOPIA EXPERIENCES 
Green 
technologies 
Technologies and services The potential4of the SSC for climate technology transfer in 
Ethiopia  
 
Cleaner energy 
supply 
Wind power, biomass, biogas, 
hydropower, mini-hydro, and 
micro turbines, waste-to-
energy, landfill gas. Solar 
power (photovoltaic, 
concentrated solar, solar 
thermal) 
High potential: - the first ever wind farms in Ethiopia at two sites 
with a combined capacity of 171 MW were constructed in 2011. The 
mechanical work for one of the projects (Adama project) was 
undertaken by Hydro China while the Chinese contractor CGOC was 
in charge of the civil work, with financial support from the China 
government. To facilitate technology transfer Addis Ababa University 
was working side by side with the Chinese companies (Ethiopia 
Investment Authority, Ethiopia Ministry of Industry and Commerce). 
- The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) provided a 
US$400 million loan for Ethiopia's Gibe 3 hydropower, which is being 
constructed with a total investment of US$1.75 billion and will 
generate 1,870 MW. The Chinese company, Hydro China, is 
undertaking the mechanical work (EEPCo and Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development) 
 
Technologies to 
improve agriculture 
Climate-resistant products and 
processes appropriate for 
changing environments (such 
as higher yield seeds for more 
arid and saline soils together 
with drought-resistant 
cultivation practices) and tools 
to understand and insure 
against climate risks with 
improved early-warning system 
processes (sea-walls, drainage 
capacity, reductions in 
environmental burden of 
disease, and water, forest and 
biodiversity management, 
Mechanical irrigation and 
farming techniques). 
High potential: - To enhance bilateral agricultural technologies 
exchange between South Korea and Ethiopia, the Korean Project on 
International Agriculture (KOPIA) opened its international office in 
Addis Ababa in July 2011. KOPIA works on the development of 
locally adaptable technologies; exchange of programs for scientists 
and experts on foods, horticultural, bio-energy, fodder and tropical 
crops, livestock and genetic resources (KOPIA study visit on 
September 2011). 
- More than 20 Ethiopia Agricultural research Institutes have joint 
research projects with Indian counter parts. Indians are the largest 
single investors in Ethiopia Agriculture where the Ethiopia 
government had earmarked three million hectares of land that has 
been leased out to Indian agriculturists (Central Statistics Agency of 
Ethiopia, Embassy of India in Addis Ababa). 
- Ethiopia-China Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center was 
established in 2010 in Ginci, Ethiopia. The centre serves as both a 
training and demonstration centre and is led by Chinese experts 
(Ethiopia ministry of Industry and Commerce). 
End use 
technologies  
 
Electric and hybrid vehicles, 
carbon capture and storage 
(CCS). Compressed air energy 
storage. Pumped air and 
water. Molten salt, solar ponds, 
cryogenic liquid air or nitrogen, 
seasonal thermal. 
Low potential: The government of Ethiopia has excluded CCS from 
its strategy with a belief that CCS represents little or no significant 
abatement potential for Ethiopian industry (Ethiopia Environmental 
Protection Authority) 
Resource and 
Energy efficiency 
  
Alternative and sustainable 
raw materials, heating, energy- 
efficient lighting, production 
processes (new uses of waste 
and other by-products from 
firms into production inputs at 
the same or other firms), 
energy audits, feasibility 
studies and related technical 
services. Project development.  
Building materials, insulation. 
Consumer/user education. 
Metering, monitoring and 
control devices. 
High potential: - Pulverized fly ash and limestone has been used in 
Messebo Cement to reduce the use of raw materials such as clay 
with the support of Pakistan expatriates (Messebo Cement Factory 
study visit on May 2011) 
 - An Egyptian company called Elsewedy Cables Ethiopia is 
manufacturing power-saving bulbs at its Addis Ababa factory 
(Elsewedy Cables Ethiopia study visit on April 2011). 
- Governmental and non-governmental organizations have made 
various efforts to introduce and disseminate improved stoves known 
as Mirt, Gonzie and Lakech in the society. Lakech reduces charcoal 
consumption by up to 25% compared to the conventional charcoal 
stoves made of sheet steel. Experience sharing in efficient cook-
stoves is undergoing with Uganda Carbon Bureau (Uganda), Climate 
Care (Kenya), and Hestian Innovations (Malawi) (Ethiopian Rural 
Energy Development and Pro-motion Center (EREDPC). 
- SKY Global PLC, an Indian company, processes ferrous, non-
ferrous metals and other recyclables in Ethiopia and has made a 
significant contribution for enhancing sustainable metal consumption 
in the country (SKY Global PLC study visit on April 2013). 
                                                                
4 The grading (High, Medium, Low) was based on the result of focus group discussion conducted with 
experts on April 22, 2011 in Addis Ababa and interviews with Wuppertal Institute and phone interviews 
World Resource Institute on June, 2011 
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Green buildings Green building design, climate-
friendly cement, construction 
and contracting, smart building 
systems, Thermal insulation 
and new materials, urban 
design (including land use). 
Medium Potential: The transfer of a patented environmental 
technology named “FGC” from Sichuan Xinghe Company Ltd, China, 
has been transferred to Ethiopia successfully. The technology 
enables the manufacturing of construction materials from straw and 
in Ethiopia it is being used widely in partition boards, walls and 
doors. The Ethiopia Ministry of Industry data indicated that the use of 
FGC products has resulted in a 50% reduction in the cost of building 
houses.  
Transportation Urban design/land use. Electric 
train, Non-grain biofuels. 
Vehicle motors, parts, 
components systems 
High potential; - The Chinese company China Railway Eryuan 
Engineering Group Co. Ltd. (CREEC) has started constructing the 
Addis Ababa light train transit (Addis Ababa City Road and Transport 
Bureau). 
-India has advanced $300 million for the rehabilitation of the Ethio-
Djibouti railway line (Embassy of India in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian 
Railways Corporation). 
- Gasohol -10 % ethanol and 90 % gasoline blend (E 10) is being 
blended by a Sudanese Petroleum company, Nile Petroleum, in 
Addis Ababa, and is being used in standard vehicles (Ethiopian 
Petroleum Enterprise). 
Services Consulting and engineering: 
emission inventories, studies, 
efficiency, renewables, other 
power systems.  
High Potential: - Nationwide Wind and Solar Energy Grid Based 
Master Plan Project is being developed with the financial and 
technical support of the Government of China (EEPCo). 
- ARUN Goswami, an Indian company, exports recyclable materials 
from Ethiopia (National Bank of Ethiopia). 
Source: Author own compilation from study visits and government agencies’ data. 
 
Reflecting the growing trade and investment ties of Ethiopia with the global south, the 
country’s foreign policy has been focusing more on the south, however, sometimes that 
comes at the cost of its historical relations to the north. For instance, the late Prime Minister, 
Meles Zienaw, during his foreign policy strategic direction speech on April 10, 2010 said "At 
the moment, there is no major trading relationship between us and Sweden, and no 
significant investment coming from Sweden to Ethiopia. At the same time we don't have an 
embassy in Brazil. Brazil is a huge emerging country, and so we are now reassessing our 
diplomatic presence globally and the first to go was Sweden because it was not worthwhile to 
have an embassy there." (Ethiopia TV-etv, Amharic program, 10 April 2010). But not 
everyone agrees with this approach and others have commented, “The government of 
Ethiopia is shifting alliances not just because of economic realities but mainly because of 
political facts. The government has enormous pressure from the west to improve its 
democratic governance and to ease that pressure the government is playing the alliance 
shifting game” (Interview anonymous, April 19, 2011). 
 
The political elite in the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 
in particular the then party head and the Prime Minister, Meles Zienawi, is influenced by the 
successful economic management of latecomers, especially Korea and Taiwan. In his article, 
Meles Zienawi “African Development: Dead Ends and New Beginnings” he extensively 
discussed the success stories of emerging economies and the lessons other developing 
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countries such as Ethiopia could learn including in the area of technology development 
(Zienawi, 2006). 
Ethiopians have mixed views regarding the increasing alignment of the government to the 
global south countries, developing countries increasing investment in Ethiopia and the 
technological lessons the country could take from those countries. The following statements 
reflect these views. 
x “Ethiopia could witness in recent years the emerging economics in particular China and 
India had had an enormous, significant and positive impact in Africa including in the area 
of technology transfer” (Interview with Masresha Mekonen on July 23, 2011). “ …Yes, 
there had been progress but much remained to be done to allow Ethiopia to benefit from 
transfer of technology available in the context of South-South cooperation and North-
South relations (Interview with Birhanu Assefa on July 10, 2011). 
x “China is importing many of its own nationals to work on reconstruction projects and 
manufacturing industries in Ethiopia, leaving little employment for Ethiopians, pays much 
less than local companies, and not allowing for cooperative working relations or the 
transfer of knowledge and skills” (Interview with Hayle-Yesus Tsehay on August 15, 
2011). 
Despite the different opinions of Ethiopians, global south influence in climate technology 
transfer has mounted, including the design and development of climate technology related 
policies and strategies. 
 
In 2010 the Chinese government provided both financial and technical support to the 
government of Ethiopia for the development of the country’s renewable energy strategic plan 
(Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development). 
A large group of experts drawn from different ministries such as the ministries of 
science and technology, energy and water, and environmental protection made quite 
frequent technology transfer study tours to Korea, China, Taiwan, South Africa, and Malaysia 
between 2009 and 2011 (Source: Science and Technology Ministry, Environmental 
Protection Authority, Ministry of Energy and Water). The purpose of the tours was to draft 
policies and strategies such as the renewable energy strategy and science and technology 
policy through experience sharing in technological policies and strategies. Highlighting the 
importance of these kinds of technology transfer mechanisms, Banik and Subbayamma 
(2000) reported that technology could be transferred through study tours, written documents, 
telephone conversations, e-mails, memos, reports, newsletters and journals. These 
experience sharing business missions have also helped in establishment of the “Technology 
Transfer and Development Directorate” in 2010 as one of the core processes in the Ministry 
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of Science & Technology (MoST). One of the objectives of Directorate is to establish a 
system that can be effectively implemented for technology transfer and development on the 
basis of significant benchmarks of different countries, especially countries of the global 
south. The latest Ethiopia science and technology policy was drafted in 2011 with the help of 
Korean experts (Source: Science and Technology Ministry). In line with this focus, a high 
official at the Science and Technology Ministry said “We, in the Ethiopia government, believe 
that Korea and other emerging economies are our best choices for our technology transfer 
strategy” (Interview with Daniel Gizachew on April 20, 2011). 
An article written in the Amharic language (Ethiopian national language) to the EPRDF 
cadres by the late Prime Minister himself, stated that the EPRDF political document and the 
Industrial Development Strategy of Ethiopia all refer to what the lessons from global south 
countries, in particular Taiwan and Korea, hold for Ethiopia’s development. 
 
The most important policy document of the current Ethiopia government, Ethiopia's five year 
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) adopted in 2011, draws on the best experiences in 
effectiveness of technological policies from emerging economies, mainly South Korea. In the 
early phase of South Korean development much of industrial production took advantage of 
an abundant labor supply and later moved into consumer goods industries and more capital-
intensive industries (Kim 2000). The Ethiopian government would like to adopt similar 
industrial development stages, corresponding to the notion of technological learning, which 
could ensure higher levels of technological sophistication. 
The transfers of technology from emerging economies through trade, investment, 
training and human movement, have been an important element in Ethiopia’s various 
strategies for development of domestic capabilities. One of the driving forces of South-South 
Cooperation, as was mentioned in Section 5.2, is the technological advance of countries like 
China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Malaysia, Turkey, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Egypt 
and some others. These countries already have a certain capacity for domestic technology 
development for technologies related to greenhouse gas emissions reductions, fueled mainly 
because of government support to organizations dedicated to research, development, 
technical assistance, and funding of equipment in these areas. 
 
Under the framework of the SSC, climate technologies are transferred to Ethiopia through 
both market mediated and non-market mediated routes. The areas where there are formal 
contracts, and direct involvement of foreign firms, are the ones for which markets exist. For 
channels like imitation, scientific exchange, exhibitions etc. no functioning market exists. Of 
course, the most common method of technology transfer to developing countries appears to. 
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TABLE 5.2 GAUGING THE POTENTIAL OF SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER: POTENTIAL AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CHANNELS 
Channels Characteristics and examples Potential5 for Climate Technology Transfer in 
Ethiopia 
Technology transfer 
through 
goods/products 
 
- Local firms have to do reverse engineering if 
they have to benefit from this channel, which 
depends on the skill content of the labor and 
local absorptive capacity (Kathuria, 1999). 
-Technology transfer through goods/products 
in Ethiopia has been hampered by  
1. Insufficient knowledge of the global 
environmental technology and related services 
markets. 
2. Lack of data and information about the 
Ethiopia market for technology suppliers 
3. Limited local capacity to do reverse 
engineering 
4. Weak capacities and networking of trade 
support institutions for promoting south-south 
trade in the sector 
High: - New products often embody new ideas 
and innovations and when these products are 
traded internationally, they transmit knowledge 
across borders (Bayoumi et al. 1999 and Basant 
and Brian 1996). 
- Half of the leading local firms in Ethiopia have 
emerged from the trading sector; for this is often 
where the deepest and most acute knowledge of 
local and international market conditions is already 
at hand (UNCTAD 2011) 
- To enhance SSTT and create a new market 
chain and generate exports for project partners, a 
series of business round tables, study tours and 
buyers-sellers meetings have been organized by 
the Ethiopian government and its southern 
counterparts (Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce 
and Sectorial Associations, Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce).  
Technology transfer 
through Foreign 
Direct Investment 
(FDI) - wholly owned 
subsidiary 
 
 
- FDI in Ethiopia has steadily increased from 
less than USD 820 million in 2008 to more 
than USD 2 billion in the first half of 2010/11 
fiscal years (Ethiopia Investment Authority).  
- Ethiopia is one of highest dependence LDCs 
on FDI from other developing countries 
(source: Ethiopia Investment Authority) where 
more than 60% FDI comes from developing 
countries. In many other LDCs it is slightly 
over 40% of the total inward FDI (UNCTAD 
2007). 
Medium: - FDI is the primary ‘agent’ of technology 
transfer (Reddy & Zhao, 1990). 
- The increasingly expanded state owned 
companies in Ethiopia have a specific objective of 
boosting local absorptive capacity to benefit more 
from FDI induced technology. However, the lower 
competitiveness of some southern companies 
relative to local firms, and their very limited 
linkages with local enterprises at the firm level, 
have hampered the potential of FDI for SSTT in 
Ethiopia (For further information see Chapter 6).  
Technology transfer 
through joint 
ventures 
 
An Indian company called ANMOL Group 
established a joint venture called Anmol 
Products Ethiopia PLC with 60% share and a 
40% Ethiopian owned. Anmol Products 
Ethiopia PLC uses waste paper that is usually 
burnt or thrown away (Anmol Products 
Ethiopia PLC study visit on April 2011).  
High: - Firms choose to transfer technologies 
through joint ventures because joint ventures offer 
a unique opportunity of combining the distinctive 
competencies and the complementary resources 
of participating firms (Hobday and Rush 2007, 
Ivarson and Alvstam 2005, Pack and Saggi 2001).  
- Firms from other developing countries that have 
actively sought to market environmental products 
and technologies for commercial reasons in 
Ethiopia are finding increasingly that they must 
establish joint ventures in particular with either 
state owned or EPRDF affiliated companies (For 
further information see Chapter 6). 
 
Technology transfer 
through movement 
of workers (labour 
turnover and hiring 
expatriates) 
 
 
- The development of quality control by X-ray 
system (QCX) in the Ethiopia cement Factory 
(the only cement factory in Ethiopia with the 
QCX system in the 2000s) is one such 
example where there were 600 workers with 
25% Chinese, 12% Turkish, 5% Indians and 
1% Danish and British. The objective of the 
expatriates was to train local employees on 
the job. The people trained in QCX in 
Messebo are now working in more than 15 
cement factories throughout the country. The 
QCX system enhances resource efficiency 
and productivity through emission reduction 
(mainly CO2), reduction of energy 
consumption, use of alternative fuels and raw 
materials. The expatriate training was also 
instrumental in the production of an 
environmentally friendly product called 
Portland-Limestone Cement (PLC) (For further 
information see Chapter 6). 
Medium: - Labor turnover is an important channel 
for technology transfer and technology diffusion 
(Osman-Gani 1999) 
- In Ethiopia companies from the south mainly 
hired their own experts and leave few positions for 
the locals, in particular for skilled professionals. 
This has negative consequences for enhancing 
SSTT. On the other hand, however, since they 
don’t curtail labor turnover by offering higher 
wages and better working condition than local 
rivals offer, there is higher labor turnover. This 
could enhance technology diffusion but most of 
these local employees are junior professionals and 
skilled laborers where-as higher skilled 
professionals don’t have the opportunity to be 
employed by these companies at the first place 
(For further information see Chapter 6).  
                                                                
5 The grading (High, Medium, Low) was based on the result of focus group discussion conducted with 
experts on April 22, 2011 in Addis Ababa and interviews with Wuppertal Institute and phone interviews 
World Resource Institute on May, 2011. 
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be through market mechanisms (Lovett et al. 2012). However, technology transfer to places 
such as Ethiopia where there are insufficient absorptive capabilities, and where dedicated 
technology transfer of climate technology transfer is a policy goal, non-market mechanisms 
and policy intervention are necessary for effective climate technology transfer particularly in 
least developing countries (Cameron 2005, Morsink et al. 2011). 
Table 5.2 illustrates the three key channels: trade in goods, foreign direct investment 
and movement of people. The potential of each of the channels for climate technology 
transfer in Ethiopia, basic characteristics and practical examples, are also reported in the 
table. The table indicates that trade in goods and products and FDI have higher potential for 
the transfer of climate technology transfer under south-south cooperation. 
5.4 THE ADVANCEMENT OF SOUTH-SOUTH CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: MOTIVES 
AND JUSTIFICATIONS  
Ethiopia is neither an oil nor other natural resource producing country, so natural resource 
seeking doesn’t seem to be a major motivational factor for SSTT in a country like Ethiopia. 
The realistic school of thought, however, views the stronger presence of emerging 
economies like China and India in the less developed other southern countries as a 
“monolithic dragon scrambling for natural resources to service their own growing capitalist 
economy” (Mohan and Power 2008). In order to understand the main drivers of south-south 
climate technology transfer in Ethiopia, a survey was conducted, and seven potential 
motivations tested for SSCTT in Ethiopia. 
The seven tested motivations include: (1) Ensuring political security and creating an 
international influence, (2) Creating environmental wellbeing, (3) Finding the optimal 
technological gap between transferor and transferee, (4) Creating and expanding markets, 
(5) Better business environment in Ethiopia than transferor home country, (6) To take 
advantage of skilled labor in Ethiopia, (7) Use parent company’s advantage in cost 
management. Among the 66 respondents of the survey 36 of them (54.5%) indicated that the 
first four should be treated as main motivations for climate technology transfers in Ethiopia 
from emerging economies. Where-as the last three were listed by 54.5% of respondents as 
factors that are not important in the current Ethiopian context. 
The realist school of thought views the motives of involvement of the global south 
powerhouses, in particular China and India, in LDCs such as Ethiopia, as a political strategy 
employed by these countries to have weaker least developed countries under their control, 
and thereby exploiting their resources (Schweller 1997). Whereas the dependency theorists 
pointed out that the natural motive of the developing countries to eliminate the structural 
divide between the center and the peripheries is the driving force for intra-investment 
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amongst peripherals (Burbach and Robinson 1999). Based on these assumptions, the 
dependency school of thought has been advocating South-South Cooperation (SSC), that is, 
cooperation between the “peripherals”. The concept of SSC for dependency theorists such 
as Cardoso and Falleto (2004) and Senghaas (1979) is understood as a mechanism through 
which countries of the global South (the periphery) would be enabled to overcome 
dependence from the industrialized nations of the global North (the core). 
5.4.1 ENSURING POLITICAL SECURITY AND CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE 
Creating an international influence seems to be a powerful factor for technology transfers in 
Ethiopia from emerging economies, in particular for attracting some sort of Chinese 
investments to Ethiopia. In this regard the realist school of thought argued that SSC is a 
strategy used by the dominant emerging south states to secure power (Mundy 2007) and it is 
promoted by regional hegemonic powers (BICS) to consolidate their dominance and 
influence; and it would be effective as long as it doesn’t diminish their power (Karns and 
Mingst 2004; Woods 2001). 
China is now looking to anchor its African investment in Ethiopia based on the close 
political cooperation of both countries. For instance, China has put its remarkable 
technological footprint in Addis Ababa major gateways, where diplomats from Africa and 
other continents can see and appreciate its technological advancement and friendship. The 
main roads to the new Addis Ababa airport, including the ring road and flyover close to the 
airport, and the new African Union headquarters, are financed and built by the Chinese. 
These things aren’t only a mark of China’s growing engagement with Ethiopia, but also 
demonstrate Chinese strategies to secure its interest in Africa through diplomatic and 
political capital. Ethiopia has occupied an important political role in the Africa region: its 
technical and military support for its fellow Africa countries during independence struggles, its 
central role in establishment of the Africa Union and its predecessor, the Organisation of 
African Unity, hosting of the headquarters of the Africa Union, Addis Ababa is home to the 
third largest diplomatic community in the world, behind New York City and Geneva, and the 
country has the aspiration of being seen as a representative of Africa in particular. 
Isolating Taiwan and securing loyalty is a particular ideological motive for transfer of 
technology specifically from China to Ethiopia and other developing countries. The Sino-
Ethiopia diplomatic relations was established on December 1st 1970 when China agreed to 
recognize Eritrea as Ethiopian, in exchange for Haile Selassie's (Emperor of Ethiopia) 
recognition of Taiwan as Chinese. The economic and political ties of Ethiopia and Taiwan are 
almost insignificant compared to those with China. Taiwan exported goods (mainly 
machines) to the value of 2.7 million US dollars to Ethiopia at the end of 2010, which is much 
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lower than the 1.1 billion the China export to Ethiopia (Ethiopia Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development). Alemayehu Geda (2008) attributed the main success of Chinese 
firms in Ethiopia to the political ties their government created with the current government of 
Ethiopia. Through Africa, China has also found a way to isolate Taiwan, its diplomatic 
archrival. China has continued exchange programs with Ethiopia where loyalty to the 
mainland might otherwise waver in face of the generous economic assistance offered by rival 
Taiwan. Gillespie (2001) has described how technology transfer between China and African 
countries were fuelled by China's concerted effort to secure and retain the loyalty of African 
regimes with a leftist bent. Ideology has since given way to more pragmatic considerations 
since the end of the Cold War, but it still plays a part in SSTT. 
5.4.2 CREATING ENVIRONMENTAL WELLBEING 
The research finds neither policy nor practices that position the creation of environmental 
wellbeing as a motivational factor for climate technology transfer to Ethiopia from its southern 
partners. The head of environmental law and international cooperation at the Ethiopia 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) said “Ethiopia doesn’t have significant environment 
and climate change cooperation with the major players of the global south countries such as 
China, India, Brazil, and South Africa” (Interview with Wondwesen Wendimagegnehu on April 
23, 2011). To the contrary, some environmental monitoring reports at the EPA indicate that 
there are environmental concerns about the various emerging economy investments in 
Ethiopia. ”The perceived lack of priority given to environmental and social safeguarding is 
almost a common criticism of South-South co-operation in infrastructure development in 
Ethiopia” (Interview with Wondwesen Wendimagegnehu on April 23, 2011). For instance, 
some Chinese and Indian contract-based projects are operating in ecologically sensitive 
regions, where they have failed to adhere to environmental guidelines. Unlike other 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and western bilateral agencies, the 
Chinese and Indians investors and financiers (such as the Export-Import Bank of China) fail 
to undertake their environmental guidelines when lending the concessional loans as part of 
their official development assistance program (Bosshard 2008). 
Critics have expressed concern that the Ethiopian government has prioritized short-
term development over long–term environmentally sustainable economic growth (Interview 
with Mehari Asfaw – Ethiopia Environmental Forum on April 20, 2011). In spite of absence of 
environmental cooperation in the SSTT, Ethiopian technological cooperation with its southern 
partners has been influenced by an extensive set of international climate change policies and 
cooperation and, more recently, by it's the role of its late prime minister, Melese Zienawi, in 
the international climate change discussions as the representative of the Africa Union. The 
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leadership aspiration of the PM in climate change has helped in securing political 
endorsement for domestic environmental issues, in particular the climate change agenda. 
Therefore, in the universe of environmental related issues, climate technology transfer from 
the global south to Ethiopia is driven by the pull factors that are characterized by international 
climate politics and regional leadership in climate change. 
5.4.3 FINDING THE OPTIMAL TECHNOLOGICAL GAP BETWEEN TRANSFEROR AND TRANSFEREE 
Ethiopia as a transferee is looking at emerging economies (transferor) as the one with an 
“optimal” potential technological gap. Technology transfer is not obtainable if there is too big 
or too small gap of economic development, organizational strength, knowledge, and norm 
between transferor and transferee, as explained by the Sharif and Haq (1980) technology 
transfer model. This model proposes the concept of a potential technological gap between a 
transferor and transferee, and argues that when the potential technological gap is either too 
great or too small between the transferor and transferee, the effectiveness of the transfer is 
low. It suggests that when a transferee first looks for a potential transferor it is important to 
look for one with an “optimal” potential technological gap. 
The technology gap between Ethiopia and the global North countries is definitely higher 
than the gap between Ethiopia and other developing countries. However, as noted by 
Alemayehu Geda (2008) in some sectors, such as footwear, plastic, cement, and textiles, 
where the emerging economies are involved in a form of FDI and trade, it seems that 
Ethiopia has failed in finding the optimal potential technological gap. The small technological 
gap means that the companies and products in these sectors from the emerging economies 
are crowding out Ethiopian domestic firms, which are less competitive. The low absorptive 
capacity of the country for technologies coming from developed countries affects the 
effectiveness of the technology transfer. In this instance, it is not only Ethiopia as the 
transferee, but also firms in the global North (the transferor), who are not interested in 
engaging in the process of technology transfer, due to the high cost of shrinking the 
technology gap and to make the technology transfer happen (Glass and Saggi 1998). 
5.4.4 CREATING AND EXPANDING THE MARKET 
The prospect of reaching Ethiopia’s large and growing domestic markets has spurred global 
south firms to seek opportunities for establishing manufacturing bases in Ethiopia, requiring 
transfer and adaptation of equipment and know-how. As economic activity has expanded (at 
an average rate of 7–10% per year from 2006 to 2011), Ethiopia is becoming a much 
wealthier country than two decades ago. The consequences for technology transfer have 
been manifold. Opportunities for commercial exchanges with other countries have multiplied, 
and Ethiopia has had greater ability to import the commodities and technologies it desires. 
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The rate of growth of Ethiopian environmentally sound technology imports is one of the 
fastest in the world. Data6 from the National Bank of Ethiopia indicates that growth of climate 
technology imports increased by 757% from 2004 to 2010, while the import growth of other 
types of technologies7 on the same year was only 350%. Imports from the USA alone grew 
by 370 %, whereas from China and India grew by 850% and 771% respectively. 
5.5 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH-SOUTH CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The official policy statements of developing countries at the UNFCCC, any other international 
regime meeting, or in national policy documents, characterize south-south technology 
transfer (SSTT) as a technological cooperation based on respect for national sovereignty; 
national ownership and independence; equality; non-conditionality; non-interference; and 
mutual benefit. For example, official statements of the Ethiopian government, as expressed 
in its five year Growth and Transformation Plan and foreign policy, indicate that the country’s 
relationship with its Southern partners is based on the need and desire to pursue mutually 
beneficial cooperation for common development. 
Apart from these kinds of political statements, what are the characteristics of SSCTT in 
practice? What makes it different from NSCTT? The realist school of thought has a simple 
answer for this, they argue that SSTT is not different from NSCCT, but rather it is essentially 
subject to the same dynamics and analytical tools as NSCTT (Kreitlow 2007). Whereas the 
dependency school of thought views SSCTT as technology transfer based on equal 
interaction a means of self-reliance and an alternative to the exploitative NSCTT (Smallman 
and Brown 2011; Darity and Davis 2005; Haq 1980; Frank 1971). 
In order to find out the characteristics of SSCTT in practice, a survey was conducted 
and respondents asked two questions. First, respondents were asked to list the 
characteristics of SSCTT vis-à-vis the NSCTT in five areas: (1) Technological cooperation 
approach (2) Investment focus and ownership type (3) Labour movement and local linkages 
(4) Technology and industrial scale (5) Export composition. A summarized response for each 
of the five areas is presented in Table 5.3. Second, in order to get new insights into the 
characteristics of SSCTT, respondents were asked to list the characteristics of SSCTT, with 
examples as they had experienced and perceived. 
The characteristics, which were listed by the respondents, were categorized into three 
broader areas in order to capture as many as possible responses. (1) Cooperation type and 
                                                                
6 For the purpose of this calculation the US International Trade Administration’s (ITA) Office of Energy 
and Environmental Industries (OEEI) Classification System and list of products for the ET industry was 
adopted by the author. 
7 “Other types of technologies” for this calculation were those that were classified as non-climate 
technology. 
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power relationship (2) Long-term strategic vision, and (3) State Capitalism. The response of 
71% (47 of the 66 respondents) of respondents fell under these three characteristics. The 
response of the remaining 29% was inconsistent, or was rejected due to poor data quality 
(such as answers, which didn’t reflect the actual question). Discussion of the three major 
characteristics is presented in Table 5.3. The discussion on the three characteristics also 
further elaborates the responses presented in Table 5.3. 
 
TABLE 5.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUTH-SOUTH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER VIS-À-VIS NORTH-SOUTH 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER  
Dependency aspects TT through SSC TT through NSC 
Technological cooperation 
approach 
- "Business is business" approach. No-
strings-attached policy towards technology 
cooperation. Has limited intension in 
supporting the improvement of Ethiopia 
institutional infrastructure and macro level 
knowledge transfer. 
- Conditions and requirements are attached 
for changes in the Ethiopian legal and 
political structure but in most cases the 
conditions don’t ensure institutional and 
systemic changes because the 
requirements focused on short-term 
changes such as the release of political 
prisoners.  
Investment focus and 
ownership type 
-The major companies in Ethiopia from the 
global south are mainly state-owned 
enterprises (Central Statistics Agency of 
Ethiopia, Ethiopia ministry of Industry and 
Commerce, Ethiopia Investment Authority). 
-Focuses very much on the secondary 
sector (e.g., tannery, food, beverages, 
textiles, pharmaceuticals), where the sector 
absorbs more than 45% of the FDI flows in 
Ethiopia (Central Statistics Agency of 
Ethiopia, Ethiopia Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce). 
 
-All major companies from the developed 
world are private enterprises (Ethiopia 
ministry of Industry and Commerce, 
Ethiopia Investment Authority). 
- Technology and knowledge transfer is 
mainly in the tertiary sector (e.g., hotels, 
tourism, consultancy), where the sector is 
the second most attractive to FDI (Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development, 
Ethiopia ministry of Industry and 
Commerce, Ethiopia Investment Authority). 
Labor movement and local 
linkages 
- Lower working conditions and wages in 
the global south companies in Ethiopia 
caused higher turnover. The turn over helps 
in facilitating technology transfer to local 
firms. On the flip side, they have weak 
linkages with domestic enterprises, and 
therefore the opportunities they offer for the 
dissemination of technologies and 
knowledge in Ethiopia is limited (for further 
information see Chapter 6). 
- Higher working conditions and wages in 
the companies that come from the 
developed world caused limited labor 
turnover. Whereas their strong linkages 
with domestic enterprises facilitates the 
diffusion of technologies and knowledge to 
local enterprises (for further information see 
Chapter 6). 
Technology and industrial scale 
- Labor intensive, relatively cheaper and 
often more applicable given the comparable 
level of development, similar climatic 
conditions and often geographical and 
cultural proximity, in particular firms from 
Africa countries, India and Middle East 
(Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia, 
Ethiopia Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce). 
- Has resulted in crowding out of some 
domestic firms because of mainly their 
lower competitiveness in technological 
advancement (Alemayehu 2008). 
- Capital and knowledge intensive, and 
technically advanced products. Superior 
technology is the most common firm-
specific advantage over local companies 
(Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia, 
Ethiopia ministry of Industry and 
Commerce).  
- The technology spillovers have the 
potential to improve the productivity of 
domestic firms and thereby stimulate 
economic growth (Xu and Wang 1999). 
Export composition  - Primary commodity exports/ cheap 
manufactured product imports (National 
Bank of Ethiopia). 
- Primary commodity exports/capital goods 
imports (National Bank of Ethiopia). 
 
The following section elaborates the responses presented in Table 5.3 by presenting 
characteristics of SSCTT into three categories. 
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5.5.1 COOPERATION TYPE AND POWER RELATIONSHIP  
There is a general perception amongst the ordinary citizens of Ethiopia and higher 
government officials, that the relation with the global south is a partnership of equals. 
However, trade data from the Ethiopia National Bank shows that there is little evidence that 
Ethiopian relations with the global south have caused a structural and fundamental 
transformation of the standard dependency features. 
It has become increasingly common to find Chinese and Indians in the rural parts of 
Ethiopia building bridges, hospitals, schools, and water treatments alongside the locals. 
Reflecting on this, a professor at the institute of technology, Addis Ababa University and 
chairman of Transparency Ethiopia, Birhanu Assefa said “Chinese and Indians who live out 
in our villages, working directly with locals, not caught up in endless meetings in the capital 
city or writing reports” (Interview on July 10, 2011). The very presence of outsiders in rural 
communities that are not used to seeing foreigners is an important stimulus for change. The 
skills they bring are passed on to the communities in which they work and a multiplier effect 
is achieved through training of local technicians who can spread the word to others after the 
foreigners have gone back home. In places like the North East and Southern parts of the 
country, where even some Ethiopia professionals are not interested to go and work because 
of security and economic reasons, it is not unusual to find Chinese engineers working with 
local technicians. On the other hand engineers from the North are concentrated in the big 
cities, in particular in Addis Ababa, and unlike in some Northern originated CSOs, North 
technical professionals mostly do not integrate with the local community. The engagement 
level of foreign experts with local community (management of cross-cultural adjustment) has 
a direct effect on the effectiveness of technology transfer (Black and Gregerson 1997). 
Reporting on the level of cross-cultural adjustment, the production manager of 
Messobo Cement Factory, (located 800 km away from the capital city), Kasim Sirag said 
“While Danish and British engineers have been sometimes working from Addis Ababa, 
Turkish, Chinese and Indians have been working and staying in the premises of the factory”. 
These practices have clearly created a general perception amongst the ordinary citizens of 
Ethiopia that the relation with the global south is a partnership of equals. The survey 
conducted by the author in Messebo Cement factory where there were 600 workers with 8% 
Chinese, 11% Turkish, 6% Indians and 13% Danish and British, reflected the above 
understanding of the ordinary citizens. 35% of the respondents8 considered their counterpart 
Chinese colleagues on a similar position as equals in the workplace, where as 30% said 
Turkish, 20% Indians and 10% said Danish and Britons. 
                                                                
8 The survey covered 65 mid-level careers (engineers, chemists, shift engineers, and senior 
chemists). 
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In cross-country working relationships, there is also a feeling among the higher 
government officials that the partnership of Ethiopia with the global south is based on a 
shared solidarity born out of similar experiences and sympathies, which is guided by the 
principles of equals and respect for national sovereignty and ownership. Gosaye Abayneh, a 
higher official at the Ethiopia ministry of Energy and Water said, “The cooperation between 
Ethiopia and emerging economies entails an equal relationship between us. We have China 
and other developing countries with equal partners in our transformational and five years 
development plan” (Interview on June 20, 2011). Unlike the ordinary Ethiopians, the 
government understanding of “equal” partnership could be the result of the Chinese and 
some global south countries “non-intervention” approach to their aids and investments. On 
the other hand, Western investments and aid, which have undertones of various forms of 
conditionality, such as the formation of free trade, building private companies, or relaxing 
government regulations, the emerging economies investments in Ethiopia are based on 
flexible soft loans and are tailored to lift the overall economic performance of Ethiopia 
(Interview with Gosaye Abayneh on June 20, 2011). 
However, the realist school of thought challenges the claim that the partnership 
between Ethiopia, and other global south emerging economies such as China, is between 
‘equals’. The concept of South-South Cooperation - presuming a horizontal and equal 
interaction - neglects the existence of economic and power asymmetries as well as the 
possibilities of dependencies between the countries of the South themselves. As pointed out 
by Carlsson (1982), the most serious problem is not connected with the actual establishment 
of intra- South trade, but its general effects on the development prospects of its participants. 
In the case of South-South trade it is likely that a replication of the exploitative North-South 
trade relationship will occur and the weaker economies of the South will continue to lag 
behind (Kreitlow 2007; Woods 2001). This is, for instance, evident by trade data from the 
Ethiopia National Bank, which shows there is little evidence that Ethiopian relations with the 
global south caused a structural and fundamental transformation of standard dependency 
features. For instance, Ethiopia exports to emerging economies the same primary 
commodities mainly coffee, leather, and other raw materials that it has been supplying to the 
global north. The National Bank historical data reported that 40 years ago (in 1972) when 
Ethiopia almost exclusively exported coffee to developed countries, coffee amounted to 
43.8% of exports, and now where the emerging economies are major destination of the 
country exports, exports are still almost entirely agricultural commodities, and coffee remains 
as the largest foreign exchange earner; amounted to 40.6% of the country export. The lack of 
economic structural reconversion does not support the long run economic growth that the 
country badly needs. First, commodity prices are highly volatile; the country has had to cope 
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with large shocks, both positive and negative. Evidence from 1998 to 2000 shows recurring 
drought has severely hampered the country’s coffee production. The largest of these shocks 
were poorly managed, with negative impacts causing substantial contractions in the output of 
coffee and other commodities. Further, as asserted by dependency theories, reliance on 
export of primary commodities does not expand the value added of exported products 
(Graaff and Venter 2001; Wallerstein 1980), which thus prevents Ethiopia from generating 
the rapid economic growth seen in other emerging economies. 
Advocacy groups and individuals such as Hayle-Yesus Tsehay, an activist on 
transparency in trade and director of one of the largest CSOs in Ethiopia, have been warning 
Ethiopia officials about the danger of replicating Ethiopia’s economic relationship with 
northern countries by simply exporting primary commodities to China, India and other 
emerging economies, while importing cheap manufactured goods (Interview with Hayle-
Yesus Tsehay on August 15, 2011). 
The engagement of Ethiopia in SSC has not only had an insignificant effect on the 
country’s trade patterns, but the trade balance with the developed world remains almost the 
same. For example, according to official statistics of the National Bank of Ethiopia, in 2010, 
China’s export volume to Ethiopia is ten times larger than the Ethiopia’s exports to China. 
During the same year, Italy, the largest trading partner of Ethiopia from the developed world, 
had an export volume six times larger than Ethiopian exports to Italy. This is contrary to the 
dependency theorists, who believe that south-south cooperation would avoid trade 
imbalances and disadvantageous terms of trade (Milios 2009; Smallman and Brown 2011). 
Further, even though it is true that emerging economy experts have much better 
personal interactions and connections with local Ethiopians compared to the developed 
country technical professionals, at the firm level emerging economy companies have very 
limited linkages with local enterprises9. Contractual practices among manufacturing firms in 
Ethiopia indicate that most emerging economy companies in Ethiopia don’t interact with 
domestic firms, but by comparison developed country companies establish better linkages 
with domestic enterprises on the supply chain, and therefore the opportunities they offer for 
the dissemination of technologies and knowledge in host economies is better in this 
instance10. 
The Ethiopian late prime minister Meles Zenawi recognized the danger of the existing 
technological and economical cooperation modalities his country and the rest of African 
countries have with emerging economies, as evidenced in the following quote from a 
newspaper interview “African states must be prudent in setting the parameters of the 
                                                                
9 The methodology and the detail discussion for this finding is found in Chapter 6. 
10 The detail analysis is found in Chapter 6.  
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relationship. The Chinese interest in Ethiopia has been nothing short of a godsend. We have 
benefited massively from it, but like everything else it is capable of becoming a nightmare. It 
is up to the host countries as to how they use the available resources from the Chinese in the 
best possible manner. Those who do will benefit, those who don’t may not benefit as perhaps 
they ought to.” (Mary Fitzgerald, 2010. Interview in Irish Times). 
5.5.2 LONG-TERM STRATEGIC VISION 
South-South technology transfer is characterized by long-term strategic vision and 
engagement, which is featured by the establishment of Engineering Academy programs to 
secure their sustainability in other developing countries, setting-up of manufacturing and 
assembling plants in joint ventures and creation of industrial parks. 
The long term strategic vision and engagement, illustrated above, enables Ethiopia to 
manage technology transfer barriers, mainly the lower skill base of the country together with 
its global south countries. Keller and Chinta (1990) argue that effective technology transfer 
would be determined by the extent to which the transferor and transferee manage the 
barriers that impede transfer and strengthen initiatives that facilitate it. The facilitating 
initiatives refer to the willingness of the partners to adapt their respective strategic and 
operational postures to ensure a “win-win” outcome. The barriers could be political, legal, 
social, cultural, economic, and technological. 
In 2000 – 2005 when China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) built the Addis 
Ababa ring road, there was a serious shortage of skilled labour in Ethiopia. As a result, 
skilled Chinese workers were imported for the few technical and managerial positions. The 
Ethiopian government asked China to establish a college that would focus on construction 
and industrial skills. The fully equipped Ethio-China Polytechnic College opened in late 2009, 
funded by Chinese aid. Chinese professors offer a two-year degree with Chinese language 
classes alongside engineering skills for 3,000 students (source: Ethiopia Federal 
Government Ministry of Capacity Building). Though the establishment of Chinese funded 
technical schools is welcome by many as major positive signs of China’s longer engagement 
in boosting knowledge transfer in Ethiopia, some are cautions about the manner China 
monopolizes sectors like the construction industry, which is mainly through low wage 
mechanisms. Reflecting on the nature of such mechanisms, Wipas (2000) noted that a 
competitiveness based on higher wages could spur technology transfer than lower wages, 
which has limited positive impact on boosting technology transfer. 
Engineering Academy programs are a critical part of the Southern companies vision to 
secure their sustainability in other developing countries including Ethiopia by building a 
skilled pool of resources from which to draw their employees from. At the same time, the 
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programs are making contributions to the country’s growth by helping it develop the technical 
skills it needs to support the leap into the competitive global economy. Samsung Electronics 
Co. Ltd, the South Korean electronics manufacturer has commenced establishment of the 
production of laptop, printer and television sets and refrigerators in Ethiopia. At the time of 
writing this thesis, the company was opening up an engineering academy in Addis Ababa at 
an estimated cost of 1.5 million dollars, in order to boost local technical and engineering skills 
for its future plant, and for Ethiopia in general. The academy, which would be equipped with 
an electronics engineering lab, will provide practical training to students from Grade 10 to 12 
drawn from schools. The company, which intends to have 10,000 electronic engineers in 
Africa by 2015, has already opened a similar electronics-engineering academy at Boksburg, 
South Africa, in 2011 (source: Ethiopia Federal Government Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce). In a similar fashion, India and Turkey have been strengthening their 
technological cooperation with Ethiopia through the establishment of technical schools. 
South Africa has already started the establishment of joint science and technology colleges 
in Ethiopia to boost technological cooperation of the two countries. In contrast, it is hard to 
find new technical schools from the global North except the few cultural institutes that were 
established some years back in the 1970s and 80s. 
The establishment of industrial parks by emerging economies is another feature of the 
long-term engagement of the global south countries with Ethiopia. One of the objectives of 
the industrial parks is to facilitate technology transfer and business development to help in 
exploiting knowledge and creating wealth. Currently, there are only four foreign investment 
parks in Ethiopia, and all of them are founded by developing countries, namely Turkey, 
Egypt, China and India. All of them have been constructed since 2010. Chinese companies 
involved in textiles, leather and manufacturing construction equipment have invested USD 
713m for Ethiopia’s first industrial park at Dukem, 37 km (23 miles) east of the capital Addis 
Ababa. The park has been built on a five million sq.m. plot and the China-Africa 
Development Fund has financed the project. Indian investors have set up an industrial zone 
in Kombolcha town (380kms away from Addis Ababa), which has the capacity of 50 to 100 
factories. Egyptians are investing USD 300m in an industrial park, which will consist of 120 
factories ranging from small-to-medium size firms manufacturing textiles and apparels as 
well as many other products, to large steel factories, which are projected to create job 
opportunities for 30,000 people. While the Turks have developed an industrial zone, which is 
now the biggest industrial park in the country at 14 to 15 million sq. m., Chinese investors are 
developing their second industrial zone in Dire Dawa, 515km southeast of Addis Ababa 
(source: Ethiopia Investment Authority, Ethiopia Federal Government Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce). The parks mainly serve companies originating from the investing country and 
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focused on enhancing inter-dependent relationships among the community firms, exchanging 
materials, water and energy in a mutually advantageous manner, each contributing to the 
welfare of the other. It is too early to make judgments on the performance of the industrial 
parks, however, if it goes as planned, the parks could enhance not only industrial productivity 
but also environmental performance through collaboration in managing environmental and 
resource issues including energy, water, and materials. 
5.5.3 THE RISE OF STATE CAPITALISM 
SSTT in Ethiopia is a reflection of the Latin American Structuralists school of thought where 
technology transfer in the country under the SSC framework is marked by state capitalism, 
where state control technology transfer is at the core of the government industrial policy. The 
dependency theorists, in particular the Latin American Structuralists believe in a larger state 
role for promoting technological innovation through industrial policy (Ocampo 2000). 
Building on the Latin America Structuralist theory, and inspired by the development 
miracle of South Korea and Taiwan, Meles Zienawi, the Ethiopia Prime Minister concluded in 
his article that technological capability accumulation in developing countries is plagued by 
pervasive market failure, information failures and extreme forms of information asymmetry, of 
increasing returns, of extensive externalities, and coordination failures. It shows that 
technology has the essential characteristics of a public good. Then, he said that effective 
technology transfer in developing countries like Ethiopia could be materialized through the 
intervention of strong government, or what he called the Development State (Zienawi 2012). 
 
The rise of state capitalism has triggered a kind of technology transfer that is facilitated and 
characterized by technological cooperation among state owned companies. In Ethiopia most 
of those state owned and party affiliated industries have technological cooperation with state 
owned companies originating mainly from China. The Chinese firms’ technological 
cooperation with Ethiopia is more often mediated by formal government-to-government 
agreements. 
In this model of capitalism (sometimes referred to as state capitalism), the state has 
more independent, or autonomous, political power, as well as more control over the economy 
(Leftwitch 1995). State capitalism, understood as the widespread influence of the 
government in the economy, either by owning and controlling companies or through the 
provision of credit and privileges to private companies, seems to be on the rise not only in 
Ethiopia, but also in many other developing countries and emerging economies (Aldo 
Musacchio 2012). 
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In Ethiopia business and politics are strongly entwined. State-owned enterprises 
dominate manufacturing industries and service sectors, and party-affiliated endowments 
have taken many of the business opportunities left for private engagement (Altenburg 2010). 
Large-scale companies like sugar, power, telecommunication, cement, and steel are owned 
mainly either by the government of Ethiopia or by governing party affiliated endowments. In 
the name of endowment the ruling political party, EPRDF, controls more than 50 large-scale 
companies operating in the industrial, mining, construction, agro-processing, trade and 
service sectors. The business groups controlled by the EPRDF are said to be one of the 
largest conglomerates in Sub-Saharan Africa (Altenburg 2010). Party affiliated companies 
and state owned enterprises comprise 34.7% of the country's total investment capital, where 
as FDI made up 20.3% of the overall investments11. The Ethiopia government is perceived 
by the private sector and analysts as critical of the commercial motivation of private 
entrepreneurs (Altenburg, 2010). Reflecting on the growing suspicious behavior of the 
Ethiopia government with the private sector, the owner and CEO of one private enterprise 
said “Unfortunately, the Ethiopian Government is suspicious of our motivation and it 
considers us ‘naturally rent-seeking’ and for the government the only productive enterprises 
are its party affiliated endowments and state owned companies” (Interview on July 10, 2011). 
The suspicious altitude of the Ethiopian Government towards the private sector has 
limited the effectiveness of its role in facilitating partnership promotion programs to stimulate 
climate technology transfer through, among other things, joint-venture activities and/or 
private inter-firm technology and marketing partnerships. The absence of dynamic and 
vibrant private sector involvement has a negative effect in the country’s development 
aspiration. As Large et al. (1992) pointed out, full sustainable and equitable development is 
not possible without the active contribution of the private sector in technology transfer. In the 
current business environment, the Government is in a unique position to play an important 
role in promoting market intermediation and capacity building, ultimately to put in place 
policies that reduce barriers to technology transfer. Unfortunately, there is no government 
based sector-specific environmental technology intermediaries. The government focus on 
monopolizing and managing businesses entities has distracted it from playing a stimulating 
role for technology transfer through government support systems. 
5.6 CONCLUSION 
The evidence of this part of the thesis on South-South climate technology transfer provided 
through the Ethiopia case indicates that technological cooperation of least developed 
                                                                
11 Calculated from the official data collected from Ethiopia Ministry of Finance and governing party 
affiliated endowment funds - Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and Southern Peoples. 
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countries (LDCs) like Ethiopia with developed countries is diminishing and is being overtaken 
by the global south. 
This could be explained by the concept of an ‘optimal technology gap’. When the 
potential technological gap between a transferor and transferee is either too great or too 
small, effectiveness of the transfer is low (Sharif and Haq 1980). The technology gap 
between LDCs and the global North countries is too great, and as a result the transfer of 
technology is ineffective. The global North firms are less interested in being involved in 
transferring technology to LDCs because of the significant costs associated with shrinking 
the technology gap and thereby making the technology transfer effective. The LDCs 
themselves do not have a great appetite to engage in the transfer of complex technology 
where higher absorptive capacity is demanded for effective technology transfer. On the other 
hand, in some sectors (for instance, footwear, plastic, cement, and textiles in Ethiopia) there 
are cases where the technology gap between LDCs and emerging economies is too narrow, 
and companies and products in these sectors from the emerging economies are crowding 
out LDCs domestic firms because of their lower competitiveness. However, the latter case is 
not evident in the transfer of climate technologies because the rapid climate technological 
advancement of emerging economies has resulted in an optimal technology gap between the 
transferor and transferee. In the south-south cooperation framework, climate technology 
transfer is evolving mainly through trade in goods and services where most environmentally 
sound technologies are embodied in imported capital goods, machinery, and equipment. 
 
Creating an optimal technological gap, and international influence along with political 
security, trade, and other foreign policy objectives seems to be a powerful factor for 
technology transfers from emerging economies to less developed countries. However, in 
contrast to the common expectations and traditional wisdom, there are no indications from 
policy or practices that a position of creating environmental wellbeing is a motivational factor 
for south-south climate technology transfer. Again, contrary to the findings of some 
researchers, technology transfer from developing countries to other non-oil or mineral 
resource producing developing countries like Ethiopia, natural resource seeking is not a 
motivational factor for south-south climate technology transfer. In addition, political solidarity 
of the global south countries in international climate regimes is not a major motivational 
factor for south-south climate technology transfer. This is mainly because of the fact that 
global south technological cooperation is guided by a “Business is Business” approach. This 
approach not only avoids attaching conditionalities to the technological cooperation, but also 
effectively sidelines the practical and technical impact of the G77+China alliance in 
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influencing and guiding the climate technology transfer process at the national level of a 
developing country. Yet, it still affects perceptions among politicians and policy makers. 
 
South-south climate technology transfer is characterized by technological cooperation among 
state-owned enterprises. In Ethiopia, for instance the major technology cooperation is 
between Ethiopian state owned companies and another developing country, mainly China, 
state owned enterprises. This is mainly because in developing countries like Ethiopia state 
capitalism is inconspicuously on the rise. This finding is contrary to the notion that many 
developing nations are in a state of privatization, or breaking up of large state-owned 
enterprises that provided opportunities for south-south technology transfer (Radosevic 1995; 
Sadowski 2001) 
Results on power relations in south-south technology cooperation are mixed. First, 
there is evidence that indicates south-south technology cooperation is guided by the 
principles of equals and respect for national sovereignty and ownership. For example, in 
contrast to North-South technology transfer, conditions such as respect for human rights, 
improved governance and competitive democracy, are not attached to south-south 
cooperation. These kinds of conditions are viewed by many developing countries as 
violations of sovereignty and the principle of country ownership. In addition to the absence of 
conditionality, the presence of engineers and technicians of a developing country in the rural 
villages of another southern country working alongside local experts and people has created 
the general perception amongst ordinary citizens and higher government officials that a 
relationship with the global south is a partnership of equals born out of similar experiences 
and sympathies. This perception is in particular held by politicians, and is also influenced by 
the spirit of the G77+China solidarity in international climate negotiations. On the other hand, 
evidence from trade data shows that south-south technology transfer has caused little 
fundamental transformation of structural and standard dependency features, which contrasts 
with the principle of equals and shared solidarity. 
The South-South climate technology transfer has a development dimension and the 
potential to make a difference in critical development areas. This is evidenced by (1) the 
long-term strategic vision of South-South technology transfer, (2) the willingness and the 
potential of the transferee and the transferor to manage technology transfer barriers together. 
This is evident by the, for instance, establishment of specialized training colleges by 
companies from other developing countries to enhance the host country local absorptive 
capacity, and (3) the willingness of companies from the global south to invest in industrial 
sectors, which are identified by the host country as priorities for the national economic 
development. In the case of Ethiopia, the developmental impact of SSCTT is evident in the 
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response of emerging economies such as the China, South Korean, Turkey, India etc. to the 
Ethiopian government’s request to establish technical colleges, setting-up of manufacturing 
and assembling plants in joint ventures and creation of industrial parks. 
 
The south-south climate technology transfer is also characterized by (1) lack of 
environmental objectives because of its “Business is Business” approach, (2) lack of 
intension in supporting the improvement of the transferee institutional infrastructure, (3) 
limitations in private sector involvement as engine of innovations because of the rise of state 
capitalism, (4) limited interaction of firms on the supply chain, and (5) the model limitations in 
reversing the unfair North-South trade relationship. 
These limitations highlight the need for adequate and effective policies for maximizing 
the net benefits of transferees and ensure a “win-win” outcome of the technological 
cooperation. As the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Melesse Zienawi said, host countries 
must be prudent in setting the parameters of their relationship with the southern transferors, 
otherwise, as warned by the PM, the south-south cooperation is capable of becoming a 
nightmare. It is, therefore, in the interests of the entire international community, and not only 
the host country, to adopt the appropriate instrument to regulate and facilitate the South–
South exchange of climate-related technologies, and thereby to make a significant 
contribution to low carbon climate resilient development. 
 The limitations also emphasize the fact that SSCTT is not an alternative to NSCTT. 
SSCTT is rather an imperative to complement NSCTT in order to promote the flow of climate 
technology to developing countries. 
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CHAPTER 6  GAUGING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION 
FOR ENHANCING CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT THE FIRM LEVEL 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
6.1.1 BACKGROUND 
This chapter of the thesis examines effectiveness of North-South (NSCTT), South-South 
(SSCTT) and North-South-South (NSSCTT)1 climate technology transfer through the prisms 
of a firm’s ability to access information and their ability to utilize knowledge obtained from 
external sources. The chapter will compare these three modalities of cooperation, and 
gauges their effectiveness for enhancing technology transfer at the firm level. It will 
investigate the effectiveness of climate technology transfer at the firm level in terms of the 
distinct and combined effects of firm’s network and absorptive capacity for climate 
technology transfer. 
A combination of actor-network theory (ANT) and the theory of absorptive capacity 
(TAC) are employed as the overarching theories to examine the effectiveness of technology 
transfer at the firm level. The combination of these two perspectives accentuates issues of 
information access and assimilation. Explaining this, Davenport and Prusak (2000) point out 
that that technology transfer at the firm level is influenced by a firm’s ability to access 
information and their ability to value, assimilate and utilize external information. The two most 
important factors for measuring the effectiveness of technology transfer at the firm level are 
(1) the nature of network alignments and interaction that are crucial for access to information 
or simply external knowledge; and (2) the knowledge base of firms or absorptive capacity to 
assimilate and apply the external knowledge (Nieto and Quevedo 2005; Lin et al. 2002; Law 
and Callon 1992, 1994). 
Technology transfer, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is affected by learning system factors 
such as environment, industry and organization, however, access to information and ability to 
utilize external information have distinct and important roles for effective technology transfer 
at the firm level. The interplay of the two factors (access to information and ability to utilize 
external information) should be taken into account to understand the effectiveness of firm 
                                                                
1 Unlike the other chapters, this chapter of the thesis examines NSSCTT in addition to NSCTT and 
SSCTT. NSSCTT for this thesis means a process whereby technology from one or more global north 
and south countries transfer to a southern country (for this chapter Ethiopia was considered as the 
host country). This understanding of NSSCTT is different from what is called Triangular cooperation, 
which is a process of technology transfer from a southern country to another southern country while a 
third actor (another country from the north or a multilateral organization) may be able to provide 
additional capacity to support the process. 
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level technology transfer. Access to information and the potential for learning are used to 
compare the three modes of cooperation (SSC, NSC and NSSC) when necessary and gauge 
their performance and effectiveness for enhancing climate technology transfer at the firm 
level. 
 
The three modes of cooperation showed distinct characteristics and result in a dissimilar 
level of effectiveness in technology transfer. Technological capacities have occurred in all the 
three modes of cooperation but at different levels. Key findings from the research analysis 
showed the complementarity nature of NSCTT and SSCTT and ratified NSSCTT as one 
important way of strengthening the effectiveness of this complementarity and fostering 
technology transfer by leveraging the best features of NSCTT and SSCTT. 
 
As a continuation of Chapter 5, this part of thesis also reports research conducted in Ethiopia 
and analyses both the nature of the country as a host for technology transfer, and the role of 
other developing countries as sources, and not only as recipients, of international technology 
innovations. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHAPTER AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This chapter compares and contrasts SSCTT, NSCTT and NSSCTT by examining the 
characteristics of networks, quality relationship of actors, performance of actors networks 
and the critical factors of a firm’s ability to value new external knowledge, including a firm’s 
routines to interpret and understand the knowledge obtained from external sources, the 
internalization of new external information and ability to utilize external knowledge. 
The contribution of this chapter of the thesis is threefold: 1) Chapters 4 and 5 revealed 
that the concept of South-South solidarity is strongly represented in the international climate 
regime, policy documents and official cooperation agreements. Yet the reality of this 
solidarity for technology transfer can be assessed by its effectiveness at the firm level. This 
chapter provides information on the effectiveness of this modality of cooperation for climate 
technology transfer by comparing and contrasting alignments and misalignments in north-
south cooperation (NSC), south-south cooperation (SSC) and north-south-south cooperation 
(NSSC) for climate technology transfer; 2) based on the results of the technology transfer 
performance analysis, it provides insights about the level of technological capability gained 
from external information and learning through alliances; 3) the information on the 
characteristics, performance and relationship quality would facilitate the understanding of the 
correlation between the asymmetry in parties’ interests at the international climate regime 
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(discussed in Chapter 4), national strategies for international cooperation to enhance climate 
technology transfer (discussed in Chapter 5) and firm level climate technology transfer. 
 
This part of the PHD study is guided by the following research question: 
 
How effective are the international cooperation modalities (SSCTT, NSCTT and NSSCTT) for 
enhancing the transfer of climate technologies at the firm level? 
 
Based on this overarching question the specific research sub questions are: 
i. How are network relationships characterized, and how are networks tied up and 
stabilized in SSCTT, NSCTT and NSSCTT? 
ii. How is absorptive capacity and technological learning characterized in SSCTT, NSCTT 
and NSSCTT? 
iii. What are the challenges and benefits of the three modalities of cooperation for enhancing 
effective climate technology transfer, and how could the challenges be overcome? 
6.1.2 METHODOLOGY 
A case study method was used to gather and analyze relevant data. Three projects in 
Ethiopia were selected as case studies to study climate technology transfer as an emerging 
phenomenon and assess the effectiveness of technology cooperation modalities in 
promoting it. 
The empirical material gathered for this chapter includes direct observation, interviews 
(formal and informal), reviewing relevant published material and the study of documentation 
available in the various international and local enterprises involved. 
The author had access to daily operation of the selected case studies during the data 
collection period of the thesis fieldwork (from February 07, 2011 to April 27, 2011 and 
September 12 -27, 2011) in Ethiopia to distribute questionnaires and conduct interviews. 
Questionnaires were developed both in English and Amharic, the Ethiopian official language. 
A pilot test was undertaken with six selected respondents. Data collection was supported by 
direct observational evidence of actors, institutional context, and processes. For each 
interview a script was used to conduct the dialog and to achieve the pre-defined lines of 
action. Concerning sources for data collection, Yin argues that a case study approach needs 
to be understood as a comprehensive research method which deals with a range of different 
sources of evidence, for example interviews, documents, surveys, observations, etc. (Yin 
1994). There are different sampling strategies with different logistics of each approach, 
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depending on the overall purpose of each strategy. The reason for this is that actors were 
selected due to their specific purposes and characteristics. 
Three case studies that involved a large set of actors both from the global south and 
industrialized world were selected. The selection of the case studies considered: (1) the need 
to compare and contrast the effectiveness of the three major modes of international 
cooperation (SSCTT, NSCTT and NSSCTT) for enhancing the transfer of climate 
technologies, (2) the necessity to find and build linkages between the three modalities of 
cooperation, (3) the idea to feature the complex political economy of climate technology 
transfer and (4) the interest to shed light on the various channels of technology transfer. 
 
The selection of the case studies was based on the information obtained from the national 
assessment on climate technology transfer, which was also used in the fifth chapter of the 
thesis. The objective of the assessment was to solicit preliminary information about the 
different initiatives and projects relating to climate technology transfer in Ethiopia. The 
assessment, which was conducted between October 8 to December 10, 2010 enabled the 
researcher to examine different options for the selection of the case studies that qualify 
typical cases for each group of technology cooperation modalities (NSCTT, SSCTT and 
NSSCTT). It was also during the assessment period that the type and nature of the evidence 
to gather, and analysis techniques to be used with the data to answer the research 
questions, were determined. During the month of March 2011 preliminary information was 
collected around the list of firms, projects and initiatives that were identified in the 
assessment process. Finally, in the first week of April 2011, three case studies were selected 
through observation, and data were collected during the second and third week of April and 
throughout the month of May 2011. Initial analysis was conducted on June and July 2011 
and the result of the analysis necessitated the need to collect additional data. As a result, the 
researcher went back to Ethiopia and re-interviewed key respondents, conducted 
supplemental observation and collected additional project documents between September 12 
-27, 2011 to improve the likelihood of accurate and reliable findings and verify key 
observations. 
 
The selected case studies were: 
1. Messebo Building Material Share Company (Messebo); 
2. Ashegoda Wind Energy Project (Ashegoda) and; 
3. Nazreth Wind Energy Project (Nazreth). 
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FIGURE 6.1  LOCATION OF THE CASE STUDIES  
Messebo manufactures cement using low carbon technology, energy efficiency, and 
emission control mechanisms, where-as the latter two case studies were the first wind farms 
to operate in Ethiopia. Messebo is owned by the governing-party- affiliated holding company 
and features North-South-South Climate Technology Transfer (NSSCTT). Ashegoda wind 
farm is owned by the government of Ethiopia and featured North-South Climate Technology 
Transfer (NSCTT); whereas Nazret wind farm, also owned by the government, featured 
South-South Climate Technology Transfer (SSCTT). The first case study belongs to a 
processing industry (Cement Production) whereas the last two case studies are from the 
same industry sector: renewable energy. The two different industries, cement processing and 
wind energy sector, have been selected to exemplify climate technology transfer in different 
sectors where as the strategic identification of the last two case studies from the same 
industry followed the interest of the research work to compare and contrast the effectiveness 
of SSCTT and NSCTT. ANT recognizes that industries are not homogeneous; rather within 
the same industry, some firms are more alike than others (Nohria and Garcia-Pont 1991). In 
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order to make an investigation on the differences that exist among the three different 
cooperation modalities (SSC, NSC and NSSC) for climate technology transfer, the strategic 
selection of the case studies considered similarities in firm scale, ownership, similarity of 
products and services, similarity in technology, among other dimensions but differences in 
alliances. 
 
TABLE 6.1  SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
 Messebo Ashegoda Nazreth 
Cooperation Modality NSSC NSC SSC 
Owner Government2 
(Governing political 
party)  
Government Government  
Sector Manufacturing 
(Sustainable Product, 
energy efficiency)  
 Renewable energy Renewable energy 
Firm Scale3 Large-sized 
(600 workers) 
Large-sized 
(450 workers) 
Large-sized 
(800 workers) 
Technology level High-tech High-tech High-tech 
 
This chapter of the thesis is organized in four sections. This section presents a brief 
background of the chapter, methods of the research including description of the selected 
case studies and overarching theories. The second section assesses the effectiveness of 
technology transfer using ANT. It examines the context embedded within the alliance in order 
to augment the understanding of what leads to technology transfer. The third section 
examines the ability of the local networks in each of the case studies to value, assimilate, 
and utilize the technological information made available by the foreign networks. The fourth 
and the last section presents the conclusion of the analysis of climate technology transfer 
effectiveness using the combination of ANT and TAC. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDIES 
MESSEBO CEMENT FACTORY (MESSEBO) 
Messebo Cement Factory, owned by Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray 
(EFFORT) a major governing-party- affiliated holding company, was established in 1996 and 
production started in April 2000. The manufacturing plant is located in the outskirts of 
                                                                
2 Even though Messebo is actually owned by the governing political party, in the current Ethiopian 
situation there is little difference between the government and governing political party (Zerihun 2008). 
3 The International Financial Corporation (IFC) defines large companies as registered businesses with 
higher than 300 employees (IFC 2012).  
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Mekelle, a town 783 km from the capital (Addis Ababa). The processing plant is located close 
to its sources of raw materials. The factory uses limestone, iron ore, gypsum, and sandstone; 
and these are found within 40 km of the production site. The cement factory was established 
with an initial capital of about $154 million and is one of the two largest cement producers in 
the country. It has an annual production capacity of 630,000 tonnes, a market share of 30% 
and a total labour force of 600. Messebo is less profitable compared with its competitor, 
Mugher cement factory, which has similar production capacity. 
 At establishment, Messebo had a large number of expatriates, particularly from 
Denmark, Turkey, India, Pakistan, who managed production, quality control and 
maintenance. The machines and equipment for the plant were supplied by M/S F.L. Smidth, 
Denmark, one of the most renowned manufacturers of cement plants in the world. The civil 
and structural works, supply and installation of the structural steel, and the entire mechanical 
erection works were done by ENKA construction & industry co. inc, a Turkish construction 
conglomerate based in Istanbul. A Chinese state owned enterprise, National Materials 
Company (CNMC), a subsidiary of China National Materials Group Corporation (Sinoma) 
was contracted in 1999 to manage the Messebo Cement factory, but the contract was 
terminated in 2002, and in 2003 a Pakistani company, Cementech International, was 
contracted and managed the factory from February 2003 until November 2009. 
ASHEGODA I WIND FARM 
Ashegoda I wind farm was the first of three phases of the 120 MW wind farm located 20km 
southwest of Mekelle, Tigray Regional State, and 763km north of the capital, Addis Ababa. 
Ashegoda wind consists of two main areas; the western area is located on two low ridges in 
an approximately north-south orientation while the eastern area is spread over a more 
distinct mountain range in north-south orientation with several branches. In between the two 
areas a lower plain area can be found. Ashegoda I wind farm is located in the Western 
slopes of the ridges at an altitude of 2400m above the sea leve close to the descent to the 
coastal plain. 
 Ashegoda I wind farm was contracted to Vergnet Groupe by the Ethiopian Electric 
Power Corporation (EEPCo). Vergnet Group is a French turbine manufacturer and wind farm 
developer and its subsidiaries conduct complementary activities including design, production, 
R&D, turbine construction, and after-sales service. Through a soft loan, the French banks 
and Agence France de Development (AFD) financed the 210 million euro project. Vergnet 
Groupe uses a patented tilting rotor on its GEV-HP 1 MW turbines and the actors in the work 
believed the company’s twin-blade machines are good for installation in rugged areas like 
Ashegoda because they do not require heavy lifting equipment. The German company, 
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Lahmeyer International GmbH (LI), supervised the wind farm construction, installation and 
commissioning activities on behalf of the owner, EEPCo. The wind farm consists of 30 
Vergnet GEV-HP 1 MW turbines and 54 Alstom 1.62 MW wind turbines located at the 
Ashegoda site in the north of Ethiopia. There were three hundred people employed on the 
Ashegoda project, forty of them were from France, Germany, Sudan and South Africa and 
the rest were locals. Ashegoda I began operation on May, 2012. 
NAZRETH I WIND POWER PROJECT 
Nazreth I Wind Power project is the first phase of the three phased 153 MW wind farm 
located just outside the city of Nazareth, which is 95km to the southwest of Addis Ababa. 
This was one of the six Ethiopia wind projects launched in 2009 but was the first wind power 
project put into operation in the country. The Nazreth wind farm is located at an altitude 
range of 1836 - 1926 m.asl (above sea level). The feasibility study including environmental 
impact assessment, and financial proposal made by GIZ TERNA in 2006 indicates Nazareth 
Wind Farm has higher annual full load hours compared to the six other sites studied. 
 China's Exim Bank lent 85% of the $117 million investment, with the remainder coming 
from the Ethiopian government. The EPC (engineering, procurement and construction) of the 
Nazreth wind farm comprises direct-drive permanent magnet wind turbines, a substation, 
cabling (to connect the wind turbines and substation to the electricity grid), wind monitoring 
equipment and temporary and permanent access tracks. The project adopts Chinese 
standards in design, construction and acceptance inspection; and it also uses Chinese wind 
turbines and employed Chinese project supervisors. It is the first Chinese wind power project 
to step onto the global stage in all aspects, namely, technology, standards, management, 
finance and equipment. In short, it is the first EPC international wind power project for China. 
The wind power equipment was supplied and installed by China state-owned Xinjiang 
Goldwind Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“Goldwind”), which is the fifth-largest wind turbine 
manufacturer in the world. This is the first project for Goldwind in Africa. The construction 
activities of the wind farm were undertaken by a Chinese joint venture comprising two state 
owned companies namely HydroChina International Engineering Company (HCIE) and 
Chinese construction group (CGCOC). The Ethiopia state owned university, the Addis Ababa 
University Faculty of Technology, was the consultant in the project. It supervised the 
implementation of the project within the estimated time and on behalf of the Employer. The 
consultant was responsible for all clarifications, approvals of detailed designs, testing 
procedures and certificates. There were 600 Ethiopians and 200 Chinese workers in the 
project, i.e. the China: local ratio was 0.33 which was much higher than the Ashegoda wind 
farm where the French: local ratio, was 0.062. In Ashegoda, there were 400 Ethiopians, 25 
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French and 25 other nationalities including from Germany, Sudan and South Africa. The 
Nazreth wind farm started operating in June 2011 and has 34 1.5MV wind turbine generating 
systems (WTGS) with a total installed capacity of 51MW. 
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: OVERARCHING THEORIES 
A combination of actor-network theory (ANT) and the theory of absorptive capacity (TAC) are 
employed as the overarching theories to examine the effectiveness of technology transfer at 
the firm level. In this chapter of the thesis, analysis of the case studies using ANT as a 
framework highlights the importance of access to information for technology transfer, 
whereas TAC centers on examining actors’ abilities to integrate the information and 
knowledge into their processes and routines. 
 
ANT enables the analysis to bring the actors together in ways that facilitate a productive 
exchange of relevant information and knowledge to understand people and technology 
changes and produce new knowledge. It explains that actors undergo some adaptation to 
use the technology; and they may make adjustments to suite the characteristics of the 
actors. However, although it is called a “theory”, ANT does not usually provide explanations 
“why” or “how” actors assimilate, change or undergo some adaptations to use the 
technology. As Latour notes (1999 and 2005) "explanation does not follow from description; it 
is description taken that much further” and “ANT does not usually explain “why” or "how" a 
network takes the form that it does”. On the other hand TAC explains “why” or “how” actors 
assimilate (Zahra and George 2002) and incorporate externally generated technical 
knowledge into the firm (Mowery and Oxley 1995). 
 
Therefore, in this thesis ANT and TAC are used in a way that they can complement each 
other in order to explain the effectiveness of the international cooperation modalities 
(SSCTT, NSCTT and NSSCTT) for enhancing the transfer of climate technologies at the firm 
level. One of the criticisms of ANT used as analytical framework is that it is highly descriptive, 
telling stories about ‘how’ relations assemble or don’t (Law 2007). In order to mitigate this 
limitation of ANT, in this thesis a two-step ANT analysis is employed: the first part focuses on 
describing the process of actor’s interaction followed by a second step, which is plotting the 
interaction of the actors on a two dimensional graph to measure the degree of mobilization of 
actors. This two-step approach coupled with the employment of TAC make the analysis 
explanatory and provides accounts of the effectiveness of the international cooperation 
modalities for climate technology transfer. 
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Actor Network Theory (ANT) claims that technology transfer processes evolve over time and 
that people and their networks change with time. These changes (actors’ negotiations) 
represent the positive and negative network alignments, with technology transfer becoming 
the result of these interactions (Law and Callon 1992). Law and Callon (1992) contend that it 
is the degree and form of mobilization of the global and the local networks, and the way in 
which they are connected, that determines success of a project in reaching its set goals. 
They suggested that it is possible to plot the interaction of the local-global networks of any 
project (Figure 6.2) on a two-dimensional graph where the x-axis measures the degree of 
mobilization of local actors (control over the local network) and the y-axis the extent to which 
global actors are linked (control over the global network). 
 
FIGURE 6.2 LAW AND CALLON (1992) NETWORK ANALYSIS 
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The theory of absorptive capacity (TAC) examines a firm’s ability to recognize the value of 
new, external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends (Lane and Lubatkin 
1998). The premise of the notion of absorptive capacity is that the organization needs prior 
related knowledge to assimilate and use new knowledge (Kim 1991). Sazali et al. (2009) 
proposed a model for measuring absorptive capacity using six important variables which 
include: (1) academic background, (2) technical capacity, (3) educational programmes, (4) 
financial support, (5) overseas training opportunities, and (6) commitment. 
 The Ethiopian networks ability to value, assimilate, and utilize external information is an 
important aspect of the network quality for effective technology transfer. A company’s 
absorptive capacity is the enabling quality for converting knowledge into new products, 
services or processes to support innovation (Zahra and George 2002). To identify which 
aspects of absorptive capacity matter more in the selected case studies, a survey was 
conducted. Survey questions were distributed by email and in person between February 07 
to April 27, 2011. In the survey, 105 Messebo, and 34 EEPCo employees were involved. 
Messebo and EEPCo are the two major actors in the local networks. The survey included 
EEPCo staff that were involved in the Ashegoda and Nazreth projects, and located both in 
the project sites and the project offices in Addis Ababa, EEPCo headquarters. The survey 
didn’t include the local subcontractors, who worked in the project for a relatively brief period 
of time. The survey participants in the two organizations (Messebo and EEPCo) were 
selected based on the diversity of their positions and educational backgrounds. Engineers, 
mechanics, marketing specialists, and human resource administrators from expert to 
management committee members were included. In addition, two senior managers from 
Vergnet, three from HydoChina and three from EFFORT were interviewed for comparative 
analysis. 
6.2 ANALYZING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER USING ANT 
6.2.1 TRANSLATION PROCESSES AND THE CASE STUDIES  
The translation process employed in this thesis refers to the processes of negotiation, 
representation and displacement between actors, entities and places (Murdoch 2001). In 
each of the case studies four major moments of a translation process (Problematization, 
Interessement, Enrolment and Mobilization) were used to analyze the manner in which 
actors form associations with other actors; and the process through which actor-networks are 
established and stabilized. However, as Woods (1997) argued the moments may in reality 
overlap. In the first moment – problematization, a group of actors identifies the problem to be 
solved or defines an issue as problematic (Verschoor 1997). The second moment – 
‘interessement’ –is characterized by getting the actors interested, negotiating the terms of 
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their involvement and consists on the deployment of devices aimed to impose the roles and 
identities addressed during problematisation (Verschoor 1997). Enrolment, the third moment, 
is the processes in which actors are persuaded or obliged to play particular roles within the 
network characterize this step (Hillier 2002). If enrolment has been achieved, then comes 
mobilization, the fourth moment, of the network of entities involved in which the actors in the 
network adequately represent the masses. 
ANT TRANSLATION PROCESS IN MESSEBO CEMENT FACTORY 
Addis Engineering Consultancy PLC, another EFFORT subsidiary company, was tasked by 
EFFORT to conduct a feasibility study on the production of cement on the outskirts of 
Makelle city in mid 1990s. Addis Engineering contacted many internationally renowned 
companies including M/S F.L. Smidth, Denmark for information and advice on the potential of 
the cement production. Finally, based on the feasibility study report findings and 
recommendations a decision was reached by EFFORT board to establish Messebo at the 
time when EFFORT was evaluating viable investment opportunities. The availability of raw 
materials, production capacity, type of cement to be produced and the types of technology to 
be purchased were decided with the involvement of both local and international experts with 
the leadership of Addis Engineering. In ANT terms, this was the moment of problematisation. 
 The network interessement was achieved through tenders, negotiations and contracts, 
which aimed to impose the roles and identities of the different actors including machine 
suppliers, construction companies, consultants and other companies. After the moment of 
problematisation, Addis Engineering came out with the role of consultant for the civil and 
structural works, supply and installation of the structural steel and the entire mechanical 
erection works of the project. However, Addis Engineering had limitations in experiences and 
skills to perform its consultant roles. In order to overcome its capacity limitations, it 
subcontracted Haltach Consultancy Co, an Indian company based in New Delhi, for the 
technical work of the consultant work while Addis Engineering focused mainly on 
administrative activities, and in particular served as a liaison between the employer and other 
actors. M/S F.L. Smidth, Denmark for machine supply and ENKA construction & industry co. 
inc for mechanical and civil works were identified. The management of Messebo cement 
from the start of commissioning was given to the Chinese company, CNMC, without going 
through a tender process. 
 The problem with the network initial alignment began at the second translation moment 
(enrolment). The advantage of the ideological proximity between CNMC and EFFORT was 
now causing disruption in the network relations with the enrolment and mobilization being 
forced by the EFFORT management. The Chinese expatriates had a problem of 
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understanding the operational manuals, which were written in English, and had difficulties 
communicating with local staff and supplier representatives. Moreover, they were unfamiliar 
with the F.L. Smidth cement technologies (Interview with Kasim Sirag on May 22, 2011). 
 The lack of trust between the F.L. Smidth and Chinese expatriates was another 
problem. F.L. Smidth expatriates were collaborative in terms of information sharing and joint 
problem solving with Messebo local staff only when the Chinese were not around. At the 
same time, the Chinese expatriates were not committed to work with F.L.Smidth expatriates 
(Interview with Dires Mekonnen on May 22, 2011). In 2001 the plant was running at heavy 
losses and there was talk of foreclosure. 
 
TABLE 6.2  MESSEBO ACTOR-NETWORKS DESCRIPTION 
Actors Intern./Local Role 
Endowment Fund for the 
Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT) 
Local Owner and employer: Overall strategic 
manager of the company 
Addis Engineering Consultancy 
PLC 
Local Consultant: represented the employer and 
supervised the work of the construction 
company 
Haltach Consultancy Co,  Int./India Subcontracted Consultant: supervised the work 
of the construction company 
M/S F.L. Smidth Int./Denmark Manufacturer and supplier: manufactured and 
supplied Messebo machines and equipment.  
ENKA construction & industry co. 
inc 
Int./Turkey Construction company: civil and structural 
works and installation of the structural steel and 
the entire mechanical erection works of the 
project 
China National Materials 
Company (CNMC) 
Int./China Contractor: managed Messebo operation and 
maintenance from 1999 -2002 
Messebo Cement company local 
staff 
Local Employees: operate and managed Messebo 
cement plant 
Cementech International Int./Pakistan Contractor: managed Messebo operation and 
maintenance from 2003 -2009 
Tigray youth co-operatives and 
mass associations 
Local Local retailers: distribute Messebo cement in 
Tigray region 
TransEthiopia P.L.C Local Transport company: transport Messebo cement 
from plant premise to distribution areas 
Guna Trading House PLC Local Wholesale trading company: national 
wholesaler for the Messebo product. 
 
The terms of reference of CNMC were renegotiated more than three times but the problem 
was not solved. As a result, the Chinese management contract was terminated in 2002. The 
preference for an ideological rather than a commercial set up of EFFORT, was causing 
another problem in terms of playing its employer role effectively. The Board members of 
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EFFORT were senior members of the governing political party, EPRDF, and during the 
Ethiopia and Eritrea war (from May 1998 to June 2000) they were engaged in party and 
government duties and were almost totally absent from their EFFORT activities. They were 
not readily available for immediate and strategic decisions (Interview with Abraham 
G.Medhin on May 24, 2011). 
 As a result, the networks among the actors were poorly connected, that is, the 
connections did not hold in the face of adversity. The network was close to falling apart 
without producing major relevant outputs. In 2003, after the war, EFFORT conducted a major 
reshuffling in its board members, hired large number of local Messebo staff including senior 
managers, and replaced the Chinese expatriates by Pakistanis (Cementech International). 
 
There was frustration and friction between the more ideological EFFORT board and the more 
professional management of the Messebo senior local managers. The divergence between 
commercial decision-making (Messebo senior local managers) and the demands of the wider 
political rationale (EFFORT board) was became more evident at the time when Messebo 
entered into a series of controversial wholesale deals for cement distribution within Tigray 
with governing-party affiliated associations and organizations such as youth co-operatives 
and mass associations, which are allowed to benefit from local monopolies such as cement 
retailers. The Messebo management along with private and construction sector critics 
complained that the local wholesale deals drove up prices and hurt Messebo’s long-term 
competitiveness (Interview with Kalimullah Bilwal on May 21, 2011, Kasim Sirag on May 22, 
2011, and Dires Mekonnen May 22, 2011). 
 In addition, EFFORT subsidiaries enjoyed exclusive national transportation and 
distribution, and they sustained a series of semi-monopolistic or transfer rents. The national 
distribution and transport of Mesebo’s cement was monopolized by an EFFORT transport 
subsidiary called TransEthiopia P.L.C and wholesale trading subsidiary, Guna Trading 
House PLC. TransEthiopia charged USD 6 per quintal for transporting the Messebo product 
from the factory site to Addis Ababa, as compared with a market rate closer to USD 3-4. 
Messebo management complained that these ideological factors made Messebo less 
profitable compared with its competitor Mugher Cement PLC. Despite the frictions and 
tensions, the EFFORT board and Messebo management maintained their institutional link. 
 The institutional connections of Messebo local staff, INKA, F.L.Smidth, Addis 
Engineering, Haltach Consultancy Co and Cementech International was relatively well 
maintained and the network was in good health (Telephone Interview with Mikkel Sørensen 
on May 26, 2011, Interview with Miao Huang on May 23, 2011, Fikru Hagos on May 23, 2011 
and Berker Demir May 26, 2011 and September 13, 2011). As a result, the actors were 
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mobilized and this enabled local experts to become acquainted with the latest production and 
quality control technologies. This also allowed the company to produce products, as certified 
by different agencies, that were well above the minimum requirement of the Ethiopian 
Standards Agency for Portland Cement. The local experts, based on the knowledge gained 
from FL.Smidth expatriates, successfully introduced a new and environmentally friendly 
product called Portland Limestone Cement (PLC), which is useful in finishing and plastering. 
 The ingredients of PLC require lower heat to burn, thereby saving on the cost of fuel. 
The introduction of PLC since 2005 also reduced the use of large amount of Pozollana ash, 
which is transported from an area located 100 km away from the factory, whereas limestone 
is available just 1.3 km away from the plant. 
 In 2009, the local Messebo experts, with the help from Cementech International, 
undertook a production process re-engineering exercise and replaced the Sudanese 
imported furnace oil it had been using, with 10% Delbi coal (mined in Ethiopia) and 90% 
petcoke (a byproduct of oil, imported from Sudan), thus reducing costs. This success created 
a new relationship and alignment between Messebo and Cementech International in the 
network. The two companies established a coal-mining company in a joint venture. 
 Messebo in 2012 was operated by local experts at 140% design capacity, producing 
about 900,000 tonnes of Portland Cement per annum, and became the only plant in the 
country producing environmentally friendly cement as a result of the technological 
competencies of the local networks. By the end of 2011, Messebo had an average turnover 
of about $83 million, and net profits of $25 million. The ANT analysis was put together in a 
systematic diagram (see Figure 6.2) where the density of the network was indicated on the 
number of connections and other features such as institutional frictions are also featured. 
 
TRANSLATION PROCESS OF THE WIND FARM CASE STUDIES 
INTRODUCTION 
Ethiopia’s considers itself as “emerging renewable energy powerhouse of Africa”. It ranks 
second in Africa in terms of hydropower potential, after the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and exports significant amounts of electricity to its East African neighbors. As part of 
Ethiopia's ambitious $150 billion, 20-year green growth strategy (GGS), diesel power stations 
will be replaced by hydro, solar, geothermal and wind energy by 2015. The renewable 
energy projects are part of Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation’s (EEPCo) plans to increase 
national electricity generation capacity five times by 2015, from 2000 megawatts (in 2010) to 
about 10,000 MW. 
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FIGURE 6.3  MESSEBO TRANSLATION PROCESS DIAGRAM 
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In the context of the Ethiopian power system, wind power will play a vital 
complementary role with hydro power in that the natural cycle of wind energy availability is 
such that it increases in the dry season when the hydropower reservoirs are low, and 
decreases in the wet seasons when the reservoirs are rapidly filling with water. This will 
make wind power a crucial ingredient to the grid energy mix by improving the reliability of the 
system even in dry years. The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) identified high investment and 
unit energy costs as the major obstacles to the large-scale deployment of wind power in 
Ethiopia. 
To address this problem the GoE, in line with its strategy for the power sector as a 
whole, set the objective of increasing the local value added in the engineering and 
technological inputs going into the development of wind farms while continuously searching 
for concessional financing, thereby ascertaining the long term future of large scale wind 
power development in Ethiopia. 
 
HydroChina International Engineering Company (HCIE) conducted a US$1.5 million survey 
financed by the Chinese government in 2004, which was meant to evaluate the country’s 
potential for a wind plant. HCIE managed the wind energy resource assessment Master Plan 
and Beijing Engineering Corporation undertook the implementation and design of the Master 
Plan. The master plan indicated that Ethiopia is endowed with a huge estimated potential of 
100 GW technically feasible wind power. The current plan of the government of Ethiopia is to 
have around 800 MW by 2015. To this end, EEPCo has so far spotted six promising wind 
farm sites as main fast-track wind energy development. Table 6.3 summarizes the different 
wind power projects that EECo has planned to be developed by 2015. 
 
TABLE 6.3 FAST-TRACK WIND ENERGY PROJECTS PLANNED TO BE DEVELOPED BY 2015 
No.  Wind Project Generating Capacity (MW) Status (as of June 2013) 
1 Ashegoda 120 Operational 
2 Nazreth 153 Operational 
3 Ayisha 300 Under construction 
4 Assela 100 Under construction 
5 Debre Birhan 100 Under negotiation 
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TRANSLATION PROCESS IN ASHEGODA WIND FARM PROJECT 
The Ethiopia government 20 year- green growth strategy and the Hydro China Corporation 
US$1.5 million survey report were the bases for the establishment of the wind park projects 
partnership between Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 
and EEPCo in the northern parts of Ethiopia. The Ashegoda site feasibility study was 
conducted by the Frankfurt based Lahmeyer International (LI) GmbH in 2006 with the 
financial support of the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC) through its operational 
unit, the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and GIZ on behalf of the German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The feasibility study included 
wind potential analysis, conceptual technical layout, environmental impact assessment and 
an economic/financial analysis. The study also comprised a Capacity Credit and Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) assessments. 
The collaboration of EEPCo, GIZ, ADA and IL was an incentive to technology 
advancements in wind energy by joining together the need for increasing the local value 
added in technological inputs going into the development of wind farms while helping the 
country achieve its development goals and limiting the 2030’s GHG emissions to 2010 level. 
This movement of translation (problematisation) created the conditions for environmental 
technology transfer. 
The interessement moment of the translation process begun in 2008 when EEPCO 
awarded contracts to French manufacturer of small turbines, Vergnet Groupe (the turbine 
manufacturer and EPC contractor) and IL (who supervised the construction work). Vergnet 
SA did the turnkey project of the farm, from design to the commissioning, at 294 million 
dollars. Construction commenced in October 2009, after the project obtained a loan from the 
French Development Agency (AFD) for 69.8% of the total projected cost. BNP-Paribas, 
syndicated with Societe General and CIC Bank, all of which are French banks, loaned 21.4% 
and the EEPCo contributed the remaining almost 9%. 
 
The turbines and the equipment were shipped to the port of Djibouti and from there the 
turbines were transported to the project site by road; the main road to Mekelle passes the 
Ashegoda site at a distance of approximately 10 kilometres. Vergnet Groupe subcontracted a 
local construction company, Rama General, to upgrade roads and build infrastructure to 
support construction before staring work on the turbine foundations in the summer of 2010. 
 
Rama General constructed new roads to the project site and reinforced existed access dirt 
roads. The transportation of the wind turbine components from Djibouti port, which is about 
800 km from the project site, was a major obstacle in the project (Interview with Gédéon  
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TABLE 6.4  ASHEGODA ACTOR-NETWORKS DESCRIPTION 
 
Durand May 8, 2011, and Tsehaye Mebhratu May 12, 2011). Somarain Oriental Shipping Co. 
Ltd, a Sudanese company, transported the entire wind turbines, which took about one and a 
half years using 10 separate trucks. Sarens South Africa, a South African heavy lifting and 
mobile crane hire group, handled the unloading, placing and installation of the wind power 
equipment. Vergnet Groupe successfully brought African firms to cooperate and work 
Actors Int./Local  Role 
Ethiopian Electric Power 
Corporation’s (EEPCo) 
Local Owner and employer: Overall strategic 
manager of the project. 
Lahmeyer International (LI) Int./Germany Consultant: conducted the feasibility study 
and supervised the work of the construction 
company. 
Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 
Int./Germany Financial provider and Subcontracted 
Consultant: Financially and technically 
support the feasibility study and acted as 
engineering advisor in the project phase.  
Austrian Development Agency 
(ADA) 
Int./Austrian Financial provider: Financially supported the 
feasibility study 
Vergnet Group  Int./France Manufacturer and contractor: Supplied and 
manufactured turbines for Ashegoda I and 
developed Ashegoda I & II.  
French Development Agency 
(AFD) 
Int./France Financial lender: covered 69.8% of the total 
projected cost 
BNP-Paribas and CIC Bank Int./France Financial lender: covered 21.4% of the total 
projected cost. 
Astom Group Int./France Manufacturer and Sub contractor: 
Manufactured turbines and equipment for 
Ashegoda II and constructed the substation 
for Ashegoda I 
Sarens South Africa Regional/South 
Africa 
Heavy lifting and mobile crane company: 
handled the unloading, placing and moving 
heavy loads during wind turbine installation. 
Somarain Oriental Shipping Co. 
Ltd 
Regional/Sudan Transport company: transported the entire 
wind turbines 
Rama General Local Construction company: Constructed roads 
and other civil works 
Hydro Plc Local Geological company: participated in the 
geological and drilling works of the project 
Sitec Ethiopia PLC Local Installation/erection company: participated 
in the electromechanically installation  
SIGMA Electric PLC Local Installation/erection company: participated 
in the substation installation works 
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together, which otherwise could not happen easily (Interviews with Abd Elmonim Artoli on 
May 11, 2011, Tsehaye Mebhratu May 12, 2011 and Gédéon Durand May 8, 2011). 
In addition to the road construction, Vergnet also subcontracted Rama General 
Contractor for the rest of the civil construction work of the project. A local firm, Hydro Plc, did 
the drilling work and Sitec Ethiopia, another local company, participated in the 
electromechanical work. Sigma Electric, a local firm, together with the French engineering 
giant Alstom constructed the high voltage (HV) substation to connect with the Mekelle–
Alamata power transmission line to enter the national grid. Modifications and mechanical 
adjustments were done and manufactured by Mesfin Engineering PLC, which is located in 
Makelle, close to the project site. In addition to subcontracting local and African firms, 
Vergnet had local staff at different positions such as engineers, inspectors, contract mangers 
as well as administrative positions. 
 
The two major actors, LI and GIZ, who participated in the feasibility study of the Ashegoda 
wind farm continued their involvement in the project phase as well: the German engineering 
consultancy Lahmeyer International obtained a construction supervision contract, while GIZ 
acted as an engineering advisor on the project. IL worked with EEPCo for many years in 
other renewable energy projects including hydro projects and the Corporation's Universal 
Electric Access Programme. Even though EEPCo engineers have been delighted working 
with IL because of its technical competency, the research interviews revealed that some 
higher officials at EEPCo didn’t fully trust IL behaviors (Interview with Alphonse Dumortier on 
May 8 and September 16, 2011, Abra Mulugeta May 10, 2011). They read the World Bank 
2007 report where the bank found IL guilty of bribing officials responsible for lending 
contracts for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. IL was barred from any World Bank 
project for seven years and fined $1.63 million. The officials were afraid that EEPCo’s long 
years of partnership with IL could affect the effort of mobilizing funds from international 
financial institutes like the World Bank and other donors, at the time where the government of 
Ethiopia desperately needed concessional loans and other form of funds from these 
institutes (Interview with Abra Mulugeta September 17, 2011). The initial date for the 
completion of the first phase of the Ashegoda wind farm was set for February 2011, and then 
moved to September 2011, and finally it was completed on May 2012. 
The project was delayed due to contract mobilization issues, problems with 
transportation, the surveying, geotechnical, and design and redesign works took longer than 
anticipated and also the delay from IL to provide product quality certificate (Interview with 
Gédéon Durand May 8, 2011, Alphonse Dumortier on May 8 and September 16, 2011, Abra 
Mulugeta May 10, 2011). 
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The contract design of the Ashegoda Wind Farm Project was altered to include turbines 
generating more power in the second and third phases of the project; the number of turbines 
went down from 90 (original plan) to 45 turbines to generate the same 90MW. As a result, 
the wind farm were relocated from its original planned site, the Western slopes of the ridges, 
to eastern area, which is a more mountainous area with more turbulent winds. The decision 
to increase the generation capacity of the turbines to be used in the later stages was made 
by EEPCo to conserve construction time. 
The second and third phase each consisting of 45 MW was scheduled in the original 
contract to be completed within 10 months but due to the contract amendment EEPCo they 
were finished earlier than the original schedule. The new mountainous location of the 
turbines is subject to more turbulence and thus ill-suited to the Vergnet turbines. As a result, 
instead of its own windmills, the French company was installing 54 Alstom ECO74 1.67MW 
three-blade turbines in the second and third phases of the project. Phases II and III were 
completed in May 2013. 
Having successfully mobilizing its local and international allies, despite the delay in 
finalizing the project, Vergnet started negotiating with the newly established government 
owned electromechanical company, Mtech Ethiopia, and HydroChina to establish an 
assembly plant in the short-term and a manufacturing plant in the long-term. Mtech Ethiopia 
is now the largest local company in electromechanical erection and commissioning. Its main 
objective is to bring about technology transfer, import substitution, and, eventually, export 
mechanical and electrical items for government led mega projects. 
 
The ANT analysis was put together in a systematic diagram (see Figure 6.4) where the 
density of the network is indicated by the number of connections. Other features such as 
institutional frictions are also included. 
 
TRANSLATION PROCESS IN THE NAZRETH WIND FARM PROJECT 
On Sep 22nd, 2009 the Joint Corporation of HYDROCHINA Engineering Consulting Co., Ltd. 
(HydroChina) and CGCOC Group signed a contract with EEPCo regarding Nazret wind farm 
with the objective of developing 51MW wind power with 34 turbine units each of 1500kW 
capacity with a total installed capacity of 51MW. This translation moment (problematisation) 
created the conditions for technology transfer. The project contract put limitations on the 
number of Chinese experts, demanded the contractor to hire local sub-contractors as much 
as possible, make available necessary documents in English, and provide training to local 
experts. The deal also included a five-year operation and maintenance contract. 
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FIGURE 6.4  ASHEGODA TRANSLATION PROCESS DIAGRAM 
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HydroChina undertook the electromechanical work for the Adama project while 
Chinese contractor CGOC was in charge of the civil work. Goldwind supplied and installed 
the equipment and the turbines. This project was funded through China’s preferential buyer’s 
credit by China Exim Bank. Another Chinese company, SANY Group Co. Ltd, undertook all 
kinds of hoisting work including unloading large-scale wind power equipment after arrival, 
moving heavy loads during wind turbine installation and maintenance and then placing and 
installing the equipment. The same company transported all equipment including the turbines 
from Djibouti port to the project site, which were supplied by Goldwind in three batches 
between March and June 2011. Addis Ababa University, the consultant, was the only local 
network major actor in the network. 
The consultant of the project was established from a team of mechanical and electrical 
engineering professors at the Addis Ababa University (AAU), School of Engineering. The 
team approached EEPCo to take part in the wind farm construction activities in 2008 at the 
time when the Ethiopia government was desperately looking for a government owned local 
company to involve in the Nazreth project (Interview with Debella Tadele on April 29, 2011, 
Gebre-Hana Wolde-Senbet on May 1 and September 23, 2011). The AAU professors’ team 
was offered the consultancy work without any kind of tender or competency evaluation. The 
team participated in the project under the banner of AAU but apart from their teaching staff 
position they didn’t have any form of institutional background such as Advisory Services or 
any other similar set up that could maintain the knowledge gained. 
 
All major activities including installation of the collector system, Chinese government owned 
companies performed design works, surveying, geotechnical, substation, transportation, and 
even the construction of access roads to each turbine site. There were no local engineers or 
other experts from the contractors’ side; however, there were unskilled labors with the 
Chinese contractors. The locals participated in labour activities mainly as drivers for small 
vehicles, workshop assistances, and other similar labour. 
 
The Chinese project consortium was continuously reorganized and regrouped without formal 
agreement with the employer, EEPPCo. For instance, the Beijing Engineering Corporation 
undertook the geological and drilling activities of the project but its participation was 
unnoticed by the RE (resident engineer) of the EEPCo and the consultant (Interview with Zhi 
Peng on September 22, 2011, Gebre-Hana Wolde-Senbet on September 23, 2011). There 
were also other Chinese companies, which participated in the electromechanical installation 
and the civil construction under the banner of HydroChina and CGOC. Despite what  
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TABLE 6.5  NAZRETH ACTOR-NETWORKS DESCRIPTION 
Actors Int./Local Role 
Ethiopian Electric Power 
Corporation’s (EEPCo) 
Local Owner and employer: Overall strategic 
manager of the project. 
Addis Ababa University (AAU) Local Consultant: supervised the work of the 
construction company. 
Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 
Int./Germany Technical provider: Technically supported 
the feasibility study. 
Xinjiang Goldwind Science & 
Technology Co., Ltd. 
(“Goldwind”) 
Int./China Manufacturer and Supplier: manufactured, 
supplied, and installed turbines and 
equipment. 
China Exim Bank Int./China Financial lender: loaned a financial support 
covering 85pc of the total projected cost. 
HYDROCHINA Engineering 
Consulting Co., Ltd. (HCIE)  
Int./China Contractor: Managed the installation of 
electromechanical and substation works.  
CGCOC Group  Contractor: Managed all kinds of civil 
construction of the project including road 
construction.  
SANY Group Co.,Ltd,  Int./China Heavy lifting and mobile crane company: 
handled the unloading, placing, moving 
heavy loads during wind turbine installation 
and transported the entire wind turbines. 
 
happened in the project implementation, EEPCo was strong in the Nazreth contract 
negotiation in particular in the area of subcontracting paragraphs. For instance, in the case of 
the Nazreth, the contract agreement read as “The contractor can’t subcontract without the 
prior consent of the Employer for any part of the Work, which was not specifically allowed to 
subcontract”. Whereas in the Ashegoda Project contract the similar paragraph read as "In the 
case such Subcontractor was not included in the list of Subcontractors in the Contractor's 
Tender, the Contractor shall notify the Employer of the details of such subcontract in the first 
subsequent monthly report made in accordance with.” 
In the project agreement, EEPCOs had tried to rise above the SSC political discourses 
and focused on results on the ground, nevertheless the project consortium was established 
based on already existed ideological relationships between the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) and the Ethiopia governing party, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF). The consultant, AAU, which was outside of the ideological network sometimes had 
a hard time to settle technical project implementation differences and find common ground 
with the Chinese contractors. The Chinese took issues and differences they had with the 
consultant to the senior managers of EEPCo. 
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The ideological factor coupled with the limited experience of the AAU and its 
unconvincing institutional set up had negative effects on the performance of the consultant 
(Interview with Deribew Byabil on May 2, 2011). EEPCo engineers did not seriously consider 
the consultant advice and recommendations. The experience of EEPCo in similar 
international projects was an important factor in the network stabilization and mobilization 
moment of the network. The strong involvement of senior managers in detailed technical 
issues, which could be a problem for the translation process, was in this case an advantage, 
as the EEPCo management had minimized the problems related to institutional tensions and 
reorganizations of the Chinese partners. EEPCo management organized a number of 
meetings with the Chinese, the consultant, and the EEPCo engineers to ensure actor 
alignment. It introduced different conditions for the Chinese contractors to ensure technology 
transfer and also stimulated local staff including the consultant to focus more on the learning 
aspect of the network. They made translation processes quite desirable and needed. The 
project consortium partners had mobilized the allies (the last moment of the translation 
process) and finalized the first phase of the project in time. EEPCo offered the same Chinese 
companies to continue their work for Nazareth II wind farm project in the same location and 
with the same allies. 
The ANT analysis is presented in a systematic diagram (Figure 6.5) where the density 
of the network was indicated on the number of connections; and other features such as 
institutional frictions are also featured. 
6.2.2 MAPPING TRANSLATION PROCESS 
INTRODUCTION 
The translation process aimed at building quality relationships among networks results in 
effective technology transfer. In this regard, Law and Callon’s (1992) network analysis model 
is a relevant framework for analyzing how quality relationships as a function of local networks 
versus global networks are built on. In this section the translation process is mapped out to 
investigate the quality of the relationships that exist between the local and the global 
networks and among the local networks as well as the global networks based on Law and 
Callon’s (1992) model. 
The mapping was made by analyzing the degree of mobilization of the local networks 
versus the level of global networks attachments. The results of the analysis of the degree of 
mobilization of the local networks and the level of attachments of the global networks were 
used as the Horizontal and Vertical coordinates respectively. ANT suggested that the 
relationship quality of networks is affected by the size of networks, alliance experiences, 
diversity of alliances, degree of alliance friction, alliance future expectations, and so on. 
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FIGURE 6.5  NAZRETH TRANSLATION PROCESS DIAGRAM 
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In this section, for the purpose of analyzing the degree of mobilization of local networks 
and level of attachments of networks, the dimensions of quality relationships were translated 
to five measurement items in order to categorize them to easily understandable control 
variables for measurement. These measurement items are: allying size, industry mix, 
alliance age, shadow of the future and institutional tension. A score that reflects, on average, 
the degree of mobilization of local networks and level of attachment of global networks, was 
given as a function of each controlling variable in a range of negative seven to positive 
seven 4  scale. The mean score of the measurement items were used to reflect the 
coordinators of the mapping. Table 6.6 presents the scoring sheet of the controlling 
variables. 
 
The description of the analysis, the scoring, and mapping process of the case studies is 
presented in the next sections. 
 
MAPPING TRANSLATION PROCESS: MESSEBO PROJECT 
The project started in the horizontal axis of the diagram when Addis Engineering was tasked 
to conduct the feasibility study with the help of international experts (A) (see Figure 6.6) and 
climbed up the vertical axis as the EFFORT leadership, Addis, Haltach and the FLSmidth 
agreed a mutually acceptable terms on the level and type of the technology and the type of 
cement to be produced (B). To move this set of agreements ENKA was hired to undertake 
civil and structural works and installation of the structural steel and the entire mechanical 
erection works of the project (C). Messebo was staffed with local personnel during the 
erection period of the plant. This enabled the Messebo staff to be familiar with 
electromechanical system and the structural work of the plant (D). To strengthen the capacity 
of the Mesebo staff, EFFORT recruited CNMC, which would manage the operation of the 
plant. CNMC was hired without any competitive process and quality check. The CNMC were 
unfamiliar with the FLSmidth technologies and this led to institutional tension with the local 
Messebo staff and crises in the network. The ideological connection between EPRDF, the 
Ethiopia governing political party, and the China communist party also led to mistrust 
between the Danish private company, FLSmidth and CNMC. Indeed, in some situations the 
CNMC found themselves engaged in a race to learn or exploit as much as they could from 
the FLSmidth’s assets. FLSmidth also felt that the private benefits that CNMC could accrue 
after they have learned from them, outweighs the common benefits of the alliance. 
  
                                                                
4 The absolute number seven was chosen to reflect the higher number of translation processes.  
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TABLE 6.6  MEASUREMENT ITEMS AND RATING SCALES 
Control 
Variables 
Definition Horizontal Coordinates Vertical Coordinates 
Negative 7 Positive 7 Negative 7 Positive 7 
Allying 
Relative 
Size 
Relative 
number of 
employees 
of local 
networks/ 
global 
networks 
Small number 
of employees 
of local 
networks 
relative to 
global 
networks 
Large number 
of employees 
of local 
networks 
relative to 
global 
networks 
Small number 
of employees 
of global 
networks 
relative to local 
networks  
Large number of 
employees of 
global networks 
relative to local 
networks 
Industry 
Mix 
Number of 
partners in 
local 
networks/ 
global 
networks 
Small number 
partners in 
local networks 
relative to 
global 
networks 
Large number 
partners in 
local networks 
relative to 
global 
networks 
Small number 
partners in 
global 
networks 
relative to local 
networks 
Large number 
partners in global 
networks relative 
to local networks 
Alliance 
Age 
 
Duration of 
alliance 
Short years of 
longevity of the 
local partners 
in the alliance 
Long years of 
longevity of the 
local partners 
in the alliance 
Short years of 
longevity of the 
global partners 
in the alliance 
Long years of 
longevity of the 
global partners in 
the alliance 
Shadow of 
the Future 
 
The 
prospect 
that the 
alliance will 
continue 
Low prospect 
the local 
partners will 
continue 
working 
together with 
the local 
network and 
global partners 
High prospect 
the local 
partners will 
continue 
working 
together with 
the local 
network and 
global partners 
Low prospect 
the global 
partners will 
continue 
working 
together with 
the global 
network and 
local partners 
High prospect the 
global partners will 
continue working 
together with the 
global network 
and local partners 
Institutional 
Tension 
Frictions 
among 
networks 
High 
organizational 
tensions and 
conflicts 
among the 
local networks 
and between 
local and 
global 
networks that 
lead to 
negative 
network 
alignments 
Low 
organizational 
tensions and 
conflicts 
among the 
local networks 
and between 
local and 
global 
networks that 
lead to 
negative 
network 
alignments 
High 
organizational 
tensions and 
conflicts 
among the 
global 
networks and 
between global 
and local 
networks that 
lead to 
negative 
network 
alignments 
Low organizational 
tensions and 
conflicts among 
the global 
networks and 
between global 
and local networks 
that lead to 
negative network 
alignments 
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Finally, the CNMC management contract was terminated (E). The global network was 
reconstructed when the decision was taken by EFFORT to rise above its ideological 
principles and hire a private company, Cementech, through a competitive process (F). 
However, EFFORT went back to its ideological origin for product marketing and contracted a 
local network with political party affiliated associations and its subsidiaries for transport and 
distribution of Messebo product. 
This effectively sidelined the global network and other local networks including 
Messebo management, local transport companies, retailers and wholesalers (G) (the control 
variables scoring sheet for the Messebo project are given in Appendix C). 
 
FIGURE 6.6  MESSEBO PROJECT NETWORK ANALYSIS (BASED ON LAW AND CALLON 1992) 
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MAPPING TRANSLATION PROCESS: ASHEGODA PROJECT 
The project started in the center of the diagram and climbed up the vertical axis as the 
EEPCo leadership and the international consortium (GIZ, ADA, and LI) agreed a mutually 
acceptable objective of developing a wind farm in Ashegoda based on the result of the 
feasibility study (A) (see Figure 6.7). To move this objective forward a global network was 
formed (B), which brought together Vergnet Group as EPC contractor, IL as supervisor for 
the construction work and AFD and BNP as financial lenders. Vergnet reconstructed the 
global network with African companies namely Somarain Oriental Shipping Co. Ltd and 
Sarens South Africa (C). Vergnet has long years of experience working with African 
companies; and the local network worked effectively with the African companies due to 
existing cultural and historical ties. Vergnet was also effective in building local networks 
(Rama, Hydo, and SITEC) for civil, erection, geological and drilling works (D). The formation 
of local-global network was further strengthened in the substation installation works (E) 
where the local company SIGMA jointly worked with one of the world’s leading wind turbine 
manufacturer, Astom Group. The movement of realignment of actors was seen when EEPCo 
renegotiated with Vergnet on the technology of the turbines (F) for Ashegoda II and III. 
EEPCo’s decision to install three-blade turbines instead of the original agreed two-blade 
turbine forced Vergnet to bring Astom Group as supplier of the turbines. Vergnet was looking 
beyond the Ashegoda project and has started discussing with local and global networks to 
locally manufacture wind turbine in joint venture (G). If materialized, this could strengthen the 
degree of attachment of local–global network actors (the control variables scoring sheet for 
the Ashegoda project is given in the Appendix D). 
 
MAPPING TRANSLATION PROCESS: NAZRETH PROJECT 
The project started in the center of the diagram and climbed up the vertical axis as the 
EEPCo leadership and the Chinese Joint Corporation (HydroChina and CGCOC Group) 
agreed a mutually acceptable objective of developing a wind farm in Nazreth based on the 
result of the GIZ feasibility study (A) (see Figure 6.8). To move this objective forward the 
Chinese global network was strengthened by bringing together Goldwind as the wind turbine 
and equipment supplier (B) and China Exim Bank as financial lender for the project (C). To 
strengthen the local network, EEPCo brought AAU as supervisor for the construction work. 
However, the local network was ineffective partly because of the AAU lack of experience and 
the Chinese unwillingness to work with local networks. One disadvantage of AAU as 
technology transfer partners was related to timing. The AAU team did not appreciate the 
urgency within which the project functions and the team were focused on the production of 
research publications out of the project rather than the technology transfer itself (D). The 
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Chinese consortium hired another Chinese company, SANY Group, for moving heavy loads 
and transporting of the wind turbines. EEPCo employees complained that this type of activity 
could have been handled by the local or regional network (i.e. other African countries) (E). 
The discussion of HydroChina with local and global networks to locally manufacture wind 
turbines in joint venture (F) could reconstruct the attachment of local-global networks, if it 
materalised (the control variables scoring sheet for Nazreth project is given in the Appendix 
E). 
 
FIGURE 6.7 ASHEGODA PROJECT NETWORK ANALYSIS (BASED ON LAW AND CALLON 1992) 
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FIGURE 6.8  NAZRETH PROJECT NETWORK ANALYSIS (BASED ON LAW AND CALLON 1992) 
6.3 MEASURING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER USING TAC 
6.3.1 ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY INDICATORS: SURVEY AND TESTING RESULTS 
Analysis of the case studies using ANT as a framework highlights the importance of access 
to information for technology transfer. However, the Ethiopia network’s ability to value, 
assimilate, and utilize external information is also an important aspect of the network quality 
for effective technology transfer. 
 
As stated in the methodology section, a survey was conducted to identify the aspects of 
absorptive capacity that matter most to the selected case studies. Of the absorptive capacity 
constraints listed, the largest number of respondents (40%) attributed a high degree of 
importance to lack of qualified personnel to utilize external knowledge. The next highest 
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constraint (29% respondents) was the perception of managers to invest the necessary 
resources for enhancing the internalization of external knowledge, followed by poor 
infrastructure such as IT (16% respondents) and poor political environment. The last 15% 
indicated methods of technological learning or technology transfer channels as critical factors 
for enhancing absorptive capacity. The two Vergnet personnel interviewed put infrastructure 
first, qualification second and managers’ altitude third. Whereas the three EFFORT 
interviewees had dissimilar views on highest constraint: two of them attributed high degree of 
importance to management perception followed by lack of a rich pool of technical talent. The 
other EFFORT interviewee listed lack of qualified personnel first and management 
perception second. One of the three interviewees of EFFORT listed poor advancement of IT 
infrastructure as the third highest constraint; however, the other two EFFORT personnel 
didn’t respond to questions related to infrastructure. For the three HydroChina interviewees 
the first, the second, and the third constraint were only one factor and that was lack of 
qualified personnel. 
 
The two major constraints identified by the survey and interview: qualified personnel and 
management perception were assessed in terms of workers experience, education 
background, quality of training, and managers’ altitude. The personnel qualification is related 
to knowledge and capability whereas the second factor, management perception, reflects 
assumptions and beliefs. These categories echo the findings of Nieto and Quevedo (2005), 
which stated that the ability of the firm to exploit external knowledge (absorptive capacity) is 
greatly influenced by the firm’s previously held basic assumptions, beliefs, and knowledge. 
 
In summary, the findings of the survey are inline with the critical factors of absorptive 
capacity that were identified by researchers such as Lin et al. (2002), Minbaeva et al. (2003), 
Nieto and Quevedo (2005) and Sazali et al. (2009). These factors connect cumulative 
experience within the firm and the extent to which this knowledge is related to external 
information (Cohen and Levinthal 1994, Allen 1977). Further, the knowledge of individuals 
influences their ability to utilize external information (Anderson 1991; Newell and Simon 
1972). The implication is that differences in the human capital allocated and embodied in 
individuals are sources of variability that influence learning in the alliance. 
 
Government science and technology policy designed to foster technology-based economic 
development for the success of technology transfer is not treated in this section as it is 
already covered in Chapter 5. A strong research and development base and the availability 
of capital are also binding constraints for enhancing the absorptive capacity of the local 
154 
network. However, both constraints are very much related to the overall development level of 
the country and its science and technology policies. Therefore, these factors are also not 
covered in this chapter of the dissertation. 
 
The identified indicators to assess the absorptive capacity of local firms, namely prior 
expertise and experience, educational level, trainings, manager’s perception and learning 
mechanisms are discussed in the following sections. Teamwork, staff morale, and internal 
communication, which also reflect assumptions and beliefs, are discussed under the 
management perception section. Availability and usefulness of information technology (IT) is 
covered under the “training and learning by doing” section. The assessment of absorptive 
capacity for the three case studies is summarized at the end of the section. 
6.3.2 EDUCATION LEVELS AND PRIOR EXPERIENCES 
Qualification is one of the first predictors of an individuals’ ability to utilize new knowledge. 
Through the qualifications portion of the survey, this study found that the majority of staff 
(34%) at Messebo had college diplomas (2-3 yrs of study), whereas at EEPCo (65%) they 
had Bachelor of Science degrees in engineering (5 yrs of study). Recent trends indicate that 
Mesebo recruits candidates with bachelor's degrees more often than candidates with college 
diploma. EEPCo did not have employees with PhD degrees and no one had specialized 
training in wind energy. In Messebo none of the employees had specialized training in 
cement technology and chemistry and there was a single employee with automation 
engineering, which is the central part of the company technology make up. 
Limitations in man power in specialized areas like wind energy, cement technology and 
automation energy is due to the developing educational base of the country. None of the 
Ethiopian colleges and universities provide professional training in these specialized fields. 
 
TABLE 6.7 NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND THEIR QUALIFICATIONS 
Education level Messebo5 EEPCo 
PhD Degree 1 - 
Master’s degree 12 5 
Bachelor degree 111 20 
Diploma 207 11 
High school certificate 87 - 
Below high school 88 - 
No Qualifications 94 - 
Total number of employees 600 36 
                                                                
5 Messebo staff includes guards and cleaners but this analysis does not include them. The total 
number of Messebo staff including this group was 800. 
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Literature in the field of organizational learning reports that organizations that possess 
relevant prior knowledge are likely to have a better understanding of new technology that can 
generate new ideas and develop new products (Nieto and Quevedo 2005). 75% of EEPCo 
project employees have more than five years of work experience in EEPCo but none of them 
have work experience in wind energy farms. EEPCo is the only utility company in the country 
that engaged in the business of construction, generation, transmission, distribution, and 
selling of electrical energy. This could be the reason that none of the EEPCo project staff 
worked in any other similar company. In Messebo none of the employees had worked in a 
cement company, even though 35% of them had work experience in other processing 
industries. 
6.3.3 TRAINING AND LEARNING BY DOING 
This section examines the type of training that can serve to enhance overall absorptive 
capacity delivered by the global network to the local network, mainly to Messebo and 
EEPCo. 
 
In the Messebo case there were three types of training: 1) Visits (Observation Assignment) 
2) Theoretical classroom lectures and, 3) Apprenticeship training.  
The employer (Messebo) and the supplier (F.L. Smidth) covered costs for the first 
training type. The supplier covered the training cost for the second, whereas the project 
management contractors, China National Materials and Cementech International, covered 
the training cost for the third one. Visiting training (1st training) covered cement plant visiting 
with technological briefings in Denmark, Italy and Pakistan and the trainee team included a 
25 personnel senior Messebo technical team. They learnt by observation of the operation 
and management of different cement plants for two months. This training included both 
operative and plant management. 
The theoretical classroom lectures (2nd training) were delivered by F.L. Smidth 
expatriates in the premises of the Messebo plant. The training covered the basics of cement 
technology and chemistry. F.L. Smidth also provided on the job practical training for about 
two years. This training included the method of operating the machines and both preventive 
and corrective maintenances. The objective of the last training type (3rd training) was to 
understand complete proficiency in machine operation and plant management. The trainees 
(Messebo staff) were supposed to work as apprentices under the direct supervision of China 
National Materials (CNM) experts for three years. However, except the automation 
engineering section, in all other parts of the plant operations and maintenance the Messebo 
staff were better prepared than the CNM experts. 
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Language problems, coupled with the CNM experts’ unfamiliarity with FLSmidth 
technologies, made the training a total failure. As a result, Cementech took over the plant 
management contract from CNM. The contract with Cementech included providing actual 
work experience on the job, as well as imparting theoretical knowledge through class room 
lectures. As part of the Cementech management-training programme the Messebo 
management was put as an "understudy” and were made assistants to the Pakistani 
managers. 
The Messebo management learnt from Cementech by experience, observation, and 
imitation. The production department management training resulted in practical changes in 
the operation system of the kiln (the major part of a cement technology). Whereas in other 
areas especially in quality control and marketing there was no significant outcome. In the 
operative part of the training, the Pakistani automation experts trained the Messebo staff in 
some basics of preventive maintenances and minor corrective maintenance of the automated 
machines. However, the Messebo experts were yet not able to manage the corrective 
maintenance of automated machines because of the lack of local automations engineers. 
Both the Cementech and CNM training was not well organized, for example, training 
materials were not well prepared; and proper documentation of their operation and 
maintenance activities, and documents related to production programs and re-engineering 
activities were not systematically organized. However, the Messebo documentation and 
reference room was full of F.L. Smidth training materials and F.L. Smidth O&M documents 
(operation and maintenance materials). 
The training formats and contents of the two wind energy projects were similar; 
however, allocation of training hours was not the same. In both cases there were two types 
of training 1) theoretical and 2) apprenticeship training. In the case of Ashegoda almost all 
training took place at the project site, except a two month visit to the Vergnet workshop in 
France, which included 25 EEPCo engineers. The Nazreth project included a two month long 
theoretical training and wind farm visit in China for 30 EEPCo engineers. In both cases the 
theoretical part of the training covered topics such as wind turbine generating systems 
(WTGS), tower and transformer factory, WTG manufactory practice, tower manufactory 
practice, WTG transportation and installation theories, wind park operation practice, and wind 
park maintenance practice. 
The apprenticeship-training component (2nd training) for both projects was simply the 
five years of operation and maintenance, where in both cases the EEPCo employees worked 
as apprentices under the direct supervision of Vergnet experts (in the case of Ashegoda) and 
China experts (in the case of Nazreth project). This part of the training in both cases 
commenced immediately after erection and commissioning of the project. In the Nazreth 
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project the training was conducted with a simultaneous translation; and in some occasions 
EEPCo employees found it difficult to understand the translation since translators were 
unable to use technical terms. 
Internet access, purpose of use and skills can indicate the level of absorption of 
technologies within an entity. Information technology enables employees to both use existing 
knowledge and create new knowledge, both of which are crucial for adoption of innovation 
(Craig et al 1997). In this regard, percentage of internet access and purpose of internet use 
were part of the assessment of learning by doing. The research found that 45% of Messebo 
and 85% of EEPCo employees had access to the internet from their desks. The internet 
access rate seen in both case studies is very high compared to the national internet 
penetration rate. The internet penetration rate in Ethiopia is just 0.4, which is the second 
lowest internet penetration rate in sub-Saharan Africa, only Sierra Leone’s is lower 
(International Telecommunication Union 2010). 
Despite the high internet penetration rate in the case studies, the workers in both 
cases, in particular the Messebo employees, did not use the internet for business purposes, 
but instead for private uses such as accessing social media (for example Facebook). 
Messebo could not complement its traditional channels of marketing communication with 
internet, not least to reach certain kinds of consumers such as multilateral construction 
companies, even though so many of their employees eyes were looking at computer screens 
daily.  
At the time of conducting this research Messebo did not have a website and or a plan 
to create one in the near future. The wind farm projects are part of power generation, and 
EEPCo employees were not expected to work on product marketing. However, they could 
have created project websites for awareness purposes. The technical staff in both cases 
could have benefited from the technical information available on the internet for operation 
and maintenance. In general, despite the high internet access available in all the three case 
studies, the internet was not used wisely for business purposes. 
 
TABLE 6.8 PURPOSE OF INTERNET USE IN MESSEBO AND EEPCO PROJECT STAFF 
Main purpose of internet 
access 
Messebo 
% of use-time 
EEPCo 
% of use-time 
Research and business email 5% 34% 
Marketing 0.1% - 
Social media and private email  94.9% 66% 
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The internet could have helped the local workers both in Messebo and EPPCo to collaborate 
with the machine suppliers as well as other professionals working in a similar industry set up 
willing to share information and references. The researcher, with the help of cement and 
wind technology experts in Germany, confirmed the availability of material in both fields that 
simulate typical scenarios that professionals encounter in real-world settings, such 
inspection, preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, product (Cement) design, and 
operation optimization. These materials integrate intelligent tutoring systems, concept 
mapping, immediate feedback, and opportunities for reflection, including the chance to replay 
recorded events and adopt alternative decision paths. 
As Herrington et al. (2002) reported these Web-based learning environments could 
give industry trainees access to many of the same resources that professionals use in their 
research and real-life experiments. Both Messebo and EEPCo local workers do not utilize 
this opportunity, not because they don’t have the internet access, but as reported in Table 
6.7 because of poor utilization of the internet for professional development. 
6.3.4 MANAGERS PERCEPTION AND CAPABILITY 
Absorptive capacity of firms also depends on the extent that the firms’ internal environment 
that emphasizes knowledge assimilation and sharing, creation of continuous learning 
capability, and managers who are challenged to emphasize organizational learning capability 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). The response of managers at Messebo and EEPCo to these 
challenges depended mainly on the country’s political environment, availability of capital, and 
their own capability and perception of constraints of absorptive capacity. 
 
This section focuses on managers’ capability and perception. For this study the Messebo 
management team includes all management committee members, which included the six 
department heads (Production, Quality Control, Maintenance, Human Resource, Finance 
and Marketing) and the General Manager. Whereas in the EEPCo case, it includes the two 
REs (Resident Engineers at Ashegoda and Nazreth), the two heads of the projects in the 
project offices at the EEPCo headquarters and the generation construction executive officer. 
The heads of the three Messebo technical departments have a master’s degree in either 
engineering or science, whereas none of the other departments (HR, Finance and Marketing) 
have degrees higher than bachelor degree. All of the Messebo managers have prior 
experience in other companies. However, the heads of the technical departments had never 
worked in managerial positions prior to joining Messebo, and never had any managerial 
training. However, the other three managers had worked in other companies in a similar 
position. Five of the EEPCo managers had master degrees in engineering, and had some 
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sort of management training, but had never worked in other organizations in managerial 
positions. 
 
Informal discussions were conducted with some of the managers of the two case studies to 
understand and identify factors and determinants for managers’ perceptions for constraints of 
technology absorption. The discussion was focused mainly on identifying the obstacles to 
solve problems related to absorptive capacity from a managerial point of view. Based on 
results of the informal discussions and personal observations, three factors were identified: 
1. Board or senior management engagement 
2. Work autonomy 
3. Teamwork, staff morale, and internal communication 
 
Structured interviews were conducted to get a sense of the managers’ perceptions on solving 
the three constraints of technology absorption. 
1. BOARD OR SENIOR MANAGEMENT ENGAGEMENT 
 
Messebo 
The Messebo managers feel that EFFORT, the owner of Messebo Company, does not follow 
up the company and is slow in responding to their requests. 
 
EEPCO 
The mangers at EEPCo, on the other hand, feel that senior management does not have a 
mechanism to encourage those employees who come up with innovative ideas. And the 
‘‘doers’’ are prevented from making decisions on training without going through elaborated 
justification and approval procedures. Senior managers don’t encourage project managers to 
bend rules and the rigid procedures in order to enhance absorptive capacity. 
2. WORK AUTONOMY 
 
Messebo 
EFFORT makes direct intervention in managers work and sometimes indirectly through 
junior employees who have direct contact with EFFORT board members because of their 
political party membership. Some management members cited EFFORT intervention in staff 
hiring and promotion and subcontracting activities in particular in product marketing. 
EFFORT sometimes makes unpredictable decisions on management committee members; 
as a result there is uncertainty in managers’ position. 
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EEPCo 
Senior management doesn’t provide the freedom to project managers to use their own 
judgment on hiring and promoting of project staff. 
3. TEAMWORK, STAFF MORAL, AND INTERNAL COMMUNICATION 
 
Messebo 
- Employees don’t work in a team across departmental or functional boundaries, in 
particular there are considerable gaps in creating a team sprit between technical 
departments and other departments. 
- Management is not aware of new ideas and suggestions from employees. 
- Employees simply follow standard operating procedures or practices to do their tasks. 
 
EEPCo 
There is not a strong desire among employees in the organization for working in a team by 
crossing departmental or functional boundaries. 
 
Teamwork, staff morale, and internal communication ratings were also assessed through a 
survey of 35 selected Messebo employees (mid-level managerial positions including shift 
engineers, senior chemists, supervisors) and the 34 EEPCo staff (mid-level managerial 
positions including senior engineers and supervisors). Table 6.9 reports the findings. 
 
TABLE 6.9 STAFF SELF-RATING OF TEAMWORK, STAFF MORALE, AND INTERNAL COMMUNICATION 
Factors Ratings Messebo 
(No. of staff) 
EEPCo 
(No. of staff) 
 
Teamwork 
Very good 14 6 
Good 17 13 
Fair 4 15 
 
Staff morale 
Very good 7 3 
Good 18 23 
Fair 10 8 
 
Internal communication 
Very good 4 11 
Good 18 22 
Fair 13 1 
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6.3.5 SUMMARY OF THE ASSESSMENT OF ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY  
All the three case studies use sophisticated technologies that they acquire almost entirely 
from foreign vendors; and the technology transfer entails the use of others’ management 
capital and know-how, equipment and competencies. 
 
The critical component of this technology transfer is the consulting services provided by the 
technology producers from Denmark, China and France, who spent years in Ethiopia training 
the local workers on the new machinery and equipment. The hiring of foreign companies for 
the operation and maintenance of machines and equipment complemented this technology 
learning. Messebo had a plant management contract with Cementech (Pakistian) and CNMC 
(China), whereas the two wind farm projects made the operation and maintenance 
agreement part of the technology acquisition project contract. 
 
None of the case studies had exchanges of technical information and staff exchange 
programs, and they had limited formal R&D. These kinds of links could have been critical to 
the firm’s ability to sustain technological learning. Moreover, none of the case studies had 
any substantive engagement with international or local research institutions. The only major 
research activity was observed in the Messebo case study. In 2005 a local Chemist at 
Messebo plant, who was inspired by the concept of cleaner production, and obtained some 
advice from a F.L. Smidth expatriate, initiated research and development for the production 
of environmental friendly cement together with local process engineers. The research activity 
got the full support of the Messebo senior management and ended up with the production of 
Portland Limestone Cement (PLC). 
 
The qualifications portion of the survey found that in all the three case studies the local 
networks, mainly Messebo and EEPCo employees, didn’t have specialized training and prior 
experiences in the respective areas of operations such as in cement technologies and wind 
energy; but employees in both cases had the basic educational qualification that would 
enabled them to utilize new knowledge. 
 
In all the three case studies, training by the international suppliers and contractors had 
received proper attention, and was part of the project contract agreements. However, in all 
cases, the local owners of the projects i.e. Messebo and EEPCo, didn’t institutionalize the 
training programs they received from the global networks, in particular the commissioning 
time intensive classroom training sessions. At the time of conducting this research both firms 
did not have separate training centers. 
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Despite the limited licensing in area of automation programs in Messebo, there was no 
substantive interest from the managers to get access to technology improvements through 
licensing in all the three cases. This could be because of the limited capacity the local 
networks have to convert patents to commercial products. To operationalize automated 
technologies including the QCX system (Quality Control by X-Ray), Messebo obtained 
program licenses from different companies in Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Italy through 
FLSmidth. The EPC contractors and the machine suppliers didn’t disclose any of their 
confidentiality information, such as wind turbine design documents to the local networks. 
EEPCo, the employer for the two wind projects, was interested only in getting certification of 
product quality from its consultants. 
 
TABLE 6.10  SUMMARY OF TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING METHODS 
Method of Learning Merssebo Nazreth Ashegoda 
Technology acquisition Main technology from 
FLSmidth (Denmark). 
Main technology from 
Goldwind (China). 
Main technology from 
Vergnet (France). 
Hiring technical experts Technical experts from 
India, Denmark, Turkey, 
China and Pakistan. 
Technical experts from 
China 
Technical experts from 
France and Germany. 
Technical training, 
meetings and 
consultation 
Training in Denmark, 
China, Pakistan, and 
onsite training by 
Danish, Chinese, and 
Pakistani expatriates. 
Training in China and 
onsite by Chinese 
expatriates.  
Training in France and 
onsite by European 
expatriates. 
Technology data, 
information and 
documentations 
The supplier in addition 
to operation and 
maintenance manuals 
made specific 
technology data 
available. 
Engineering documents 
in relation to operation 
and maintenance as well 
as foundation design 
and underlying data 
were made available. 
However, the local 
networks were not 
allowed to see Wind 
Turbine design 
documents. 
 
Engineering documents 
in relation to operation 
and maintenance as well 
as foundation design 
and underlying data 
were made available. 
However, the local 
networks were not 
allowed to see Wind 
Turbine design 
documents. 
 
Independent R&D and 
links with international 
and research institutions 
In the first years of the 
plant operation there 
were limited formal R&D. 
However, since then 
there was not any form 
of R&D. 
Nil The Ashegoda site 
served as a study site 
for the local university 
(Mekelle University), 
however, they did not 
have a formal research 
agreement. 
Licensing  Programs for most of the 
automation parts 
including QCX parts 
from F.L. Smidth. 
Nil Nil 
Technical exchanges Nil Nil Nil 
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
The three modalities of cooperation (SSC, NSC and NSSC) showed distinct characteristics 
and resulted in dissimilar climate technology transfer levels of effectiveness. The selection of 
the case studies based on the existence of different modes of cooperation (Nazreth for SSC, 
Ashegoda for NSC and Messebo for NSSC) enabled the analysis to compare the three 
modes of cooperation when necessary and gauge the performance and effectiveness for 
enhancing technology transfer. The effectiveness of technology transfer in the three cases 
was highly dependent on the networks that could be established with the local and global 
networks (global North and South) and the learning efforts of the local networks. The 
analysis of the case studies using ANT as a framework highlights the importance of access 
to information for technology transfer. However, the Ethiopian firms ability to value, 
assimilate, and utilize external information was also an important aspect of the network 
quality for effective technology transfer. 
 
In NSSCTT and NSCTT, a better training approach and effective learning service was 
observed, even though in all the three case studies training by the international suppliers and 
contractors had received proper attention, and was part of the project contract agreements. 
The Danish company, FLSmidth, training materials for Messebo employees, and Vengrat, 
the French company training for EEPCo and Mesfin Engineering employees, were better 
organized and well received by the local employees compared to the Chinese and Pakistani 
training materials and approaches. Despite difference in provision of training by the global 
networks to the local ones, the skill base of the local firms was similar in the three case 
studies (SSCTT, NSCTT and NSCTT), which enabled comparison of the three technology 
cooperation modalities easier. 
This also made possible a comparative analysis focusing on the capacity of accessing 
external knowledge, since the ability of the local networks was similar across the three case 
studies. The qualifications portion of the survey found that in all the three case studies the 
local networks, mainly Messebo and EEPCo employees, didn’t have specialized training and 
prior experience in the respective areas of operations, such as cement technologies and 
wind energy, but employees in both cases had the basic educational qualification that would 
enable them to utilize new knowledge. The internet access rate seen in the three case 
studies was very high compared to the national internet penetration rate, however, in all 
cases the internet was not used wisely for business purposes. 
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Key findings from the three case analyses show that, as the result of the transfer of 
knowledge from the global to the local networks, technological capacities have changed in all 
the three modalities of technological cooperation, but at different levels. 
The level of transferred technologies to the local networks could be summarized 
according to the classification of Lall (2000) and Hansen (2008). In NSSCTT, Messebo, 
technological capacities was mainly intermediate level (know̺what), particularly because of 
the local employees success in product optimization, but it was also partly limited to basic 
level (know̺ how) because there was no substantial reengineering activity or formal 
research and development related activities. 
In the NSC, Ashegoda case, some characteristics, or potential of the intermediate level 
technological capability, were observed but the technological capacities remained largely at a 
basic level. This was manifested in the local networks that worked together with the Northern 
companies had already developed the capacity of reengineering activities, but the local 
networks of EEPCo capacity did not go beyond undertaking ordinary operation and 
maintenance of the wind farms. Whereas in SSC, Nazreth, technological capability was not 
more than the basic level because in this case local staff were limited to undertaking 
operation and maintenance of the wind farms with the oversight of the expatriates. This was 
mainly due to the limited opportunities that the local networks in the SSC had to connect with 
the global network and with each other. The detail findings that led to this conclusion are 
presented as follows: in NSSC, Messebo, the technological machinery and equipment were 
operated and maintained fully by local networks. 
The introduction of environmentally friendly products (Portland Limestone Cement 
(PLC)) by the Messebo local workers, based on the knowledge gained from F.L. Smidth 
expatriates (Denmark), demonstrated that the capacity of the local workers was improved as 
the result of the technology transfer, enabling them to undertake incremental minor 
adjustments, modifications improvements, and optimization. The ingredients of PLC require 
lower heat to burn thereby saving on the cost of fuel and minimized the production of 
environmentally unfriendly by-products whilst producing a useful product in finishing and 
plastering. PLC was a new-to-the-company product but not new-to-the-market product. The 
Messebo local employees also undertook replacement and repair of mechanical and 
electrical parts of the technology. To some extent, they have developed the capacity of 
maintaining and replacing minor automation components. 
In the NSC, local networks that worked together with the Northern companies in the 
Ashegoda wind farm project, mainly Mesfin Engineering P.L.C., already obtained 
subcontracts from the new other wind farm, Ayisha wind farm project, to fabricate minor 
components. Rama General construction P.L.C, the other local company that participated in 
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the project, obtained an offer to manage the civil construction of Ayisha wind farm project. On 
the other hand, in the Nazreth wind farm projects since broad local networks were not 
involved except EEPCo and AAU, the technological learning was limited. The EEPCo 
employees couldn’t go beyond the daily operation and maintenance work of the wind farm, 
whereas the AAU didn’t take participate in any wind farm projects after its failed participation 
in the Nazreth project. 
 
This research revealed that in south-south cooperation there are limited linkages between 
the global companies and local enterprises, and this negatively affected the effectiveness of 
climate technology transfer. 
The network belonged to a common pool or domain of information and circulated the 
same information. Using the terminology of ANT, redundant ties characterized the SSCTT, 
whereas NSCTT and NSSCTT involved broad-networks with a number of disconnected 
actors, and these were connected as a result of the goals of the specific projects in question. 
The disconnection between contacts implied that actors are connected to non-overlapping 
sources of technological information. In the terminology of ANT, both cases were non-
redundant networks. ANT suggested that networks characterized by greater non-redundancy 
in ties provide access to a greater range of new, unique and different technological 
information than networks that lack non-redundant ties (Burt 1992). Messebo (NSSCTT) and 
Ashegoda (NSCTT) networks, which were non-redundant in ties, were more powerful for 
technology transfer than the Nazreth (SSCTT) networks, which didn’t involve broad 
networks, and the networks relationships were characterized by low frequency of 
interactions, which resulted in less effective transfer of technology. In the Nazreth (SSCTT) 
networks Chinese firms dominated the network and local networks did not get the chance to 
connect with the global network, or with each other. 
The Ethiopian government, owner of the project, was well aware of the redundant ties 
in SSC and the dominancy of the Chinese network in project consortium. The government 
project contract put limitations on the number of Chinese experts employed, demanded the 
contractor to hire local sub contractors as much as possible, make available necessary 
documents in English, and provide training to local experts. However, the contractual 
agreement was not respected when it came to limiting the number of Chinese experts. 
 
The research also found some limitations in NSCTT, including delays in project completion, 
cost ineffectiveness, relatively limited understanding of local situations, and promoting 
technologies that didn’t readily adapt to the context of the local situations. 
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The Ashegoda wind farm (NSCTT) was supposed to be completed within 10 months, 
but it took 16 months. In comparison, the Nazreth wind farm (SSCTT) was completed in 11 
months, which was shorter than its contractual completion date, 12 months. To meet 
construction time for Phase II and III of Ashegoda, the contract design of the Ashegoda wind 
farm project was altered to include turbines generating more power in the second and third 
phases of the project; the number of turbines went down from 90 (original plan) to 45 
turbines to generate the same 90MW. 
As a result, the wind farm was relocated from its original planned site, the Western 
slopes of the ridges, to the eastern area, which is more mountainous with turbulent winds. 
This change in the design of the project complicated the process, and the new mountainous 
location of the turbines was ill-suited to the Vergnet turbines. As a result, instead of its own 
windmills, the French company, Vergnet, needed to bring another France company, Astom 
Group, as the supplier of the turbines, 54 Alstom ECO74 1.67MW three-blade turbines. The 
patchy roads from the port (Djibouti) to project site (Ashegoda), with its destroyed bridges, 
also made for longer routing, preventing project components from reaching the site on time. 
The contractor, Vergnet, didn’t plan transportation of the machinery and equipment based on 
the actual road conditions. The change in design, coupled with the re-planning of the 
transport, resulted in project cost escalation. 
At the time of this research, the final actual cost of the project was not completed but 
one of the Vergnet Group site engineers at Ashegoda explained “we have lost a lot of money 
and we don't expect to make any money” (Interview with Alphonse Dumortier on September 
16, 2011 ). 
 
Though this research found that the NSSCTT was relatively the more effective modality of 
cooperation for enhancing climate technology transfer because it combined the comparative 
advantages of both SSCTT and NSCTT, the research revealed some limitations. Identifying 
the common interests of the three actors (The North, South and the host country) places 
additional demands on the management capacity of all the actors, in particular on the host 
country to ensure each actor plays its designated role. 
In the Messebo case (NSSCTT), there were occasions when the Chinese company, 
CNMC, found itself engaged in a race to learn or exploit as much as they could from the 
global north (Denmark) firms’, F.L. Smidth’s, assets and technologies. In the NSSCTT 
technology transfer process, both F.L. Smidth and CNMC were supposed to play the role of 
transferors where-as the Ethiopian firm, Messebo, was a transferee, but CNMC was 
engaged not as transferor but as a transferee. F.L. Smidth also felt that the private benefits 
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that CNMC could accrue after they had learned from them, outweighed the common benefits 
of the alliance. In the end, the CNMC management contract was terminated. 
 
The research revealed the negative effects of state capitalism, and SSC political solidarity, in 
the effectiveness of technology transfer at the firm level. In South-South cooperation, there is 
a higher level of commitment and self-confidence from higher-level political officials, who also 
sit on management boards of state owned companies. In contrast, the operational company 
management would like to rise above the SSC political discourses and focus on results on 
the ground. This created frustration and friction between the more ideological company board 
members and the more professional management of the company senior local managers; 
and also resulted in high levels of mistrust between other actors. This in return undermined 
effectiveness of technology transfer. 
Divergence between commercial decision-making (senior local managers) and the 
demands of the wider political rationale (company managing board) became more evident at 
the time of project consortium establishment, when project contracts were offered to Chinese 
state owned companies based on already existed ideological relationships between the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Ethiopia governing party, Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), without a competitive process and quality check. 
In actual project operation, other actors which were outside of the ideological network, found 
it hard to settle technical project implementation differences, and find common ground with 
the Southern contractors, such as the Chinese and Pakistanis. In particular, the Chinese 
used to take issues and differences they had with other actors directly to Ethiopian higher 
political figures without consulting the local company/project management. 
 
Key findings from the research analysis showed the complementarity nature of NSCTT and 
SSCTT, and ratified NSSCTT as one important way of strengthening the effectiveness of this 
complementarity and fostering technology transfer by leveraging the best features of NSCTT 
and SSCTT. 
The analysis revealed that despite some of its limitations, NSSCTT could compensate 
for certain constraints and overcome NSCTT and SSCTT imitations that may limit their 
effectiveness. The mutual learning that was observed between NSCTT and SSCTT in order 
to complement each other was one of the manifestations of NSSCTT to be the future most 
promising modality of technology cooperation for more effective climate technology transfer. 
For example, NSCTT has learnt from SSCTT on how to make their engagement long-
term and work with government owned companies. On the other hand, the SSCT has learnt 
technological know-how and developed better technological learning from the NSCTT. For 
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example, the Chinese companies looked beyond the Nazreth wind farm project and were in 
the process of establishing an assembly plant in the short-term, and a manufacturing plant in 
the long-term, with the newly established government owned electromechanical company, 
Mtech Ethiopia. The French company, Vergnet Group, which was working in the Ashegoda 
wind farm, drew a lesson from the Chinese, and started negotiating with Mtech Ethiopia and 
the Chinese companies to join the joint-venture to locally assemble and manufacture wind 
turbines. If materialized, this joint venture will serve as a partnership platform for the major 
networks in the NSCTT of the Ashegoda, and SSCTT of the Nazreth, wind farms to 
strengthen the transfer of climate technology from the global networks to local ones 
(Ethiopian firms) in a NSSCTT modality of partnership. On the other hand, in the Messebo 
case, the Pakistani company, Cementech International, successfully learnt from the Danish 
company, F.L. Smidth, about the provision of quality technological learning services. 
Cementech used F.L. Smidth training materials and instructions methods to reorient its own 
approach and provide a better technological learning service to its Ethiopia partners. 
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CHAPTER 7  CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
7.1.1 MAIN CONCLUSION 
This final chapter provides an overview of the most important conclusions of the thesis. It 
seeks to answer the central research question and reflect on the findings of the analysis. 
Furthermore, this chapter elaborates on the empirical and policy implications of the study, its 
limitations, contributions; and reflects on the methodology and suggests areas for future 
research.  
The thesis examines relationships between multi-leveled decision making structures for 
climate technology transfer through an exploratory assessment of both top-down macro 
policy, and bottom-up micro implementation. The thesis employs multiple data collection 
methods (a combination of survey, observation, and case study) and iterative explanation 
building. In addition, the thesis uses concurrent data analysis techniques to address the 
research question: what is the relationship between firm practices, national policies, and 
international discourses for climate technology transfer? Is there a disjunction? If so, then 
why? 
The thesis seeks linkages between the top-down and bottom-up processes, and aims 
to reflect the dynamic nature of climate technology transfer. This linkage explains how 
climate technology transfer decisions at different levels are being shaped and reshaped by 
changes that occur on other levels, either above through top-down processes, or below 
through bottom-up processes. The research examines how international climate technology 
transfer policy, negotiated under the UNFCCC, filters down to national polices and ultimately 
to the micro entities such as firms and companies. Reciprocally, the thesis examines how 
climate technology transfer practices at the firm level is reflected in national approaches and 
is molded by international climate policies. 
The thesis concludes that, in relation to the research question, the three levels 
(international, national and local) are more loosely coupled than is needed for effective 
climate technology transfer. The research revealed that there is relatively good accord 
between international climate technology transfer discourses under the UNFCCC and the 
national technology transfer policy. There is also good compliance between national policy 
and firm level climate technology transfer practices. However, there is a clear disjunction 
between the international and the local level because the international climate regime 
focuses on NSCTT and pays less attention to SSCTT; while the local level focuses on the 
complementary nature of NSCTT and SSCTT. 
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The loose interconnections between the three levels in the intense interplay of top-down and 
bottom-up processes have resulted in a mixture of coherence and incoherence in the 
relationships between the three levels. Results from combining top-down macro-policy 
analysis (mainly in Chapters 4 and 5) with bottom-up micro-implementation analysis (mainly 
in Chapter 6) revealed the existence of the different levels of coherence between the multi-
leveled decision structures for climate technology transfer. The following findings of the 
research explain these arguments further: 
 
(1) Chapter 4 discusses the historical contingency implicit in the principle of ‘differentiated 
responsibilities’ of international climate policy under the UNFCCC. This has led to a simplistic 
view of technology transfer as “North-South.” The transfer of climate technology from the 
global north countries to the south has dominated much of the technology transfer discussion 
in the UNFCCC; and has caused deep divisions between the global North and South 
countries. 
This division is incongruous with national policies and strategies, which incline to 
South-South climate technology transfer (SSCTT). Developing country policy documents, as 
argued in Chapter 5, favour SSCTT as opposed to North-South climate technology transfer 
(NSCTT). SSCTT is characterized as a technological cooperation based on respect for 
national sovereignty; national ownership and independence; equality; non-conditionality; non-
interference; and mutual benefit. This characterization is seen in policy documents, as well 
as in the perception of developing country politicians; and is in harmony with the G77+China 
solidarity spirit in the international climate negotiations. This is where congruence between 
national level strategies and international climate regime policy was observed. The 
G77+China alliance was born out of the historical contingency implicit in the principle of 
‘differentiated responsibilities’. 
On the other side of the multi-leveled decision structures, the international climate 
regime focus on NSCTT, with less attention to SSCTT, is inconsistent with the firm level 
practices. Key findings from the research analysis in Chapter 6 showed the complementary 
nature of NSCTT and SSCTT at the firm level, and revealed the relatively greater 
effectiveness of NSSCTT (North-South-South climate technology transfer) for enhancing 
climate technology transfer. The research also found ratification of NSSCTT as one 
important way of strengthening effectiveness of NSCTT and SSCTT complementarity, and 
ultimately leveraging the best features of the two modalities (NSCTT and SSCTT). The firm 
level research confirmed that the three modalities of cooperation (SSC, NSC and NSSC) 
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showed distinct characteristics and resulted in dissimilar level of effectiveness of climate 
technology transfer. 
 
(2) The research reveals another disjunction between the three levels. The analysis in 
Chapters 5 and 6 shows that there are few indications of either policy or practices that 
position, in particular in SSCT, creation of environmental wellbeing as a motivational factor 
for climate technology transfer at the national and local levels. As indicated in Chapter 4, 
creating environmental wellbeing is a central goal of international climate technology transfer, 
but it is not reflected at national and local level decision making structures for climate 
technology transfer. This could be partly due to the lack of shared vision between the multi-
leveled decision-making structures and also due to changes in global economic development 
and market connections overtaking the historical institutionalism of the UNFCCC. 
 
(3) Negotiations during climate conferences under the UNFCCC have been protracted, and 
have not led to substantial changes in climate technology transfer that could be transmitted 
from national strategies through to firm level practices. As the research analysis from 
Chapter 4 shows, this key challenge for climate technology transfer relates to the polarized, 
entrenched negotiating positions between the global north and the global south countries, 
which permeate the atmosphere of international climate negotiations. 
 
(4) The national government of Ethiopia has successfully implemented a policy of creating 
demand for climate technology transfer, especially in the renewable energy sector. However, 
in relation to participatory approaches from the bottom-up, the government has not 
adequately consulted companies in preparation of its policy documents and the technology 
needs assessment report for the UNFCCC. The lack of genuine and legitimate stakeholder 
participation and feedback loops (Chapter 5) and the loose network between international 
companies and local firms (Chapter 6) have, in practice, limited the capacity of bottom-up 
processes to bring about a convergence between national level climate policy and firm level 
climate technology transfer actions. 
 
Table 7.1 summarizes the interplay between top-down and bottom-up processes that 
explains the nature of the relationships between the three decision-making levels. The table 
is followed by a detail explanation behind the convergences and divergences of firm 
practices, national policies, and international discourses on climate technology transfer. 
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TABLE 7.1 SUMMARY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MULTI-LEVEL DECISION-MAKING 
STRUCTURES FROM THE ANALYSIS OF TOP-DOWN MACRO POLICY AND BOTTOM-UP MICRO 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Multi-level decision making structures Points of congruity Disjunction points 
 
International 
discourses 
Top–down intervention  
 (The effect of international climate 
policy on national policies and 
local practices) 
Key findings from Chapters 4, 5 & 
6 
- G77+China alliance in 
influencing and guiding the 
climate technology transfer 
process at the national level of a 
developing country. 
- The lack of progress in the 
UNFCCC in ensuring the 
effective transfer of 
technologies. 
- Lack of appropriate 
instruments to regulate and 
facilitate SSCTT and NSCTT. 
 
National 
Policies 
Top–down intervention (The 
effect of national policies on local 
practices) 
 
Key findings from Chapters 5 & 6 
- Creates demand for climate 
technology transfer. 
- Lack of adequate and effective 
policies for maximizing the net 
benefits and ensure a “win-win” 
outcome of the SSCTT. 
Bottom-up provision 
(The contribution of national efforts 
for international climate policies) 
Key findings from Chapters 4 & 5  
- Responds to the UNFCCC 
requests by preparing 
documents such as 
Technological Needs 
Assessment, National 
Adaptation Program of Action, 
Program of Adaptation to 
Climate Change, etc. 
- The perception that the global 
south is a partnership of equals 
among developing country 
politicians is partly influenced by 
the spirit of the G77 + China 
solidarity in the international 
climate negotiations. 
- The policy documents that 
were submitted by national 
governments to the UNFCCC 
did not reflect the actual 
technology transfer practices of 
the country. 
 
Local 
Practices 
Bottom-up provision 
(The implications of local practices 
in shaping national polices and 
influencing international climate 
policy discussions) 
Key findings from Chapters 5 & 6 
- Responds to the market 
created by the national policies 
and strategies. 
- Creating environmental 
wellbeing has not been a priority 
as a driving factor for SSCTT 
both in national strategies and 
local level practices. 
- The alliance structure at the 
international climate policy 
negotiations and the political 
solidarity of the SSC at the 
national level has little effect at 
the local level. In addition, 
contrary to UNFCCC aims, 
creating environmental 
wellbeing is not a motivational 
factor for climate technology 
transfer in SSCTT at the firm 
level. 
- The lack of genuine and 
legitimate stakeholder 
participation and feedback 
loops. 
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7.1.2 CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVEL 
Key accords: The research demonstrated that harmonization between national and 
international levels centered mainly on two aspects: (1) inspiration from, and influence of, the 
G77+China alliance in the climate technology transfer process at national level of a 
developing country. The other aspect is (2) the developing country government’s response to 
the demands of global climate policy under the UNFCCC. Governments have been preparing 
documents such as the Technological Needs Assessment, National Adaptation Program of 
Action, Program of Adaptation to Climate Change, and other documents in response to the 
UNFCCC calls. International technology transfer in these national documents as well as in 
the UNFCCC is framed as a technology flow from the global North to the global South 
countries. However, results presented in Chapter 5 show that in practice, technological 
cooperation of LDCs (least developed countries) such as Ethiopia with developed countries 
is diminishing and is being overtaken by the global south. This indicates that country 
documents submitted by national governments to the UNFCCC in response to the 
Convention request, sometimes do not reflect the actual technology transfer practices in a 
country. 
 
Key disjunction points: Congruence between the two decision making structures, the 
international and national level, was dampened by the following two elements: (1) in least 
developed countries, like Ethiopia, technological cooperation with emerging economies 
represents a south-south dialectic relation, which is taking place in an emerging new global 
economic configuration marked by a technology gap. The country-level technological 
cooperation with developed countries is diminishing and being overtaken by the global south. 
In contrast to the growing SSCTT, the UNFCCC is still governed by the principle of 
‘differentiated responsibilities’, which is characterized by the North-South technology transfer. 
(2) There is not a coherent or comprehensive international framework for the new 
phenomenon of South–South technology transfer under the UNFCCC. This is partly because 
the international climate regime under the UNFCCC falls short of sufficiently considering the 
potential of south-south technology transfer. International frameworks could have harnessed 
the potential of SSCTT in order to stimulate greater technological growth in the developing 
world. 
 
Implications for good accord: The following issues could be considered to enhance 
harmonization between international and national level decision making structures. (1) The 
relevance of technology transfer, not only from a climate perspective but also from a 
development view, underlines the need to develop appropriate legal and financial 
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mechanisms. These components will support and encourage the diffusion of mitigation and 
adaptation technologies between developing countries. It is in the interests of the entire 
international community to adopt appropriate instruments to regulate and facilitate South–
South exchange of climate-related technologies, and thereby make a significant contribution 
to more effective environmental well-being in conjunction with stable, long-term domestic 
economic growth. (2) There should also be a quality check for national documents prepared 
in response to the UNFCCC. 
7.1.3 CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL 
Key accords: The following two points could explain the good compliance between national 
climate technology transfer strategies and local practices. (1) Transfer of climate 
technologies depends on successful implementation of policies that could create demand for 
such climate technologies. Governments of least developing countries such as Ethiopia have 
created demand for climate technologies in particular in the energy sector. As a result, 
foreign direct investment is on the rise, and FDI from other developing countries is at the 
forefront of this trend. Companies from other developing countries have been establishing 
industrial parks and training schools to facilitate their long-term engagement, technology 
transfer and business development. (2) The government of Ethiopia, as is the case in many 
other developing countries, is in the process of building and strengthening state owned 
companies. As a result, technological cooperation in SSCTT at the firm level is dominated by 
state-owned enterprises (for example, between Ethiopian state owned companies and other 
developing countries, mainly Chinese, state owned enterprises). 
 
Key disjunction points: The good congruity between national level climate policy and firm 
level climate technology transfer practices is hampered by at least three factors: (1) The lack 
of genuine and legitimate stakeholder consultation during the Technological Needs 
Assessment and preparation of other country documents. This in turn, limits the contribution 
of stakeholders’ perspectives, which could have led to the development of a shared vision to 
progress the climate technology transfer agenda. (2) National policies inclined more to south-
south cooperation for promoting transfer of climate technology transfer; whereas findings 
from the firm level research analysis reconfirms SSCTT as a complement to NSCTT rather 
than a substitute. (3) In contrast to national government ambition to enhance local company 
capacity through international technology cooperation, the research revealed that in SSCTT 
there are limited linkages of global companies to local enterprises, and this negatively affects 
effectiveness of climate technology transfer. This made technology transfer from the global 
south less effective compared to technology flow in NSCTT and NSSCTT. 
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Implications for good accord: The following two points could be considered to strengthen 
congruity between national and local level decision-making structures. (1) In order to make 
international climate technology transfer effective in developing countries, stakeholder 
participation and feedback loops should be emphasized. Companies as key stakeholders 
need to be consulted to prepare them for possible technological changes, to facilitate their 
participation in decision-making and to establish shared vision. (2) There is a clear market 
failure in the degree and form of mobilization of the local networks and the way they are 
connected with global south companies. In the event of this kind of market failure there 
should be policy intervention by both national and international governance systems to 
enhance the quality of relationships between global and local companies. 
7.1.4 CLIMATE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AT THE LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
Key accords: The role of the private sector (firm level) in climate technology transfer and 
implementing innovative solutions in energy efficiency, carbon management and climate 
technologies has been recognized in international climate policy discourses. Local entities, 
including the private sector, have been attending climate policy discussions under the 
UNFCCC to understand current thinking on the issues, and to ensure that they can help their 
clients tackle the risks associated with the consequences of climate change. Despite the 
number of meetings among subnational entities and private sector communities at climate 
conferences, COPs decisions and agreements and nation-state implementation pledges, 
have focused at the national-level. That disconnect raises broader questions about whether 
the UNFCCC process should be changed, either formally or informally, to include subnational 
and local networks more fully. 
 
Key disjunction points: In the international climate policy discussion under the UNFCCC, 
leveraging of private finance through public finance and the general trend from regulatory 
approaches to market-based methods are controversial issues. Leading to a heated debate 
on market-based versus non-market based technology transfer. The research in Chapter 6 
showed a market-led mechanism as the primary means of climate technology transfer.  
However, the findings in Chapter 5 showed markets for climate technologies were 
created mainly by significant government interventions through regulatory mechanisms and 
‘mega projects’. The mixed role of the government in setting rules for the market, being a 
market player through its enterprises, and as a source of finance, has created confusion and 
frustration at the firm level. If market-based solutions for climate technology transfer were 
defined by international climate policies, those problems would have better chances of being 
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reduced. It is perhaps because of the lack of international policies and clear mechanisms, 
that the discourses and efforts of international discussions under the UNFCCC, in one way or 
another, have not been felt at the firm level. Technology transfer under the UNFCCC remains 
biased towards the national scale, despite recognition of private-sector activity as being key 
in technology transfer; and the holding of private sector meetings at international climate 
conferences under the UNFCCC. By its very nature the UNFCCC treats international law for 
climate technology transfer as a matter that can only be handled at national scale. There is 
no well-defined structure under the UNFCCC for tapping into private expertise, and to take 
due account of private stakeholders' interests in the UNFCCC context. In consequence, there 
is little effective and formal private sector engagement within the international climate change 
policy development and implementation process. 
 
Implications for good accord: The treatment of nation-states as core units in the UNFCCC 
conforms with international law, which views nation-states as its primary subjects and 
objects. However, the research underscores the need for engaging local entities, such as the 
private sector, at international climate policy discussions. A formal engagement would create 
a more informed debate at the UNFCCC, effective implementation of the international climate 
policy for technology transfer and re-centering the international climate policy to micro-level 
structures. This leads to the following recommendations for a better linkage between the 
international and firm level transfer of climate technologies. (1) Documents submitted to the 
UNFCCC by national governments should consider the interest, needs, and capabilities of 
micro-level structures, like firms and companies. (2) The international climate policy under 
the UNFCCC should have polices that support the technology supply, as well as 
technological learning, on the recipient side. (3) Firm level climate technology transfer needs 
international policy to encourage cooperation among firms. To encourage cooperation there 
is a need to have effective and formal private sector engagement within the international 
climate change policy development and implementation process. 
7.2 GENERALIZATION OF FINDINGS INTO OTHER CONTEXTS  
The results obtained on the relationships between the multi-leveled decision structures for 
climate technology transfer can be extrapolated to other developing countries in particular to 
LDCs. In addition, the findings have direct validity to other COPs (Conferences of the 
Parties) under the UNFCCC as they are also governed by the principle of ‘differentiated 
responsibilities’ situated along the North-South axis. Therefore, generalization of the 
empirical results in this thesis can be made for both of these dimensions. 
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(1) Validity to other developing countries: Least developed countries positions, preferences 
and bargains for climate technology transfer under the UNFCCC was similar and they were 
responding to the UNFCCC calls such as conducting Technological Needs Assessments, 
National Adaptation Program of Actions, and others. LDC relationships, and level of 
interconnections to the international climate policy under the UNFCCC, were comparable. In 
addition, south-south cooperation as a new technology transfer paradigm for international 
climate technology transfer is occurring in many developing countries. 
 
(2) Validity to other Conferences of the Parties (COPs): As key findings from the Chapter 4 
research illustrate, the Copenhagen conference (COP 15) set in motion particular negotiating 
strategies and positions that are relevant to the ongoing process and COPs including COP 
16, COP 17 and COP 18. The historical contingency implicit in the principle of ‘differentiated 
responsibilities’ has caused COPs to be characterized by deep divisions between the 
classically defined global North and South countries. 
7.3 OUTLOOK AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Each chapter of the thesis in particular Chapters 4, 5 and 6 highlights some areas of future 
research. Nevertheless, there are particular strands of future inquiry that are emphasized in 
this section. New questions can be set out, with the results from this research as a starting 
point for expanding the breadth and depth of this work. 
Firstly, the qualitative analysis is limited by the study of a single country, Ethiopia. 
While this provided good insights into the different challenges faced by developing countries, 
it still provides a partial view of the developing world, given the particular characteristics of 
emerging economies, mainly their good economic performance and strong institutions. More 
case studies are required to reflect the diversity of challenges faced by different developing 
countries. The thesis looks at the transfer of climate technologies from emerging economies 
to least developed countries. This neglects the fact that the nature and characteristics of 
technology transfer within emerging economies will differ in the national and local context. An 
extension of this thesis to case studies from emerging economies would thus be necessary 
to conduct a comparative study of technology transfer among developing countries. 
Secondly, the thesis deals with the international arena of climate change negotiations 
under the UNFCCC by focusing on the Copenhagen conference. Incremental changes and 
adjustments have occurred in international climate policy discussions since the Copenhagen 
conference. These changes are mainly: 
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(1) A split among the G77/China groups in particular the divide between BASIC countries 
(Brazil, South Africa, India and China), and least developing countries was observed in 
Copenhagen, but was more evident in the latter COPs. This could herald the beginning of a 
process of blurring the developed/developing country distinction, despite the observed 
divergent and often conflicting preferences persisting among countries because of the 
principle of ‘differentiated responsibilities’. At the time of this research, the split among 
developing countries was just emerging and the extent of the split was not clear. 
Perhaps the time has come for innovative proposals for future international climate-
policy architecture, not for incremental adjustments to the old pathway. The incremental 
changes on climate technology transfer institutions might serve as incentives to mobilize 
coalitions behind the need for changes on the major sticking point of international climate 
bargaining: the principle of ‘differentiated responsibilities’. Change on the first generation 
decision could usher in profound institutional transformation in the realms of international 
climate technology transfer. If the gap between developing and developed countries closed, 
a shift in the negotiating dynamic may become apparent. As a result, there could be a 
chance to change the major sticking point of the international climate bargaining: the 
principle of ‘differentiated responsibilities’. Any future change in the principle of 
‘differentiated responsibilities’ could be a game changer in the international climate policy 
discourse. 
 
 (2) The second incremental changes were on institutional arrangements for climate 
technology that include establishment of a Technology Mechanism, a Copenhagen Green 
Climate Fund, and a High Level Panel. At the time of this research for the thesis, it was too 
early to see how the creation of the new Technology Mechanism enhances the transfer of 
climate-friendly technologies, particularly to developing countries. The Mechanism is 
composed of two main bodies: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). In addition, at the time of this research, the 
institutional set-up of Technology Mechanism, its link with the Green Climate Fund (GEF), 
and how it would influence the relationship of the multi-leveled decision structures for 
climate technology transfer, was not clear. Moreover, at the time of writing of this thesis, the 
Green Climate Fund, which was expected to establish a window for technology transfer, had 
not come into effect. 
The GCF was formally established at COP 16 as an operating entity of the financial 
mechanism of the Convention. At COP 17 a governing board was established, and the 
Republic of Korea as a host country of the Fund was chosen at COP 18. In order to enforce 
actual change on the ground, and make an informed decision at the GCF board level, a 
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group of academicians had suggested that the board combine its top-down approach with a 
bottom-up operation mechanism through a multi stakeholder process. This suggestion, if 
implemented, may enhance congruity between the three-levels of decision structures. 
7.4 REFLECTION ON METHODOLOGY 
Research on the multi-leveled decision structures for climate technology transfer requires a 
multidisciplinary background, including international climate politics, development and 
technical backgrounds. This requires the research to have a wide general knowledge, but 
also be able to focus this broad background through specific methodological techniques. 
Entry into the research domain of international climate technology transfer is challenging, 
tedious, and simply quite difficult. The main reason for this difficulty was the political 
sensitivity of international technology transfer, in particular at the international level under the 
UNFCCC. Data collection for the international level of the thesis was made in 2010, 
immediately after the Copenhagen climate conference. Government representatives were 
not willing to reveal and discuss their actual positions outside negotiation rooms. 
In addition, the political atmosphere in Ethiopia during the fieldwork period was very 
tense due to the Arab uprisings. To obtain cooperation of respondents, and retrieve 
government data, required emphasizing the political neutrality of the research work, but this 
took substantial time and energy. For example, locating appropriate participants involved a 
great deal of explanation, meetings, referrals, calls and approval processes. The political 
atmosphere in the country prompted revision of the questionnaire due to political sensitivity 
of some of the research questions and confidentiality of information. In a country like 
Ethiopia, where there is restriction on freedom of expression, people are not willing to make 
comments on the country’s political positions and policy documents. In addition, there was a 
need to probe beyond the surface of policy documents, since documents such as the 
Technological Needs Assessment, National Adaptation Program of Action, Program of 
Adaptation to Climate Change policy do not fully represent the actual positions of the 
country. 
The researcher was fortunate to have privileged access to higher government officials 
in climate conferences and other high profile related international conferences, for example, 
he had the chance to meet and conduct interviews (especially unstructured interview) with 
higher government officials in Bonn, Addis Ababa, Brussels, Washington, Cape Town, 
Brasilia, Beijing, Istanbul, Cairo, Abu Dhabi, Mauritius and Oslo. The researcher effectively 
used his contacts at the secretariat (UNFCCC) in Bonn, various ministerial offices in Addis 
Ababa, and other countries, to gain access to organizations and increase participation in the 
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research project. It was through his contacts that data were effectively collected and data 
validity was strengthened.  
In addition, the application of an iterative explanation building analysis technique 
through early and continual analysis, facilitated collection of better quality data. This was 
conducted by cycling through old and new data, adjusting tactics and even strategies based 
on preliminary findings. 
7.5 SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH 
The findings of this research on the mixed coherence and incoherent relationships of the 
multi-leveled decision structures for climate technology transfer could help facilitate 
negotiations on international climate policy, improve the quality of national policies, and 
improve the transfer of climate technologies at the firm level. The empirical evidence 
presented could enable negotiators, policy makers and practitioners better understand the 
reciprocal nature of the climate technology transfer processes; and the intense interplay 
between top-down and bottom-up processes. 
The research contributes to filling knowledge gaps on understanding the comprehensive and 
broader notion of climate technology transfer. Prior work on climate technology transfer 
focused on analyzing specific mechanisms or specific institutional contexts of technology 
transfer at a specific level of decision-making structure, which is inadequate for 
understanding the big picture of climate technology transfer. This thesis provides information 
on the synergies of decision-making structures that result from analysis of socio-political and 
technical factors at different scales and shows how the different entities intervene and 
influence the decision-making processes. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER EFFECTIVENESS IN THE SOUTH  – SOUTH 
COOPERATION MODALITIES 
QUESTIONNAIRE (ORIGINAL) 
The aim of this research is to advance the understanding and rationalization of climate 
technology transfer in Ethiopia. The paper is confined to the analysis of climate investments 
originated from other developing countries to Ethiopia, which have the potential for the 
transfer of climate technology transfer. The ultimate objective of the study is to assess the 
effectiveness of the south-south cooperation modality in expanding opportunities for the 
transfer of climate technology transfer.  
 
General Information 
Respondent Name  ………………………………………………………………………………. 
Position …………………………………………………………………………….… 
Department …………………………………………………………………………….… 
Organization …………………………………………………………………………….… 
Email …………………………………………………………………………….… 
Office Tel …………………………………………………………………………….… 
Fax …………………………………………………………………………….… 
Year Established …………………………………………………………………………….… 
 
Section 1: Organization size, focus and organizational culture 
1. What are the major three activity fields your company is focusing on? 
 
2. What is the type of ownership of the company? 
A. Wholly owned Foreign Corporation 
B. Joint venture 
If it is the latter, what is the percentage of domestic capital and foreign  capital? 
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3. What is the amount of sales by product? 
Annual sale volume (in USD) 
Product (A) ------------------ Product (B) ------------------ Product (C) ------------------ 
 
4. What is your company's Rate of Investment? Use this formula:ROI=((Gain from 
Investment - Cost of Investment))/(Cost of Investment) 
 
5. Your organization runs its business through a culture of: 
A. Managing Leading  
B. Performance oriented 
C. Success oriented 
 
Section 2: Sources and Level of Technology Transfer 
6. What are your sources of technology transfer? 
A. Joint venture  
B. Foreign Direct Investment  
C. Total process contracting  
D. Technical consultancy contracts  
E. Purchasing machinery supplies 
F. Employment of experts 
G. Others, (Please indicate strategy): 
 
7. What is the number of technology transfer projects currently underway that should diffuse 
unavailable technology in the organization? 
 
8. What is the number of licenses signed for external technology in the past three years? 
 
9. Rate the success of the new technology at meeting its intended requirements. 
A. Success B. Partial success C. Failure 
 
10. How do you rate the efficiency of the organization information scanning systems? 
A. Optimal B. Advantageous C. Useful  D. Not useful 
 
11. What is the percentage of new products using technology developed outside the 
organization? 
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12. How do you rate your technological advancement compare to the current state of art 
across the world?  
A. Latest technology B. Average C. Ordinary 
 
13. What makes your technology different from the technologies being used in other similar 
industries in Ethiopia? 
 
14. There are several factors that hinder the process of technology transfer or cause projects 
to fail. Please select those that you think are a barrier to your business and rank them 
top-down. 
A. Lack of awareness: many organizations are not aware of available technology. 
B. Lack of knowledge: if an organization is short of skills and knowledge, it may be 
unable to use the technology offered. 
C. Lack of funds: organizations may be unable to purchase or develop technology. 
D. Lack of common interest: organizations may exhibit a lack of motivation to reach 
agreement or settle differences of opinions about available options. 
E. Conflict of interest: competing organizations may be unwilling to collaborate. 
F. Poor coordination: individuals within an organization or collaborating organizations fail 
to effectively coordinate about activities, processes, goals and directions of the 
venture. 
G. Lack of resources: this can include both physical resources and loss of a key 
member. 
H. Lack of time.  
I. Lack of trust.  
J. Technical problems 
K. Organizational problems, Management attitudes 
L.  Resistance to change  
M. Poor information flow  
N. Weak links between customers and suppliers  
O. Cultural differences 
P. Geographic difference  
Q. Legal constraints  
R. Administrative burdens 
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Section 3: Absorptive Capacity 
15. List the number of employee with respect to their qualifications in the table below. 
 Education Level Number of employees 
A PhD degree  
B Masters Degree  
C Bachelor Degree  
D Diploma  
E Vocational School 
Diploma 
 
F High School Secondary 
Level 
 
G Below High School  
H No qualifications  
 
16. What percentage of trainings is external?   
17. What is the main objective of internal and external trainings?  
18. Is employee performance review is the base for selecting a training program for the 
employee?  
19. How often and in what format training is provided to the employees?  
20. How the trainings are relevant to employee job and her/his level of expertise? 
21. How after such training, employees immediately put what they learned into action? 
22. How do you evaluate their satisfaction level to the trainings? 
23. What are the main contents of the trainees’ evaluation reports after each training 
programme?  
24. What is the average training expenditure per employee? 
 
25. Technology absorptive ability adopted is: 
A. Adaptation 
B. Application 
C. Production 
 
26. What percentage of your employees has access to the Internet from their desks? 
A. 100% B. 75%- 99% C. 50%-74% 
D. 25%-49% E. 10%-24% F. Less than 10% 
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27. If your organization uses the internet, do you use it for 
A. Email B. Technical and Marketing Research C. Selling 
 
28. Does your organization have a homepage site on the internet? 
A. Yes B. No 
 
29. What is the technology diffusion channel? 
A. Formal B. Informal 
 
30. What is the interaction mechanism for the technology mechanism? 
A. Intra-organization B. Inter-organization 
 
31. Does your organization allocate any resources (funds, time or effort) to research and 
development (R&D)? 
A. Yes B. No 
 
32. What is the main source of research and development? 
A. Human resources  
B. Ambitious of R&D staff  
C. Experience Staff 
D. Administrative support 
 
33. What percentage of research is classified as having some degree of commercial viability? 
 
Section 4: Value Networks 
34. How many cooperative agreements do you have with? 
 Organization Type 
Number of 
cooperative 
agreements 
A Small and Medium 
Enterprises 
 
B Larger Organizations  
C Other R&D institutions  
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35. If your organization engages in cooperative agreements, please indicate the level 
reached with each agreement between your organization and the overseas or local 
research and development (R&D) institution. 
A. Little communication Cooperation 
B. Formal communication and exchange of information Coordination   
C. Shared information and decision-making Coalition 
D. Shared resources and frequent prioritized communication Collaboration 
E. Members belong to one system and census is reached on all decisions 
 
36. What variables, properties, or constraints might be affecting a participant’s ability to 
create or add value? 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN COMPLETING THE QUESTIONNAIRE. 
 
APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Would you please tell me some of the Ethiopia policies that promote the transfer of 
climate technologies? How these policies encourage the provision of direct financial 
support like grants, subsidies, provision of equipment or services, loans and loan 
guarantees and indirect financial support, like investment tax credits? 
2. How can current legal legislation be improved to improve continual technology transfer 
and adaptation particularly private-sector-driven pathways? 
3. How do you evaluate the current Ethiopia property rights infrastructure in enhancing 
technology transfer? What are the major limitations in the national frameworks for 
intellectual property protection? What should be done to overcome these barriers? 
4. What is the total number of patents generated per year? What is the number of patents 
generated in climate technologies? 
5. What are the main countries of origins for technology transfer in Ethiopia? (please list 
the first five countries) 
6. What are main sources of technology transfer in Ethiopia? 
A. Joint venture  
B. wholly owned subsidiaries  
C. Total process contracting  
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D. Technical consultancy contracts purchasing machinery supplies Employment of 
experts licensing agreements 
E. Coproduction research and development (R&D) agreements 
F. Personnel exchanges 
G. Information transfers from documents and conferences, 
H.  Others, (Please indicate strategy) 
7.  Among the main sources of technology transfer indicated above, which are more 
common for technologies originated from developing countries like India and China to 
Ethiopia? 
 
APPENDIX C 
CONTROL VARIABLES SCORING SHEET: MESSEBO PROJECT 
Control variables 
A B C D E F G 
X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y 
Allying Relative 
Size 3 1 5 2 4 3 7 5 -3 4 6 4 -4 -6 
Industry Mix 2 3 4 1 6 4 7 7 1 2 5 5 3 -6 
Alliance Age 4 2 5 3 6 5 7 7 -2 -6 3 4 1 -3 
Shadow of the 
Future 3 5 4 2 2 3 5 4 -4 -1 6 7 3 5 
Institutional 
Tension 5 2 2 3 3 4 6 7 -4 -5 1 4 -7 -6 
Mean Average 3.4 2.6 4 2.2 4.2 3.8 6.4 6 -2.4 -1.2 4.2 4.8 -0.8 -3.2 
 
APPENDIX D 
CONTROL VARIABLES SCORING SHEET: ASHEGODA PROJECT 
Control variables 
A B C D E F G 
X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y 
Allying Relative 
Size 2 5 4 3 3 6 7 7 4 3 -4 5 5 5 
Industry Mix 2 4 3 2 4 5 7 6 6 5 -1 3 5 7 
Alliance Age 4 4 2 3 6 6 4 5 2 5 3 6 7 7 
Shadow of the 
Future 6 6 5 4 3 2 5 4 6 6 4 5 7 7 
Institutional 
tension 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 -5 2 3 4 
Mean Average 3.2 4.4 3.4 3.2 4 4.6 5.6 5.4 4.4 4.8 -0.6 4.2 5.4 6 
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APPENDIX E 
CONTROL VARIABLES SCORING SHEET: NAZRETH PROJECT 
Control variables 
A B C D E F 
X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y 
Allying Relative Size 2 4 1 2 1 3 3 3 -2 4 5 5 
Industry Mix 3 3 1 2 2 4 2 3 -1 3 5 7 
Alliance Age 4 3 -2 -1 2 4 -3 -1 -1 2 7 7 
Shadow of the Future 3 4 3 4 3 4 -2 4 -1 2 7 7 
Institutional tension 3 3 2 3 3 4 -4 3 -3 2 3 4 
Mean Average 3 3.4 1 2 2.2 3.8 -0.8 2.4 -1.6 2.6 5.4 6 
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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis examines the relationships between multi-leveled decision structures for climate 
technology transfer through an analysis of top-down macro-policy and bottom-up micro-
implementation. It examines how international climate technology transfer policy under the 
UNFCCC filters down to the national policies that govern the micro entities, such as firms and 
companies. Similarly, the thesis examines how climate technology transfer practices at the firm 
level are reflected in national strategies and molded by international climate policies. 
Specifically, the thesis addresses the research question: what is the relationship between 
firm practices, national policies, and international discourses for climate technology transfer, and 
if there is a disjunction, then why? In order to analyze these relationships, the thesis locates 
technology transfer as a response to climate change at the interface between three factors: (1) 
technology transfer issues that have always been at the forefront of the global climate change 
debate (2) the objective of technology transfer for achieving low-carbon climate resilient national 
socio-economic development aspirations and (3) the effectiveness of technology transfer at the 
firm level in decreasing GHG emissions. 
 
The thesis concludes by addressing the research question of whether the three levels 
(international, national and local) are more weakly coupled than is needed for effective climate 
technology transfer. The loose interconnections between the three levels in the intense interplay 
of top-down and bottom-up processes have resulted in a mixture of coherent and incoherent 
relationships between the three levels. Results from combining top-down macro-policy analysis 
(mainly in Chapters 4 and 5) with bottom-up micro-implementation analysis (mainly in Chapter 6) 
reveal the existence of the different level of coherence between the multi-leveled decision 
structures for climate technology transfer. The research shows that there is a relatively sound 
accord between international climate technology transfer discourses under the UNFCCC and 
national technology transfer policy. There is also good congruity between national policy and 
firm-level climate technology transfer practices. However, there is a clear disjunction between 
the international and local level. 
 
A qualitative explanatory research method, including a combination of case study, survey, and 
observation research methods, was employed to answer the research questions. The data  
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analysis followed a process of “iterative explanation building,” and analysis in each unit took 
place concurrently with data collection. In order to trace linkages between the three levels of 
analysis (international, national, and firm levels), each research chapter (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
relates findings to the other levels of analysis. Linking of the three levels of analysis was done to 
trace possible causal links and to reveal the holistic picture of climate technology transfer. 
The thesis employed a combination of theories and schools of thought as a framework for 
examining the processes of multi-level international climate technology transfer. The research 
first drew on historical institutionalism to investigate causes for the lack of ambitious international 
climate technology transfer agreements. It also employed international regime theory, most 
notably its three core concepts— power, interest and knowledge—to explain the basic problems 
in global climate negotiations and to examine the asymmetry in parties’ interests and demands 
for climate technology transfer under the UNFCCC. The research also took advantage of 
pertinent insights from development theorists to investigate whether and how countries’ 
development approaches accelerate the transfer of climate technologies. This research also 
employed the methodologies of actor-network theory (ANT) and the theory of absorptive 
capacity (TAC) to examine effectiveness of technology transfer at the firm level. The 
combination of these two perspectives highlights issues of information access and assimilation. 
The first component (Chapter 4) of the research chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) 
investigates the reasons for difficulties in developing a concrete international policy on climate 
technology transfer. It examines the origin and structure of countries’ incompatible preferences 
and bargains under the UNFCCC. It also provides insights for exploring the reasons for accords 
and disjunctions that could exist between international climate technology transfer debates 
under the UNFCCC, national policies and priorities for ‘climate-smart’ institutions (discussed in 
Chapter 5) and the effectiveness of technology transfer at the firm level (discussed in Chapter 
6). Chapter 4 specifically examines the substance and processes of the 2009 Copenhagen 
Climate Conference negotiations and reviews policy positions of countries on international 
environmentally sound technology transfer as a climate change mitigation and adaptation 
mechanism. It examines what the outcome might mean for facilitating international transfer of 
climate technologies, and investigates causes for the lack of ambitious international climate 
technology transfer agreements. This part of the research demonstrates that once an agreement 
has been negotiated between a large numbers of countries, it is hard to change paths due to 
inbuilt inflexibility in the prior establishment of an international institutional arrangement. Chapter 
4 concludes that causes for the deep divisions between the global North and South countries, 
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and the reasons incompatible preferences persist, lie not in the absence of shared norms (e.g. 
the importance of combating climate change), but rather in the historical contingency implicit in 
the principle of “differentiated responsibilities.” This was first apparent in the Byrd-Hagel 
resolution, which effectively paralyzed the Kyoto Protocol. The principle of differentiated 
responsibilities, dating from the birth of the UNFCCC, was a major sticking point in Copenhagen 
and in subsequent meetings preventing concrete forward movement in the international climate 
policy negotiations. The historical institutionalism implicit in the principle of ‘differentiated 
responsibilities’ of the international climate policy under the UNFCCC has led to such a simplistic 
view of technology transfer as “North-South.” However, evidence from Chapter 5 challenges the 
traditional characterization of developed-developing, north–south transfer as the major form of 
technology transfer. 
The research findings from Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that the harmonization between 
the national and the international level is centered mainly on two aspects: the inspiration from, 
and influence of, the G77+China alliance in international climate policy under the UNFCCC is 
reflected in the climate technology transfer process at the national level of a developing country. 
The other aspect is the fact that developing country governments have been attempting to 
shape and reshape their national policies in response to the demands of global climate policy 
under the UNFCCC, even though these changes in national policies are not substantive enough. 
 
The national level component of the thesis (Chapter 5) emphasizes the role of developing 
countries as sources, as well as recipients, of international technology innovations. Despite wide 
recognition of the economic advancement and technological sophistication of particular 
developing countries, these changes in relation to international technology flow have received 
relatively little attention in academic research and have no coherent international policies under 
the UNFCCC. Chapter 5 of the thesis analyses the potential, characteristics, and relevance of 
south-south cooperation as the new technology transfer paradigm for international 
environmentally sound technology transfer, emphasizing the role of developing countries as both 
sources and recipients of technology innovations. The evidence for this part of the thesis on the 
South-South climate technology transfer (SSCT) came from analyzing the case of Ethiopia. The 
evidence indicates that technological cooperation of least developing countries (LDCs), such as 
Ethiopia, with developed countries is diminishing and is being overtaken by cooperation with the 
global south. 
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However, the research concludes that SSCT is not an alternative to NSCTT; rather, it is an 
important adjunct to North-South cooperation aimed at promoting the flow of technology to 
developing countries. The research did not find indications from policies or practices that 
environmental wellbeing is a motivational factor for south-south climate technology transfer. 
Neither was political solidarity of the global south countries in international climate regimes a 
major motivating factor for south-south climate technology transfer. Evidence from the chapter 
demonstrates that in south-south climate technology transfer there is also lack of support for 
improvement of the transferee’s institutional infrastructure, and the rise of state capitalism has 
limited the private sector’s involvement as an engine of innovation. In addition, limited interaction 
of local firms on the supply chain, and limitations in reversing the unfair North-South trade 
relationship, characterize south-south climate technology transfer. These limitations highlight the 
need for adequate and effective policies for maximizing the net benefits of transferees and 
ensuring a “win-win” outcome of the technological cooperation. Transfer of climate technology 
from the global north countries to the south, as discussed in Chapter 4, characterizes the 
international level climate policy under the UNFCCC. This is incongruent with national policies 
and strategies, which incline to SSCTT. Developing country policy documents, as argued in 
Chapter 5, favour SSCTT, as opposed to NSCTT. SSCTT is characterized as a technological 
cooperation based on respect for national sovereignty; national ownership and independence; 
equality; non-conditionality; non-interference; and mutual benefit. This characterization as seen 
in policy documents, as well as in the perception of developing country politicians, is in harmony 
with the G77+China solidarity spirit in international climate negotiations. This is where the 
concurrence between the national level strategies and the international climate regime policy 
was observed. The G77+China alliance was born out of the historical institutionalism implicit in 
the principle of “differentiated responsibilities.” Implementation of national policies at the local 
level in the context of international negotiations is studied in Chapter 6 of the thesis. This 
chapter addresses limitations of existing literature in providing details about the broader picture 
of climate technology transfer through empirical evidence from smaller-scale units, and the 
limitations of studies that look at the perspective of actors involved in actual climate technology 
transfer activities. As a continuation of the national level analysis (Chapter 5), the firm level study 
also analyzes the case of Ethiopia as a host for technology transfer with other developing 
countries, as well as developed countries, as sources. Three projects in Ethiopia were selected 
as case studies to examine climate technology transfer as an emerging phenomenon and to 
assess the effectiveness of technology cooperation modalities in promoting it. 
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The thesis examines the effectiveness of North-South (NSCTT), South-South (SSCTT) 
and North-South-South (NSSCTT) climate technology transfer through the prisms of a firm’s 
ability to access information and its ability to utilize knowledge obtained from external sources. It 
compares these three modalities of cooperation and gauges their effectiveness for enhancing 
technology transfer at the firm level. It investigates the effectiveness of climate technology 
transfer at the firm level in terms of the distinct and combined effects of the firm’s network and 
absorptive capacity for climate technology transfer. 
The research question for this component of the research is: “How effective are the 
international cooperation modalities (SSCTT, NSCTT and NSSCTT) for enhancing transfer of 
climate technologies at the firm level?” 
 
The three modes of cooperation (SSCTT, NSCTT and NSSCTT) show distinct characteristics 
and result in dissimilar levels of effectiveness in technology transfer. Technological capacities 
occur in all three modes of cooperation but at different levels. The results show the 
complementary nature of NSCTT and SSCTT and endorse NSSCTT as an important way of 
strengthening effectiveness of this complementarity and fostering technology transfer because it 
combined the comparative advantages of both SSCTT and NSCTT. Results from analysis at the 
national (Chapter 5) and firm level (Chapter 6) show that there is congruity between national 
climate technology transfer strategies and local practices. This can be explained by the fact that 
governments of least developing countries, such as Ethiopia, have created demand for climate 
technologies at the firm level through their national policies and strategies. In addition, national 
policy inclines towards state capitalism (the “developmental state”) and this is reflected in the 
focus of developing country governments like Ethiopia on building and strengthening state-
owned companies. As a result, technological cooperation in the SSCTT at the firm level is 
dominated by state-owned enterprises (for instance, between Ethiopia’s state-owned companies 
and another developing country, mainly China’s state-owned enterprises). However, congruity 
between national level climate policy and firm level climate technology transfer practices is 
impeded by certain factors. For example, contrary to national government ambitions to enhance 
local company capacity through international technology cooperation through SSCTT, the 
research revealed that in SSCTT there are limited linkages between global companies and local 
enterprises, and this lack of connection negatively affects effectiveness of climate technology 
transfer. This makes technology transfer from the global south less effective, compared to 
technology flow in NSCTT and NSSCTT. 
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On the other side of the multi-leveled decision structures, the international climate regime 
focus on NSCTT (Chapter 4), coupled with less attention to SSCTT, is inconsistent with results 
from the firm level study (Chapter 6), which showed the complementary nature of NSCTT and 
SSCTT at the firm level and revealed the relatively greater effectiveness of NSSCTT. 
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SAMENVATTING 
 
In dit proefschrift worden de relaties tussen meerlagige besluitvormingsstructuren voor de 
overdracht van klimaattechnologie bestudeerd aan de hand van een analyse van het top-down 
macrobeleid en de bottom-up micro-implementatie. Onderzocht wordt hoe internationaal beleid 
inzake de overdracht van klimaattechnologie in het kader van het United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) doorwerkt op nationale beleidsmaatregelen ten 
aanzien van micro-entiteiten (zoals ondernemingen). Tegelijk wordt bestudeerd hoe de 
praktijken ten aanzien van de overdracht van klimaattechnologie op bedrijfsniveau hun weerslag 
vinden in nationale strategieën en hoe ze worden vormgegeven op basis van internationale 
klimaatbeleidsmaatregelen. 
Het proefschrift richt zich met name op de volgende onderzoeksvraag: wat is de relatie 
tussen de bedrijfspraktijken, de nationale beleidsmaatregelen en het internationale debat over 
de overdracht van klimaattechnologie, en als deze niet in overeenstemming zijn – wat is de 
reden daarvan? Om deze relaties in kaart te brengen, wordt technologieoverdracht als een 
respons op klimaatverandering in dit onderzoek beschouwd op het grensvlak van drie factoren: 
(1) kwesties met betrekking tot technologieoverdracht in het mondiale debat over 
klimaatverandering die altijd al een prominente rol hebben gespeeld; (2) het doel van 
technologieoverdracht ten behoeve van het verwezenlijken van de nationale ambities op het 
vlak van koolstofarme, klimaatveranderingsbestendig sociaal-economische ontwikkeling; en (3) 
de doelmatigheid van technologieoverdracht op bedrijfsniveau wat betreft de vermindering van 
de emissie van broeikasgassen. 
 
Tot slot richt het proefschrift zich op de onderzoeksvraag of de verbanden tussen de drie 
niveaus (internationaal, nationaal en lokaal) zwakker zijn dan eigenlijk nodig is voor een 
effectieve overdracht van klimaattechnologie. De losse onderlinge verbanden tussen deze drie 
niveaus binnen het intensieve samenspel van processen van boven- en onderaf hebben 
geresulteerd in een mix van coherente en incoherente verbanden tussen deze niveaus. Als we 
de resultaten van een analyse van het top-down macrobeleid (zie met name de hoofdstukken 4 
en 5) naast die van een analyse van de bottom-up micro-implementatie (zie met name hoofdstuk 
6) leggen, blijkt dat er verschillende maten van samenhang bestaan tussen de meerlagige 
besluitvormingsstructuren voor de overdracht van klimaattechnologie. Het onderzoek geeft aan 
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dat het internationale debat over de overdracht van klimaattechnologie in het kader van het 
UNFCCC en het nationale beleid inzake technologieoverdracht relatief goed overeenkomen. 
Ook is er een goede overeenstemming tussen nationaal beleid en de overdrachtspraktijken van 
klimaattechnologie op bedrijfsniveau. Er is echter een duidelijk gebrek aan afstemming tussen 
het internationale en het lokale niveau. 
 
Om een antwoord te formuleren op de onderzoeksvragen is een kwalitatieve verklarende 
onderzoeksmethode toegepast, met inbegrip van casestudy's, enquêtes en waarnemingen. Bij 
de gegevensanalyse is uitgegaan van een proces van 'iteratieve explicatieopbouw'. Van elk 
onderdeel vond de analyse tegelijkertijd met de gegevensverzameling plaats. Om de verbanden 
tussen de drie onderzoeksniveaus (internationaal, nationaal en bedrijfsniveau) na te gaan, zijn in 
elk onderzoekshoofdstuk (hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6) de bevindingen gerelateerd aan de overige 
onderzoeksniveaus. Het koppelen van deze drie onderzoeksniveaus is gedaan om mogelijke 
causale verbanden te traceren en om een allesomvattend beeld te krijgen van de overdracht 
van klimaattechnologie. 
In het onderzoek is gebruikgemaakt van een combinatie van theorieën en denkwijzen als 
kader voor het beoordelen van de processen voor meerlagige internationale overdracht van 
klimaattechnologie. Bij het onderzoek is eerst uitgegaan van historisch institutionalisme om 
oorzaken van het gebrek aan ambitieuze internationale overeenkomsten op het gebied van 
overdracht van klimaattechnologie in kaart te brengen. Daarnaast is gebruikgemaakt van de 
internationale-regimetheorie, met name van de drie kernconcepten daarvan - macht, belang en 
kennis - teneinde de basisproblemen bij mondiale klimaatonderhandelingen te verklaren en de 
asymmetrie van belangen en behoeften van partijen wat betreft de overdracht van 
klimaattechnologie in het kader van het UNFCCC te beoordelen. Ook is uit relevante inzichten 
van ontwikkelingstheoretici geput om te beoordelen of en hoe de ontwikkelingsbenaderingen 
van landen de overdracht van klimaattechnologieën versnellen. Om de doelmatigheid van de 
technologieoverdracht op bedrijfsniveau te beoordelen, is verder gebruikgemaakt van de "Actor-
Network Theory" (ANT) en de theorie van absorptiecapaciteit (TAC). Aan de hand van een 
combinatie van deze twee gezichtspunten kunnen problemen met betrekking tot 
informatietoegang en -assimilatie worden blootgelegd. 
In het eerste onderdeel (hoofdstuk 4) van de onderzoekshoofdstukken (hoofdstukken 4 t/m 
6) worden de redenen voor de moeilijkheden bij het opzetten van concreet internationaal beleid 
inzake de overdracht van klimaattechnologie onderzocht. Er wordt ingegaan op de herkomst en 
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structuur van de onverenigbare voorkeuren en overeenkomsten van landen in het kader van het 
UNFCCC. Het hoofdstuk biedt tevens inzichten voor het onderzoeken van de redenen achter 
overeenkomsten en verschillen die zouden kunnen bestaan tussen het internationale debat over 
de overdracht van klimaattechnologie in het kader van het UNFCCC, nationale 
beleidsmaatregelen en prioriteiten voor klimaatvriendelijke instellingen (zoals besproken in 
hoofdstuk 5), en de effectiviteit van technologieoverdracht op bedrijfsniveau (zoals besproken in 
hoofdstuk 6). Hoofdstuk 4 gaat specifiek in op de inhoud en de processen die aan de orde zijn 
geweest tijdens de onderhandelingen gedurende de klimaatconferentie in Kopenhagen in 2009. 
Tevens worden de beleidsstandpunten van landen over internationale ecologisch verantwoorde 
technologieoverdracht als mechanisme voor inperking van en aanpassing aan de 
klimaatsverandering tegen het licht gehouden. Beoordeeld wordt wat de uitkomsten kunnen 
betekenen voor de bevordering van internationale overdracht van klimaattechnologie. Ook wordt 
gekeken naar de oorzaken van het gebrek aan ambitieuze internationale overeenkomsten op 
het gebied van overdracht van klimaattechnologie. Dit deel van het onderzoek laat zien dat 
zodra een grote hoeveelheid landen tot een bepaalde overeenkomst is gekomen, het moeilijk is 
van dit pad af te wijken vanwege de inflexibiliteit die inherent is aan het voorafgaande proces om 
een internationaal institutionele overeenkomst te bereiken. Hoofdstuk 4 wordt afgesloten met de 
conclusie dat oorzaken van de grote verdeeldheid tussen de noordelijke en zuidelijke landen 
van de wereld en de redenen waarom onverenigbare voorkeuren blijven bestaan, niet gelegen 
zijn in de afwezigheid van gedeelde normen (bv. het belang van de strijd tegen de 
klimaatverandering), maar eerder in de omstandigheden die voortkomen uit het beginsel van 
'gedifferentieerde verantwoordelijkheden'. Dit kwam voor het eerst aan het licht bij de Byrd-
Hagel-resolutie, waardoor het Kyotoprotocol feitelijk werd verlamd. Het beginsel van 
gedifferentieerde verantwoordelijkheden, dat dateert van de oprichting van het UNFCCC, bleek 
een groot knelpunt tijdens de conferentie in Kopenhagen en in daaropvolgende bijeenkomsten 
dat de concrete vooruitgang in de internationale onderhandelingen over het klimaatbeleid 
belemmerde. Het historisch institutionalisme dat besloten ligt in het beginsel van 
'gedifferentieerde verantwoordelijkheden' van het internationale klimaatbeleid in het kader van 
het UNFCCC, heeft geleid tot de zeer simplistische onderverdeling van technologieoverdracht in 
noord en zuid. De resultaten in hoofdstuk 5 komen echter niet overeen met de traditionele 
karakterisering van overdracht van ontwikkelde landen naar ontwikkelingslanden en van noord 
naar zuid als de voornaamste vorm van technologieoverdracht.  
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De onderzoeksbevindingen in de hoofdstukken 4 en 5 duiden er op dat de harmonisatie 
van het nationale en het internationale niveau zich met name op twee aspecten toespitst: Ten 
eerste vinden de inspiratie opgedaan door en de invloed van de alliantie G77+China voor 
internationaal klimaatbeleid in het kader van het UNFCCC hun weerslag in het 
overdrachtsproces van klimaattechnologie op het nationale niveau van een ontwikkelingsland. 
Het tweede aspect is het feit dat de regeringen van ontwikkelingslanden hebben getracht en nog 
steeds trachten hun nationaal beleid vorm te geven of te hervormen naar de behoeften van het 
mondiale klimaatbeleid in het kader van het UNFCCC, ook al gaan deze wijzigingen in nationaal 
beleid nog niet ver genoeg. 
 
In de nationale component van het proefschrift (hoofdstuk 5) wordt de rol van 
ontwikkelingslanden als ontwikkelaar en ontvanger van internationale technologische innovaties 
benadrukt. Ondanks het feit dat de economische vooruitgang en de technologische verfijning in 
specifieke ontwikkelingslanden algemeen worden erkend, hebben deze wijzigingen afgezet 
tegen de internationale technologiestroom relatief weinig aandacht gekregen binnen het 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek en zijn er geen coherente internationale beleidsmaatregelen in het 
kader van het UNFCCC. Hoofdstuk 5 van het proefschrift gaat dieper in op het potentieel, de 
kenmerken en de relevantie van zuid-zuid-samenwerking als het nieuwe technologie- 
overdrachtsparadigma voor internationale, ecologisch verantwoorde technologieoverdracht. 
Daarbij wordt de rol van ontwikkelingslanden als ontwikkelaar en als ontvanger van 
technologische innovaties benadrukt. De bewijsmiddelen voor dit deel van het proefschrift 
inzake zuid-zuid-overdracht van klimaattechnologie zijn afkomstig van een analyse van de 
situatie in Ethiopië. Het bewijsmateriaal wijst erop dat de technologische samenwerking van de 
minst ontwikkelde landen, zoals Ethiopië, met ontwikkelde landen aan het afnemen is. 
Samenwerking met het zuidelijk halfrond komt hiervoor in de plaats. 
 
In het onderzoek wordt echter geconcludeerd dat de zuid-zuid-overdracht geen alternatief is 
voor de overdracht vanuit het noorden. Het is slechts een belangrijke aanvulling hierop, met als 
doel de stroom van technologie naar ontwikkelingslanden te bevorderen. Het onderzoek heeft 
geen aanwijzingen uit de beleidspraktijk opgeleverd dat behoud van natuurlijke hulpbronnen een 
motivatie vormt voor deze zuid-zuid-overdracht van klimaattechnologie. Politieke solidariteit in 
internationale klimaatregelingen tussen de landen op het zuidelijk halfrond vormt evenmin een 
grote motivatie voor de zuid-zuid-overdracht van klimaattechnologie. Uit het hoofdstuk blijkt dat 
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er binnen de zuid-zuid-overdracht van klimaattechnologie ook een gebrek aan steun is voor 
verbetering van de institutionele infrastructuur van het land waaraan de overdracht plaatsvindt. 
Tevens heeft de opkomst van het staatskapitalisme de betrokkenheid van de private sector als 
motor van innovatie beperkt. Bovendien wordt de zuid-zuid-overdracht van klimaattechnologie 
gekenmerkt door beperkte interactie van lokale bedrijven binnen de toeleveringsketen en 
beperkingen bij het veranderen van de oneerlijke noord-zuid-handelsbetrekkingen. Deze 
beperkingen leggen de behoefte bloot aan adequate en effectieve beleidsmaatregelen om de 
netto voordelen van ontvangende landen te optimaliseren en te zorgen voor een win-winsituatie 
bij technologische samenwerking. De overdracht van klimaattechnologie van de landen van het 
noordelijk halfrond naar die van het zuidelijk halfrond, zoals besproken in hoofdstuk 4, is 
kenmerkend voor het klimaatbeleid op internationaal niveau in het kader van het UNFCCC. Dit 
komt niet overeen met nationale beleidsmaatregelen en strategieën, die meer geneigd zijn tot 
zuid-zuid-overdracht. In beleidsdocumenten van ontwikkelingslanden, zoals beschreven in 
hoofdstuk 5, heeft zuid-zuid-overdracht de voorkeur, en niet noord-zuid-overdracht. Zuid-zuid-
overdracht wordt gekarakteriseerd als een technologische samenwerking gebaseerd op 
inachtneming van nationale soevereiniteit, nationale ownership en onafhankelijkheid, gelijkheid, 
niet-voorwaardelijkheid, het uitblijven van bemoeienis, en wederzijds profijt. Deze 
karakterisering, die behalve in de beleidsdocumenten ook terug te vinden is in de opvattingen 
van politici in ontwikkelingslanden, komt overeen met de solidariteitsgeest van de G77+China in 
internationale klimaatonderhandelingen. Op dit punt kan een raakvlak tussen de strategieën op 
nationaal niveau en het internationale beleid inzake klimaatregelingen worden geobserveerd. De 
alliantie G77+China is voortgekomen uit het historisch institutionalisme dat besloten ligt in het 
beginsel van 'gedifferentieerde verantwoordelijkheden'. In hoofdstuk 6 van het proefschrift wordt 
aandacht besteed aan de uitvoering van nationale beleidsmaatregelen op lokaal niveau in de 
context van internationale onderhandelingen. Het hoofdstuk behandelt de beperkingen van de 
bestaande vakliteratuur om aan de hand van empirisch bewijs van kleinschaligere eenheden 
nadere gegevens te verstrekken over de overdracht van klimaattechnologie in ruimere zin. 
Tevens wordt aandacht besteed aan de beperkingen van studies waarbij alleen gekeken wordt 
naar het gezichtspunt van actoren die betrokken zijn bij de feitelijke overdrachtsactiviteiten ten 
aanzien van klimaattechnologie. Als voortzetting van het onderzoek op nationaal niveau 
(hoofdstuk 5) bevat de studie op bedrijfsniveau ook een analyse van Ethiopië als gastland voor 
technologieoverdracht met andere ontwikkelingslanden en ontwikkelde landen als ontwikkelaar 
van technologieoverdracht. In Ethiopië zijn drie projecten geselecteerd als casestudy met de 
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bedoeling om de overdracht van klimaattechnologie als opkomend verschijnsel te bestuderen en 
om de doelmatigheid van de technologische samenwerkingsmodaliteiten ter bevordering 
daarvan te beoordelen. 
In het proefschrift wordt de doelmatigheid onderzocht van noord-zuid-overdracht, zuid-
zuid-overdracht en noord-zuid-zuid-overdracht van klimaattechnologie, bezien door de bril van 
het vermogen van een bedrijf om toegang te krijgen tot informatie en om de uit externe bronnen 
verkregen kennis ook daadwerkelijk te gebruiken. Deze drie samenwerkingsmodaliteiten worden 
vergeleken, en de effectiviteit ervan voor het verbeteren van de technologieoverdracht op 
bedrijfsniveau gepeild. De doelmatigheid van de overdracht van klimaattechnologie op 
bedrijfsniveau wordt beoordeeld door te kijken naar de afzonderlijke en gecombineerde effecten 
die het bedrijfsnetwerk en de absorptiecapaciteit hebben op de overdracht van 
klimaattechnologie. 
Voor deze component van het onderzoek luidt de onderzoeksvraag als volgt: hoe 
effectief zijn de internationale samenwerkingsmodaliteiten (noord-zuid, zuid-zuid en noord-zuid-
zuid) voor het verbeteren van de overdracht van klimaattechnologie op bedrijfsniveau? 
 
De drie samenwerkingsvormen (noord-zuid, zuid-zuid en noord-zuid-zuid) hebben elk hun 
specifieke kenmerken en resulteren in een ongelijke mate van effectiviteit van de 
technologieoverdracht. In alle drie de samenwerkingsvormen is sprake van technologische 
capaciteit, maar de mate waarin verschilt sterk. De resultaten wijzen op de complementaire aard 
van noord-zuid- en zuid-zuid-overdracht, en bevestigen dat noord-zuid-zuid-overdracht een 
belangrijke manier is om de effectiviteit van deze complementariteit te vergroten en om de 
technologieoverdracht te bevorderden omdat hierin de relatieve voordelen van noord-zuid- en 
zuid-zuid-overdracht worden verenigd. De resultaten van het onderzoek op nationaal niveau 
(hoofdstuk 5) en dat op bedrijfsniveau (hoofdstuk 6) laten zien dat er punten van 
overeenstemming bestaan tussen nationale strategieën en lokale praktijken voor overdracht van 
klimaattechnologie. Deze kunnen worden verklaard door het feit dat regeringen van de minst 
ontwikkelde landen, zoals Ethiopië, een vraag naar klimaattechnologie op bedrijfsniveau hebben 
gecreëerd door middel van hun nationale beleidsmaatregelen en strategieën. Bovendien neigt 
nationaal beleid naar staatskapitalisme (de 'ontwikkelingsstaat'), zoals wordt weerspiegeld in de 
focus die regeringen van ontwikkelingslanden zoals Ethiopië hebben om bedrijven in staatsbezit 
op te richten dan wel te versterken. Bijgevolg wordt de technologische samenwerking in de zin 
van zuid-zuid-overdracht op bedrijfsniveau gedomineerd door bedrijven in staatsbezit (bv. 
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samenwerking tussen een Ethiopisch bedrijf in staatsbezit en een bedrijf in staatsbezit in een 
ander ontwikkelingsland, met name China). De afstemming tussen het klimaatbeleid op 
nationaal niveau en de overdrachtspraktijken ten aanzien van klimaattechnologie op 
bedrijfsniveau wordt echter door bepaalde factoren gehinderd. In tegenstelling tot de ambities 
van nationale regeringen om de lokale bedrijfscapaciteit door middel van internationale 
technologische samenwerking op basis van zuid-zuid-overdracht te vergroten, blijkt uit dit 
onderzoek bijvoorbeeld dat er binnen de zuid-zuid-overdracht slechts beperkte verbanden zijn 
tussen mondiale ondernemingen en lokale bedrijven en dat dit gebrek aan betrekkingen de 
doelmatigheid van de overdracht van klimaattechnologie negatief beïnvloedt. Hierdoor wordt de 
technologieoverdracht vanuit het zuidelijk halfrond minder effectief vergeleken met de 
technologiestromen binnen de noord-zuid- en noord-zuid-zuid-overdracht. 
Aan de andere kant van de meerlagige besluitvormingsstructuren kan gezegd worden 
dat het feit dat het internationale klimaatregime vooral gericht is op noord-zuid-overdracht 
(hoofdstuk 4) en de geringe aandacht voor zuid-zuid-overdracht in strijd zijn met de resultaten 
van de studie op bedrijfsniveau (hoofdstuk 6). Hieruit blijkt namelijk de complementaire aard van 
noord-zuid-overdracht en zuid-zuid-overdracht op bedrijfsniveau. Tevens geeft het onderzoek op 
bedrijfsniveau de relatief grotere effectiviteit aan van noord-zuid-zuid-overdracht. 
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